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LAW & MORALITY IN AFRICA: TOWARDS A RATIONAL 
PUBLIC POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING INTIMATE 
HUMAN CONDUCT IN GHANA 	
Kwaku Agyeman-Budu* 
 
ABSTRACT1 
 
Law and morality have always been uneasy bedfellows; for whose morality should the 
law protect and enforce? Is there a collective form or sense of morality that societies 
accept and agree to be bound by at any particular point in time? If so, how is this done? 
What does morality even mean? And should the law concern itself with enforcing 
religious and/or cultural moral codes in the modern secular State? These and other 
questions have been at the heart of philosophical and jurisprudential debates concerning 
the intersection between law and morality and its impact on public policy from time 
immemorial. This dissertation is therefore an attempt to revisit and review the concept of 
morality from the perspective of law and public policy in a modern African State. The 
main focus of the dissertation is to examine and evaluate the moral content and 
underpinnings of the offence of sex work in Ghana, and propose a new neutral form of 
“morality” that is more rational, devoid of stigma and is incapable of being used as 
justification for criminalization of the conduct of persons who are the subject matter of 
the offence in question. Ultimately, the dissertation proposes a new approach to dealing 
with criminal offences that involve the balancing of individual autonomy of action and 
the legitimate State interest in regulating the scope and extent of such conduct or actions, 
since the old approach has not only failed, but has also led to the proliferation of sex 
work in Ghana over the years. 
 
 
 																																																								
* Doctor of Juridical Science (S.J.D.) Candidate and Doctoral Fellow, Fordham University School of Law. 
1 The S.J.D. dissertation project of the author focuses on the intersection between law and morality in 
1 The S.J.D. dissertation project of the author focuses on the intersection between law and morality in 
Africa, and proposes a new approach to dealing with criminal offences (like sex work), which involve the 
balancing of individual autonomy and legitimate State interest in regulating such conduct in Ghana. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
“As a general proposition it will be universally accepted that the law is not concerned with private morals 
or with ethical sanctions. On the other hand, the law is plainly concerned with the outward conduct of 
citizens in so far as the conduct injuriously affects the rights of other citizens. Certain forms of conduct it 
has always been thought right to bring within the scope of the criminal law on account of the injury which 
they occasion to the public in general.” The Street Offences Committee Report, 1928. 
 
A) OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION TOPIC 
 
The morality of laws has always been deemed critical in some quarters in terms of the 
validity of laws in the first place.2 A law that conforms to certain moral precepts and 
dictates was seen by many as law that was whole.3 On the contrary, laws that lacked 
fundamental moral content were seen as either incomplete, or lacking the necessary 
quality of law that all laws necessarily required.4 Discussions on morality however have 
been a very slippery-slope from time immemorial, for many scholars and theorists have 
tried in vain to fully conceptualize or understand the value and essence of law in itself, 
and the idea of inherent morality of laws.5 For example, questions involving the moral 
construct of law have never been fully resolved despite the vast amount of literature that 
exists on that particular subject matter.6 
																																																								
2 Mark C. Murphy, 'Natural Law Jurisprudence', 9 LEGAL THEORY 241-67 (2003).  
3 John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEVELAND S. L. REV. 1-13 (1990). 
4 John Finnis, The “Natural Law Tradition”, 36 J. L. EDUCATION 492-95 (1986). 
5 Brian Bix, On the Dividing Line Between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1613-24 (2000). 
6 See for example, J.V. Gomez, The Hart Fuller Debate, PHILOSOPHY COMPASS, 9: 45-53 (2014); B. 
Zipursky, Practical Positivism versus Practical Perfectionism: The Hart-Fuller Debate at Fifty, NYU LAW 
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Also, even more fundamental questions like what morality even means remain 
controversial, as there are a plethora of views and ideas in that regard. Some schools of 
thought are of the view that morality refers to certain variables that dictate the inner or 
inherent quality of rules and regulations.7 There are also other schools of thought that do 
not necessarily ascribe any inherent quality to rules and regulations, but rather view 
morality from the perspective of ideals that societies from time to time agree to have as a 
sort of moral conscience that dictate day to day life.8 Others also view morality purely 
and solely from a religious perspective.9 Hence, Judeo-Christian conceptions of morality 
have been the foundation and fundamental basis for many laws that have been 
promulgated in most parts of the world for more than two centuries.10 
 
Similarly, for many years now, scholars and philosophers have attempted to 
define what a crime is, and its essence.11 Although there isn’t a universally accepted 
definition of what a crime is, it is generally understood to mean acts and omissions which 
are prohibited by law, and which attract penal consequences for their breach thereof.12 
Crime has also been described as a legal wrong, which is usually followed by criminal 
proceedings resulting in some form of punishment.13 In the famous case of Amand v. 																																																																																																																																																																					
REV., Vol. 83: 1170 (2008); G. Dworkin, Devlin was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality, 40 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 927 (1999); J. Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harmless Wrongdoing 
(1988); R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977); and P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965).	
7 LON. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). 
8 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARVARD L. REV. 593-629 (1958). 
9 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAWS AND NATURAL RIGHTS 371-413 (1980). 
10 Id.  
11 See COURTNEY STANHOPE KENNY, OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL LAW 16 (1936) (“crime is a wrong whose 
sanction is punitive, and which is in no way remissible by any private person, but is remissible by the 
crown alone, if remissible at all.”); see also, GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, LEARNING THE LAW 27 (1983) 
(defining crime as “a legal wrong that can be followed by criminal proceedings which may result in 
punishment.” 
12 WILLIAMS supra at 27. 
13 Id.  
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Home Secretary and Minister of Defence of Royal Netherlands Government it was held 
that ‘a cause or matter is criminal in nature if it is one which if carried to its conclusion 
might result in the conviction of a person charged and in a sentence or some 
punishment.’14 The Criminal Offences Act of Ghana15 defines a crime as ‘any act 
punishable by death or imprisonment or fine.’16  
 
In Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney General for Canada, Lord 
Atkin held as follows: ‘[t]he domain of criminal jurisprudence can only be ascertained 
by examining what acts at any particular period are declared by the State to be crimes, 
and the only common nature they will be found to possess is that they are prohibited by 
the State and that those who commit them are punished.’ 17  From the foregoing 
description, we may deduce three essential elements or characteristics constituting a 
crime: (1) a prohibited act; (2) prohibited by law or a statute for the time being in force; 
and (3) the provision of penal consequences for breach thereof. Thus, when a State 
considers an act and/or omission injurious to the public welfare, then the doing of any 
such act or an omission thereof is prohibited. The prohibition must however be made 
under the authority of law – a statute in force. Finally, there must be penal consequences 
associated with the prohibited act. 
 
																																																								
14 Amand v. Home Secretary and Minister of Defence of Royal Netherlands Government, [1943] AC 147. 
15 See Criminal Offences Act (Act 29) (1960) (Ghana). 
16 Id. § 1. 
17 Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney General for Canada, [1931] AC 310; see also id. at 
324 (“the criminal quality of an act cannot be discerned by intuition; nor can it be discovered by reference 
to any standard but one: is the act prohibited with penal consequences?”). 
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The 1992 Constitution of Ghana therefore provides that: ‘[n]o person shall be 
convicted of a criminal offence unless the offence is defined and the penalty for it is 
prescribed in a written law.’18 An act or omission cannot therefore be a crime unless it is 
expressly prohibited by law, which is known to all, and the punishment is also provided 
for. This principle of legality is what has been captured by the famous Latin expression 
‘nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege.’19 It must be noted that the penalties for 
the infraction of the criminal law are almost never pleasant, including imprisonment, fine, 
and death. It has thus been asserted, although arguable, that it is as a result of these 
potentially unpleasant consequences that obedience to the criminal law is usually 
achieved.20 
 
The essence of the criminal law is therefore to regulate human conduct for social 
cohesion. Without it, there will be chaos, as human beings will be free to engage in acts 
that are likely to be inimical to the progress of society in general, and human 
development in particular. It is important to therefore note that crimes are considered to 
be injurious to the State as a whole, and not just the victim. It is therefore the State that is 
usually mandated to seek redress for such wrongs, and not necessarily the individual 
victim of the crime, no matter how heinous it may have been. 
 
This dissertation is an attempt to revisit the oft-debated relationship between law 
– in particular, the criminal law – and morality, and the place of both within the realm of 																																																								
18 See CONSTITUTION Art. 19(11) (1992) (Ghana). 
19 Or, “an act is not a crime unless it is expressly prohibited by law.” 
20 See Annalise Acorn, Fear of Crime and Punishment, 1 J. THEORETICAL & PHIL. CRIMINOL. 79–89 (2009; 
see also, Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Why do Criminals Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and 
Social Networks on Active Offenders, 102 J. THEORETICAL & PHIL. CRIMINOL. 397–440 (2012).  
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public policy making. It focuses on how conceptions of religious and cultural morality 
have over the years been the driving force for the continuous criminalization of certain 
conduct in Ghana, which involve individual autonomy but is fraught with moral 
judgments and negative stereotypes. For example, prostitution or sex work,21 sometimes 
referred to as the oldest profession in the world, remains criminalized in Ghana as in most 
parts of the world.22 Many States still have restrictive laws that prohibit the act of sex 
work and solicitation in public places.23 However, to suggest that sex work thrives 
despite this criminalization would actually be an understatement. For example, in Ghana, 
it is a notorious fact that the “night sex trade” has become a permanent fixture of nightlife 
in the urban centers like Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi, to the extent that certain areas 
have become known “hotspots” and are synonymous with the sex trade.24 It is also a 
known fact that the law enforcement agencies, especially the police, continuously and 
consistently exploit these vulnerable women who are engaged in the trade, for monetary 
gain, in light of the criminalization of the sex trade.25 
 
The aim of this dissertation is therefore to examine in detail the social cost of the 
criminalization of sex work in Ghana. It is argued for example that the continuous 
criminalization of sex work on moral grounds violates fundamental human rights and is 																																																								
21 Both words i.e. ‘prostitution’ and ‘sex work’ are used interchangeably throughout this dissertation, as 
they connote the same activity. 
22 Criminal Code §§ 107(1), 273–77, amendments consolidated in Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, No. 
646 (2003). 
23 See, e.g., Chi Mgbako and Laura A. Smith, Sex Work and Human Rights in Africa, 33 FORDHAM INT'L 
L.J. 1178 (2009), citing Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia as States 
criminalizing prostitution and its procurement. 
24  INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, GHANA, BEHAVIOURAL STUDY OF FEMALE SEX 
WORKERS ALONG GHANA’S TEMA‐PAGA TRANSPORT CORRIDOR 9 (2012). 
25 See Kwaku Baka, Ghana Police Sweeps, INTER PRESS SERVICE THIRD WORLD NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 6, 
1998) http://walnet.org/csis/news/world_98/ips-980806.html. 
	 13	
contrary to constitutional dictates. Thus, a newer, more rational and morally neutral based 
approach is required in regulating sex work as a profession or trade, subject to specific 
rules and regulations that balance legitimate State interest (including public health and 
“moral” concerns, for example) with individual liberty and autonomy of action 
implicating the right to work and to make a decent, honest living, free from victimization 
and stigma, as well as the rights to dignity and equality. The dissertation is therefore an 
exercise in social construction that envisages a new approach to public policy, where law 
and morality intersect. It proposes a new framework within which public policy is 
underpinned by not just religious and cultural conceptions of morality, but by a new 
neutral form of morality based on respect for the fundamental human rights principles of 
dignity, individual autonomy and equality. 
 
B) JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY 
 
Criminal offences are important in legal systems to provide punishment for 
persons who violate the underlying fundamental social norms that the society through law 
seeks to protect. However, the conceptualization and framing of some of these offences, 
especially those purportedly prohibited as a result of religious and culturally based 
“moral” convictions especially in Africa generally and Ghana in particular, present 
problems in terms of having a coherent and rational public policy regime or framework 
for the regulation of particular acts. This then makes it difficult for the full realization of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the rapidly developing and increasingly 
changing socio-cultural context of Ghana. In this section, I discuss my reasons for 
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pursuing this topic in the first place, and its relevance for the development of the law in 
Ghana. 
 
1. Reasons for pursuing the topic 
i. Interest & Knowledge Gap 
Sexual offences and those involving intimate decisions predicated on individual 
autonomy have been an often-neglected area of the law in Ghana, in terms of scholarly 
interest and research. This stems from the fact that it is generally assumed and agreed that 
it is important to regulate such conduct, especially those acts that involve some violation, 
whether as a result of the lack of consent, the age of the victim or fundamental societal 
concerns regarding sexual morality and the maintenance of the religious and cultural 
beliefs and values of the people. For example, the crime of rape is important in any legal 
system to provide punishment for persons who sexually violate other persons without 
their consent. Similarly, “defilement” or statutory rape is an important crime intended to 
punish persons who sexually violate the chastity of children. Also in Ghana, the cultural 
context, as well as the religious and moral inclination of an overwhelming majority of the 
people means that the law prohibiting sex work is generally accepted without much 
question as morally opprobrious.26  
 
																																																								
26 Jacquelyn C.A. Meshelemiah, Tourism and Prostitution in West Africa: A Glimpse of the “Roamers” in 
Ghana, in, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING: AFRICA, ASIA, MIDDLE EAST, 
AND OCEANIA 31, 40 (2011) (citing examples of sex workers characterized as “inferior,” “contagious,” a 
generative source of all that is bad and wrong and rotten with sex,” “immoral,” “shameful,” and 
“avaricious”).  
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As a result of the general acceptance of the utility of these aforementioned crimes 
in preventing and punishing sexual violations of women and children (in the cases of 
Rape and Defilement respectively), and maintaining the religious, cultural and moral 
fiber of the society (with respect to the crime of prostitution, which effectively prohibits 
sex work), there has not been any serious academic and scholarly exposition regarding 
any of these offences generally over the years in Ghana.27 The jurisprudence of the courts 
in Ghana also suggests that they have not critically examined any of these offences in any 
great detail over the years. They have merely tended to apply the laws as they are, 
without engaging in any serious critique of the conceptualization of the offences. In 
particular reference to sex work, there have been few reported trials and dispositions in 
the past.28 There therefore exists a serious knowledge gap that urgently needs to be filled, 
in terms of critically exploring the conceptualization and framing of these types of laws 
within the Ghanaian context and how they implicate human rights in general, and the 
rights of specific groups of people in particular – devoid of any form of gender 
stereotypes, stigma, biases and prejudice.       
  
ii. Law Reform 
The knowledge gap that exists in relation to intimate sexual offences in Ghana 
also means that there is significant room for law reform to bring Ghanaian law in 
																																																								
27 For example, see P.K. TWUMASI, CRIMINAL LAW IN GHANA (1985); HENRIETTA J.A.N. MENSA-BONSU, 1 
THE GENERAL PART OF CRIMINAL LAW – A GHANAIAN CASEBOOK (2001); HENRIETTA J.A.N. MENSA-
BONSU, 2 THE GENERAL PART OF CRIMINAL LAW – A GHANAIAN CASEBOOK (2006) and HENRIETTA J.A.N. 
MENSA-BONSU, THE ANNOTATED CRIMINAL OFFENCES ACT OF GHANA, (5th Ed., 2008), none of which 
discuss sexual offences in any detail. 
28 For case studies of the few prosecutions under these laws, see United States State Department, 2016 
Trafficking in Persons Report, OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (June 2016), 
https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2016/258773.htm. 
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consonance with contemporary realities, which have been neglected for far too long. For 
example, prostitution is defined in section 279 of the Criminal Offences Act of Ghana as 
including ‘the offering by a person of that person’s body commonly for acts of lewdness 
for payment although there is no act or offer of an act or ordinary sexual connection.’29 
Furthermore, section 276 of Act 29 prohibits solicitation or importuning by sex workers. 
Specifically, section 276(1) stipulates that: 
 
A person who persistently solicits or importunes in a public place or in sight of a 
public place for the purpose of prostitution commits a criminal offence and is 
liable to a fine not exceeding twenty-five penalty units and for a second or 
subsequent offence shall be dealt with as for a misdemeanor.30 
 
A reasonable inference that can be made from these provisions is that the law does not 
necessarily criminalize the fact of being a sex worker or sex work generally for that 
matter, rather it prohibits sex workers from seeking clients in public and other ancillary 
places,31 and criminalizes the fact of ‘aiding, abetting or compelling the prostitution for 
purposes of living off the earnings of prostitutes,’ (pimping)32 and keeping of brothels.33  
 
																																																								
29 Criminal Offences Act § 279.  
30 It is however important to note that section 276(2) provides that “[a] person shall not be tried for an 
offence in this section without the consent of a superior police officer but this shall not prevent the arrest, 
or the issue of a warrant for the arrest, of a person in respect of any officer or the remanding in custody or 
on bad of any person charged with an offence notwithstanding that such consent has not been obtained.” Id. 
§ 276(2). 
31 Id. § 276(1). 
32 Id. § 274. 
33 Id. § 277.  
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 The problem with this construction of the law not particularly criminalizing the 
fact of being a sex worker or sex work but rather prohibiting acts amounting to 
solicitation or importuning within the meaning of the law, and living off the earnings of 
prostitutes and keeping a brothel,34 is that it is gravely ambiguous and incoherent. For 
instance, section 107(1)(a), which criminalizes the offense of “procuration,” seems to 
suggest the fact that it is possible for persons over the age of twenty-one years to be sex 
workers or otherwise engaged in sex work.35 Specifically, this statute prohibits the 
trafficking of persons under the age of 21 for the purposes of “carnal connexion,” so long 
as those persons are not considered to be ‘a prostitute or of known immoral character’.36 
Similarly, section 108 of Act 29, which prohibits the seduction or prostitution of children 
below sixteen years of age, acknowledges the fact of the existence of sex workers and sex 
work generally.37 Section 108(2) provides that ‘For the purposes of subsection (1), a 
person causes or encourages the seduction, carnal knowledge or unnatural carnal 
knowledge, prostitution or commission of indecent assault on a child, if that person 
knowingly allows the child to consort with, enter or continue in the employment of a 
prostitute or person of known immoral character’.38 Emphasis added. It is important to 
note that none of these provisions make it a criminal offence to be a sex worker or be 
engaged in sex work.39 
 
																																																								
34 Id. § 107(1)(a). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. § 108. 
38 Id. § 108(2). 
39 Save for solicitation or importuning in public places, and other persons assisting for the purposes of 
living off the earnings of prostitutes and keeping brothels for purposes of prostitution. 
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 The above provisions notwithstanding, other provisions of the Act dealing with 
prostitution criminalize the fact of living wholly or in part on the earnings of 
prostitution, 40  exercising ‘control, direction or influence over the movements of a 
prostitute in a manner as to aid, abet or compel the prostitution’,41 and keeping of 
brothels for the purposes of prostitution.42 Similarly, section 275 provides that: 
 
A person commits a misdemeanor who in a public place or in sight of a public 
place persistently solicits or importunes 
(a) to obtain clients for a prostitute, or 
(b) for any other immoral purposes.43 
 
In the same vain, and as already noted, persons who persistently solicit or importune in 
public and other ancillary places also commit a criminal offence. Therein lies the 
ambiguity and incoherence in the law; for if solicitation and importuning for clients or for 
other immoral purposes by or on behalf of a sex worker, and the keeping of brothels for 
sex work are criminalized, what about other means of solicitation and importuning which 
do not have the “public place nexus” and do not take place in a brothel?44 Is it the case 
that the law recognizes “private immorality”?45 Consequently, what if a person engages 
the services of a middleman who is expressly given the responsibility to “recruit” clients 
																																																								
40 Id. § 274(1)(a).  
41 Id. § 274(1)(b). 
42 Id. § 277.  
43 Id. § 275. 
44 See John Agbemabiese, Cyberfraud: A New Force and Threat to Ghana’s Image and Security. GRAPHIC 
ONLINE. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://graphic.com.gh/features/ cyber-fraud-a-new-force-and-threat-to- ghanas-
image-and-security.html (citing increase in child sex trafficking due to increased access to internet 
communications technologies).  
45 See H.L.A. HART. LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963). 
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for said prostitute at a fee? Will the middleman be liable to prosecution for the offences 
of soliciting or importuning and living off the earnings of prostitutes? What of 
contemporary means of solicitation and importuning through social media platforms like 
WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, or even escort websites?46 Are these platforms 
to be considered “public places” for the purposes of the law?  
 
 To stoke the controversy even further, how do we place sex tourism, and other 
contemporary means of sex work and sex trade that occur in not only most of the 
prestigious hotels in Ghana, but also at contemporary “Movie Houses”?47 It is a notorious 
fact in recent times, that some hotels and their employees engage in the recruitment of 
both men and women – but especially women – for sexual purposes for their guests or 
customers.48 Also, it is alleged that some persons known or alleged to be prostitutes or of 
immoral character are seen frequenting hotel lounges and bars in the hopes of “hooking 
up” with potential clients.49 In recent times, there has also been the proliferation of 
“Movie Houses” that offer rooms for a few hours to clients, ostensibly for the purposes of 
private movie screenings. It is however a known fact that these so-called movie houses 
knowingly and deliberately facilitate the sex trade as well as ordinary sexual encounters 
by couples, as they provide a cheaper option than hotels.50 This thus leads to the question 
of what the definition of a brothel is. According to section 279 of Act 29, a brothel means 
																																																								
46 Agbemabiese, supra note 44.  
47 The New Form of Brothels, THE HERALD (Aug. 3, 2015), http://theheraldghana.com/new-form-of-
brothels-pop-up-in-accra/. 
48 See, MATILDA PAPPOE, THE STATUS OF FEMALE PROSTITUTION IN GHANA (1996); See also, Two 
Nigerians arrested for human trafficking, GHANAWEB (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Two-Nigerians-arrested-for-human-
trafficking-523693. 
49 Meshelemiah, supra note 26 at 36.  
50 See The New Form of Brothels, supra note 47. 
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‘any premises or room or set of rooms in any premises kept for purposes of 
prostitution.’51 Since it is a notorious fact that the managers of some of the hotels and 
movie houses (which for all intents and purposes are public places) in Ghana knowingly 
permit or must be deemed to knowingly permit sex work within rooms in their premises, 
these hotels and movie houses must also be deemed to be brothels within the meaning of 
the law.52 
 
However, aside from the proscription or prohibition of the seduction or 
prostitution of minors – which is totally understandable because of the sexual violation it 
portends due to their immaturity – sexual and otherwise, and sex trafficking,53 the 
question remains whether it is the proper function of the criminal law to regulate private 
consensual adult sexual conduct (albeit involving payment as a quid pro quo), of which 
there are no victims. How does the State even begin to enforce such an offence, the 
substance of which by its nature is purely private, and thus incapable of enforcement 
without incursions into the privacy of the homes and sexual lives of consenting adults?54 
Moreover, technological advancement and the availability of various social media 
platforms means that new means and mediums of solicitation and importuning for the 
purposes of sex work are now in existence, and seemingly outside the remit of the law. 
 
																																																								
51 Note that, section 277 makes it an offence to keep a brothel. Thus, anyone who knowingly permits a 
premises or part thereof to be used as a brothel or for habitual prostitution commits a misdemeanor. 
52 Efia Akese, Sex Workers Adopt New Tactics, GRAPHIC ONLINE (Feb. 13, 2015), 
https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/sex-workers-adopt-new-tactics.html. 
53 The Human Trafficking Act (Act 694) (2005) (Ghana) prohibits sex trafficking in all its forms and 
manifestation, in line with International Law. 
54 See HART, supra note 45. 
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There is also the issue of the constitutionality of the laws that altogether prohibit 
sex work. The main dimension of this issue is that such prohibition violates the anti-
discrimination clause of Article 17 of the Constitution of Ghana, which prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, social or economic status. 55  Also, the 
proscription of sex work is arguably an affront to the right to work and to make a decent 
living as outlined in international human rights instruments like the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights UDHR),56 the International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR)57 and the African Charter on Human & Peoples Rights’ (Banjul 
Charter).58 The law also seemingly infringes on the inherent dignity that humans are 
deemed to possess, and can be seen as an affront on individual autonomy/liberty as well. 
 
Thus, the laws related to sex work are in need of fundamental reform not only 
because of their potential conflict with constitutional demands, but also because their 
conceptualization leads to ambiguity and incoherence, whilst social media and the 
advancement of technology has rendered them practically otiose to a large degree. In 
working towards reformation in this regard, there is the need for a rational and robust 
public policy framework that underpins these and other similar offences that are 
predicated on society’s fear of moral decay, maintenance of cultural purity and religious 
sanctity. It is my contention therefore that public policy dictates that form the basis for 
the regulation of the offences in question must not be solely based on religious and 
cultural conceptions of morality in the pluralistic society that is Ghana. Legislation based 																																																								
55 Constitution, Art. 17 (1992). 
56 See G.A. Res. 217(III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) art 1. 
57 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
58 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Jun. 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 
I.L.M. 58 (1982) 
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on these conceptions of morality alone regulates human conduct in a way that fails to 
ensure human progress, but rather drives the conduct that is the subject matter of the 
legislation underground and practically unenforceable, whilst violating fundamental 
human rights.59  
 
Unfortunately, the Constitution Review Commission of Ghana in its report did not 
touch on the issue of sex work in its various forms and manifestations.60 It is therefore 
now prudent more than ever for there to be an academic discussion and scholarly 
exposition grounded in law, which critically evaluates the contending positions in terms 
of the conceptualization of the crime of sex work in Ghana. Accordingly, this dissertation 
will serve as a useful resource of information and knowledge, and may provide the basis 
upon which any future reform of the law may be grounded.     
  
iii. Contribution to Scholarship 
The existence of a knowledge gap and the consequent need for law reform makes 
it imperative for the production of a work that will critically assess and examine the 
offences connected to sex work in light of contemporary thinking, realities and human 
rights norms and standards. As a result, this dissertation seeks to make an original and 
substantial contribution to legal scholarship especially in Ghana, and thereby pave the 
																																																								
59 See Isaac Kaledzi, Prostitutes in Ghana battle for recognition, DEUTSCHEWELLE (Aug. 21, 2013),  
http://www.dw.com/en/prostitutes-in-ghana-battle-for-recognition/av-17036797. 
60  The Constitution Review Commission in its report to the Government of Ghana did, however, 
recommend ratification and domestication of the Protocol on the Prevention of the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography. See CONSTITUTION REVIEW COMMISSION, FROM A POLITICAL TO A 
DEVELOPMENTAL CONSTITUTION: FINAL REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION REVIEW COMMISSION (2011), 
http://ghana.gov.gh/images/documents/crc_report.pdf. 
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way for further study and research into similarly placed and often-neglected and 
controversial areas of the law in Ghana. 
 
2. Relevance of the topic in Ghana 
i. Legislative & Policy Reform 
The dissertation may also possibly lead to legislative and policy reform. The goals 
of the dissertation are noble ones, which seek to soberly interrogate often-neglected and 
controversial issues regarding our criminal law, and thereby provide guidance on the way 
forward. As a result, a proposal for a new neutral form of morality based on respect for 
the fundamental human rights principles of dignity, individual autonomy and equality 
(D.I.E.) is strongly advocated for to form the basis of public policy in terms of the 
regulation of the offences connected to sex work and other intimate human conduct 
involving sex.           
  
ii. Enforcement and Realization of Fundamental Human Rights 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are guaranteed in Ghana by virtue of 
Chapter 5 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.61 In Ghana, the upholding of, and reverence 
for human rights in general has become part and parcel of our democratic dispensation 
since the coming into force of the Constitution in 1993.62 However, in terms of issues 																																																								
61 See CONSTITUTION ch. 5, arts. 12-33 (1992) (Ghana). 
62 The 1992 Constitution of Ghana entered into force on January 7th, 1993. However prior to this, Ghana’s 
history in terms of respect for and the promotion of human rights has been tumultuous to say the least, as 
judicial dereliction of duty in terms of protecting and enforcing human rights characterized the post-
independence period. Human rights in Ghana is therefore generally discussed in Chapter Five of this 
dissertation (Human Rights in Ghana) to discover how the concept has evolved through the decisions of the 
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involving sex, sexuality or sexual morality that have a human rights dimension, 
Ghanaians generally shy away from openly or publicly discussing them, largely due to 
long-held gender stereotypes, biases and prejudice. Religion and culture are also reasons 
why such matters are not usually publicly discussed. 
 
Thus, even though it is a notorious fact that many Ghanaians engage in acts that 
can easily be categorized as sex work within the meaning ascribed to prostitution and 
associated conduct by our criminal law, most people may nonetheless be oblivious to the 
fact that those acts may in fact be proscribed, and that their criminalization is probably 
even contrary to human rights as their enforcement by the State may constitute violations 
in and of itself. Therefore, this dissertation is a human rights-based critique of sex work 
that examines and critically analyzes certain aspects of the conceptualization of its 
associated offences, by measuring their compatibility with the fundamental human rights 
and freedoms provisions of the Constitution of Ghana, and thereby prescribing a new way 
of dealing with such human conduct within the Ghanaian context. It is the hope that the 
recommendations of this dissertation would eventually lead to litigation, in the form of 
public interest cases being brought before the Supreme Court, for the purposes of 
determining the constitutionality of those potentially discriminatory aspects of the 
offences in question.63 
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
courts in Ghana post-independence, in order to assess the likelihood of the future acceptance of the right to 
sex work and rights of sex workers as part of the fundamental rights available in Ghana. 
63 Litigation is advocated for as part of the recommendations of this dissertation only as a last resort. Other 
measures and activities must first be undertaken in the pursuance of legal reform, failing which litigation 
can be resorted to. Chapter Seven of this dissertation (Recommendations) thus outlines and discusses the 
specific recommendations for law reform in respect of sex work in Ghana in detail. 
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iii. Reference Materials for teaching and learning of Constitutional Law, 
Criminal Law, Human Rights Law & Legal Philosophy 
The knowledge gap that exists in relation to offences involving sexual morality in 
Ghana also means that, there is an urgent need for a well-researched scholarly work in 
this area of the law. This dissertation can therefore serve as a useful resource for the 
teaching and learning of Criminal Law and even Constitutional, Human Rights Law and 
Legal Philosophy at the many Law Faculties in Ghana, and the Ghana School of Law.64 
The dearth of knowledge and scholarly works in the area of Criminal Law in general in 
Ghana65 creates an urgent demand for such a work, which will contribute to illuminating 
this often-neglected aspect of the criminal law. 
 
C) METHODOLOGY & STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
In this part, I attempt to briefly outline the methodology and structure of the 
dissertation. It is important to reiterate that the dissertation seeks to propose a new public 
policy standard for the regulation of intimate human conduct, and is an exercise in 
dispassionately and impartially examining the utility, legality and constitutionality of one 
of the most important and controversial offences that exist in Ghana: sex work.  
  
1. Research Questions 
																																																								
64 There are about ten (10) Faculties of Law presently accredited in Ghana, and they all prescribe Criminal 
Law and Constitutional Law as Core Subjects, that all students must enroll and pass in their first year in 
order to progress. The Ghana School of Law also organizes a Post-Call Course (Bar Conversion course), 
where foreign trained attorneys are expected to study and pass certain core law subjects, including Criminal 
Law and Constitutional Law, in order to be admitted to the Ghana Bar. 
65 See note 27, supra. 
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By focusing on sex work in Ghana, a major goal of this dissertation is to ascertain 
the efficacy, utility and legality of this and other similarly placed offences in 
contemporary Ghana, within the broader context of fundamental human rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under Ghana’s Constitution and also in respect of Ghana’s regional 
and international human rights obligations. My research questions in this regard are as 
follows: 
 
a) Is it possible to develop a public policy framework for regulating sexual and 
private morality that is rational, devoid of stigma and incapable of being 
used as justification for criminalization of the conduct of persons who are the 
subject matter of offences like sex work?66 
 
b) Is the criminalization of aspects of sexual and private morality under the 
Criminal Offences Act of Ghana, 1960 (Act 29) constitutional?67 
 
2. Challenges 
The major challenges that I have encountered in writing this dissertation have 
been in respect of access to legal scholarship on the subject matter from a Ghanaian 
perspective. The general dearth in jurisprudential legal scholarship, and socio-legal 
research in Ghana for that matter has meant that I have had to rely extensively on foreign 
scholarship, especially in developing my theoretical framework (Chapters Two and 																																																								
66 Chapter Three of the dissertation (Theoretical Framework: A New Morality) is devoted to answering this 
question. Chapter Six (Constitutionality of Regulating Intimacy & Sexual Morality: Applying the D.I.E. 
Framework) proceeds to apply the framework with particular emphasis on sex work in Ghana. 
67  Chapter Six (Constitutionality of Regulating Intimacy & Sexual Morality: Applying the D.I.E. 
Framework) also examines the constitutionality of the law prohibiting sex work in Ghana. 
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Three) for a rational public policy regime that should underpin laws that tend to 
criminalize conduct that involve private and sexual morality. Also, the lack of adequate 
empirical research on the issue of law and morality in Ghana with specific reference to 
intimate human conduct has also hampered my ability to address the topic from a 
sociological point of view. That notwithstanding, I make references to the few available 
Ghanaian research on the subject matter. 
 
3. Dissertation Structure 
The dissertation structure is essentially an outline of each of the various 
constituent elements of the dissertation. What I attempt to do here therefore is to provide 
a concise summary of the structure in which the dissertation takes. Thus, the various 
Chapters of the dissertation are briefly summarized, highlighting the essence of these 
Chapters within the grand scheme of the overall dissertation objectives. 
 
The introductory chapter of the dissertation provides a broad and general 
overview of the major themes of the topic, and the controversies that the dissertation 
seeks to address. It also provides the justification for the study and its relevance for the 
development of law in Ghana. Chapter One therefore provides a road map and clearly 
outlines the themes that are discussed and examined throughout the dissertation, 
including a statement of the research questions. Chapter Two then delves into a review of 
the major works that have helped me formulate my thoughts and opinions regarding the 
intersection between law and morality. In Chapter Three, I attempt to propose a new form 
of morality, underpinned not just by religious and/or cultural beliefs, but also by the 
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universal human rights principles of Dignity, Individual autonomy and Equality (the 
D.I.E. framework for developing public policy).  
 
Chapter Four then critically examines sex work in Ghana from a historical 
perspective and traces the evolution of the practice and the law to present times. The law 
of prostitution is thus discussed extensively in light of what actually pertains today, as 
well as the social cost of criminalization. Chapter Five, traces the history of human rights 
in Ghana since independence and examine the consistency of the laws regarding sex 
work with the human rights guarantees provided for by Ghana’s 1992 Constitution, as 
well as Regional and International Human Rights treaties that Ghana is a state party to. In 
Chapter Six, the constitutionality of regulating sexual and private morality is analyzed 
using the proposed D.I.E. framework of public policy. The ‘Right to Sex Work’ is thus 
explored from a constitutional standpoint in this regard. Finally, Chapter Seven is the 
concluding part of the dissertation, where I make specific recommendations with regard 
to sex work and how to effectively regulate it in a rational and coherent manner. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Law and morality are two concepts that have puzzled scholars and theorists and led to 
countless debates from time immemorial. Theoretically speaking, the concept of “law” 
has been variously defined from many different perspectives and by many different 
scholars. Morality on the other hand is also quite dynamic, due to the difficulty of 
conceptualizing such a complicated idea. This state of flux regarding these two concepts 
and their relationship presents problems in terms of regulating some aspects of human 
behaviour through the criminal law – for example, sex work. The problem is further 
compounded as many people view law through the prism of what is rightful or wrongful 
moral conduct. Thus, the laws that govern societies are deemed to be some representation 
of, or form of moral capital that people wish to own, as mirroring the values of their 
society.68 In this Chapter of the dissertation, the concepts of law and morality are re-
examined and their relationship further explored; whilst situating the discussion within 
the context of the criminal offence of sex work in Ghana. I therefore attempt reviewing 
and critiquing some of the most important works within the field of legal philosophy that 
has shaped and continue to shape my thoughts on the subject matter of this dissertation. 
 
A) WHAT IS LAW? 
																																																								
68 Kenworthey Bilz and Janice Nadler, 'Law, Psychology & Morality, Moral Cognition and Decision 
Making: The Psychology Of Learning And Motivation,' in D. Medin, L. Skitka, C. W. Bauman, & D. Bartels 
(eds) (Vol. 50, Academic Press, 2009) 101-131, 101 
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There have been several attempts in the past century and beyond by various 
scholars and legal philosophers to define the essence, nature and characteristics of law.69 
Some of these works have been ground breaking and continue to receive wide acclaim.70 
However, the concept of “law” remains very controversial as there has not necessarily 
been a general acceptance of the nature of law.71 Defining what law means is rather 
elusive as several factors must be considered, and many seemingly contradictory 
positions must be balanced in order to begin appreciating law’s nature and scope.72 
Cairns, for example, notes the various descriptions that have been attached to law over 
the centuries in the following manner: 
 
We have been told by Plato that law is a form of social control, and instrument of 
the good life, the way to the discovery of reality, the true reality of the social 
structure; by Aristotle that it is a rule of conduct, a contract, an ideal of reason, a 
rule of decision, a form of order; by Cicero that it is the agreement of reason and 
nature, the distinction between the just and the unjust, a command or prohibition; 
by Aquinas that it is an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him 
who has care of the community, and promulgated; by Bacon that certainty is the 
prime necessity of law; by Hobbes that law is the command of the sovereign; by 
Spinoza that it is a plan of life; by Leibniz that its character is determined by the 
structure of society; by Locke that it is a norm established by the commonwealth; 																																																								
69 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); R. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW; AND H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1949). 
70 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW; I. KANT, 
GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS; H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (1967). 
71 See the Hart-Fuller and Hart-Dworkin debates for example. 
72 The relationship between law and morality exemplifies the theoretical debates that have exemplified the 
difficulty in appreciating the full nature and scope of law. 
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by Hume that it is a body of precepts; by Kant that it is a harmonizing of wills by 
means of universal rules in the interests of freedom; by Fichte that it is a relation 
between human beings; by Hegel that it is an unfolding or realizing of the idea of 
right.73 
 
The above notwithstanding, one of the most important works in terms of the 
definition, nature and scope of law is The Concept of Law by H.L.A. Hart.74 This work 
however transcends legal philosophy and is a useful guide to understanding social 
construction. As the author notes in the preface, ‘My aim in this book has been to further 
the understanding of law, coercion, and morality as different but related social 
phenomena. Though it is primarily designed for the student of jurisprudence, I hope it 
may also be of use to those whose chief interests are in moral or political philosophy, or 
in sociology, rather than in law.’75  I find the work in general intriguing, thought 
provoking and stimulating, because it addresses almost all aspects of the nature of law. 
As a matter of fact, this work is critical my understanding of legal philosophy generally, 
which in turn leads me to propose a new form of morality as the basis of public policy 
making where the criminal law is concerned in Chapter Three of this dissertation. As 
such, it is prudent that I begin my literature review with Hart’s work. 
 
In The Concept of Law, Hart devotes the first seven chapters to critical issues 
concerning the essence, nature and characteristics of law. Chapter One for example 
delves into a critical analysis of the age-old question – what is law? Hart suggests that for 																																																								
73 Huntington Cairns, Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel (The John's Hopkins Press, 1949). 
74 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). 
75 Id., The Preface. 
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many years several scholars, including lawyers, jurists and philosophers have pondered 
over this seemingly simplistic question without ever agreeing on a universally accepted 
answer. This, he attributes to the very problematic nature of law as a concept, and as a 
tool of social ordering.76 Thus, he suggests that the reason this inquiry into law seems to 
be a never-ending one is the fact that the concept itself is inherently vague, and somewhat 
stratified into several different categories, depending on the one making the inquiry, and 
the one who may perceive it from a distance.77 Hence, according to him, any inquiry 
relating to what law is must first begin with a critical examination of what the nature of 
law is i.e. the essential characteristics of the phenomenon.78  
 
Hart therefore believes that there are some recurring and fundamental issues that 
crop up in any discussion of the nature of law i.e. (1) that law tends to make some human 
conduct non-voluntary and obligatory; (2) that law and morality are sometimes viewed as 
two sides of the same coin; and (2) that law consists of rules.79 The aforementioned, in 
my opinion, seem to be the general characteristics of law as we know it. However, they 
present enormous problems for social ordering when applied in real life settings. For 
example, Hart contends that the idea that legal systems consist of rules is problematic – 
because ‘what are rules’?80 He thus tries to draw a distinction between legal rules on one 
hand, and what he terms ‘mere convergent habits of behavior’ on the other hand.81 For 
example, we can consider the now established social norm of “tipping” at almost all 
																																																								
76 Id, at p. 6. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id, at p. 13. 
80 Id, at p. 8. 
81 Id, at p. 9. 
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Western restaurants, and even in Ghana in recent times as well. In Ghana, there is no 
ascertainable law or rule that requires a customer to give the waiter or waitress who 
served him or her at a restaurant a tip when the bill is being paid. However, it has now 
become customary to give a tip of a percentage of your total bill, regardless of the quality 
of service. Indeed, at some restaurants, the tip is pre-included in the bill. Is this then 
considered a rule, to which all patrons must abide by? Or is it mere convergent habits of 
behavior that customers generally adhere to the social norm by providing tips for services 
rendered, in Ghana for instance?  
 
I believe therefore that, any suggestion that law is merely a system of rules is 
somewhat simplistic, although it probably captures the essence of what we call “law” in 
many respects. Hart then discusses the three recurrent issues that in his opinion are at the 
core of any analysis of the nature and essence of law.82 These three recurrent issues or 
questions, which are derivatives of the aforementioned issues that crop up in any 
discussion of the nature of law, are as follows: (1) How does law differ from, and how is 
it related to orders backed by threats; (2) how does legal obligation differ from, and how 
is it related to, moral obligation; and (3) what are rules, and to what extent is law an affair 
of rules.83 In my humble opinion, I think the Austinian conception of law, essentially as a 
collection of commands backed by sanctions, is a simplistic way of examining the nature 
of law.84 This is because, such a description only captures the essence of some types of 
laws, primarily amongst them is the criminal law.  
																																																								
82 Id, at p. 13. 
83 Id. 
84 I make reference to Austin here because Hart’s three recurrent issues regarding the nature of law 
inevitably cites Austin’s command theory of law. 
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However, there are other types of laws that no sanctions attach from a failure to 
conform to their dictates – for example marriage laws (for the law cannot and does not 
compel one to marry at all cost). Similarly, even though it has been strenuously 
contended in some quarters that law and morality are essentially two sides of the same 
coin, and that any law that lacks a moral component is somehow valueless or immoral, 
this in my opinion is simply not true. Admittedly, law and morality have a convergence 
point sometimes. But the question that ought to be greatly examined in the same way that 
the question of ‘what is law’ has, is what is morality?85 For example, whose conception 
of morality must law adhere to? What standards must a particular behavior be measured 
against in order to be deemed moral? This list can go on. Thus, the nature and essence of 
law seems to be one of those theories that are most useful to philosophers and other 
similarly placed persons, whose mission is to push the frontiers of such inquiries. The 
practical reality to me however is that, when one comes into contact with the law, one is 
likely to understand and appreciate its full effects without necessarily engaging oneself in 
theoretical and philosophical debates, even though it is these same debates that are likely 
to influence and shape public policy towards the morally neutral public policy framework 
which I am proposing in this dissertation. 
 
Chapter Two of Hart’s book is essentially a critique of John Austin’s formulation 
of law as a collection of commands backed by threats i.e. the command theory of law.86 
Hart acknowledges that it is the theory itself that seems to be at the center of his critique, 
																																																								
85 This does not however suggest that the issue of morality has not been vigorously debated and addressed 
within the legal academy. It is only an indication of the importance that I place on defining morality in a 
morally neutral manner. 
86 THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra, note 74, Chapter II. 
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not Austin.87 For my part, I think, any suggestion that law only comprises of commands 
that are backed by threats of sanctions, is an overly simplistic way of analyzing the 
essence of law, as I have already noted. For, as I have already suggested, there are 
different types of laws that do not necessarily coerce people to act one way or the other, 
and are merely indicative of procedural steps available to people, if they so wish in a 
given situation or context. Thus, I believe that law should not only be seen through the 
lenses or prism of commands backed by sanctions, as such a state of affairs only tend to 
maximize the problem of defining law. 
 
In Chapter Three, Hart discusses three (3) major objections to the construct of law 
as made up of commands or orders backed by sanctions.88 These objections, according to 
Hart, relate to the content of laws; their mode of origin; and their range of application.89 
In Ghana for example, there are a wide range of laws that differ in terms of their content, 
as well as how they are enacted, and their applicability. For instance, the Legal 
Profession Act90 was enacted by Parliament, and deals primarily with the organization 
and structure of legal education in Ghana, as well the regulation of the legal profession in 
Ghana.91 Thus, this Act (or, law) is therefore of little consequence and practically useless 
to the head porter who plies her trade on the roads of Accra central.92 However, it is of 
great importance to law students and lawyers alike.  
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In fact, quite recently, the General Legal Council that is established by virtue of 
this law was adjudged by the Supreme Court of Ghana as having acted unconstitutionally 
in terms of its continuous organization of entrance examinations for law students seeking 
entry into the Ghana School of Law.93 On the other hand, Accra Metropolitan Assembly 
(A.M.A.) By-laws are passed by the Assembly itself, and not necessarily by Parliament;94 
and some of these by-laws may directly affect the head porter or roadside seller. The 
point is that, Hart is right to identify different categories of law as a critique of the 
command theory of law. For law does not simply consist of commands, but are a much 
more complex phenomenon of a variety of rules meant for social ordering (assuming we 
can properly define the exact meaning of “rules” – that is).  
 
Chapter Four on the other hand discusses the idea that in every society where law 
exists there is necessarily a Sovereign, who is habitually obeyed as a result of the ‘fear of 
sanctions’ but this Sovereign habitually obeys no one.95 I find this idea preposterous to 
say the least, as such a situation is not tenable with constitutional democracy. In fact, the 
meaning of constitutionalism itself is limited power – limited power in the sense that the 
sovereign or in contemporary times, all branches of government are to be limited in terms 
of the powers that they have. To suggest therefore that a sovereign habitually obeys no 
one or no laws therefore, is to advocate for autocratic and dictatorial rule. I must however 
hasten to add that, despite this undesirable situation, there still exist a handful of countries 
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Myjoyonline.com) https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2017/June-22nd/supreme-court-quashes-ghana-
law-school-admission-processes.php - last visited November 5, 2017. 
94 The Constitution of Ghana, 1992 authorizes Parliament to delegate some of its law making power to local 
authorities for limited purposes. 
95 THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra, note 74, Chapter IV. 
	 37	
in the world where the sovereigns or political leaders are essentially unaccountable, or are 
only cosmetically accountable to the people or to the law for that matter.96 
 
According to Hart, since the command theory of law fails to mirror what actually 
pertains in a legal system, it is imperative for a redefinition of law – this is the essence of 
Chapter Five of his work.97 Thus, he introduces the idea of primary and secondary rules 
as embryonic of the essence of law.98 He suggests that primary rules generally impose 
duties, whereas secondary rules confer public or private powers.99 Similarly, primary 
rules concern actions involving physical movement or changes, whereas secondary rules 
provides for actions that lead to the creation or variation of duties and obligations.100 He 
concludes by suggesting that these two distinct but interrelated rules are the heart of any 
formal legal system, and I totally agree with him.101 
 
Chapter Six discusses, inter alia, the rule of recognition and legal validity, and 
dissects the essential characteristics of a legal system.102 Just like Hart points out, I 
believe that any formal legal system must have a solid foundation. Thus, the source of 
validity of the rules that make up a legal system must be necessarily ascertainable to 
avoid controversies. In Ghana for example, there has been an on-going debate in the legal 
academy, especially with regard constitutional jurisprudence, as to where our present 
laws derive their validity. For example, there is one school of thought that believes that 																																																								
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situation.  
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since the 1992 Constitution expresses itself to be the supreme law of the land, all other 
laws must necessarily derive their validity from it.103 On the other hand, another school of 
thought is of the view that the 1992 Constitution itself, being a mere schedule to the 
Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana (Promulgation) Law, 1992 (P.N.D.C.L. 
282), cannot be the source of validity for our present laws; and that our “grundnorm” in 
Kelsenian terms, must either be P.N.D.C.L. 282, or better still, the P.N.D.C. 
Establishment Proclamation.104  
 
Chapter Seven essentially is a description of the difference between statute law 
(or legislation), and case-law (or judicial precedent).105 These are what essentially 
ordinary people see as the law i.e. what the statute says, and what the judges say. Thus, it 
is imperative that in any society, the law be as clear as possible so as to order the affairs 
of the people. Certainty of the law, I believe, is therefore of the utmost import in any 
legal system. This is because, any uncertainty whatsoever may lead to disastrous 
consequences. For example, if Parliament were to pass a law prohibiting the doing of 
particular acts, but the courts interpret the law to exclude certain acts, that Parliament 
included in the law as part of the prohibitions laid down, there could be some confusion 
in the minds of people. This raises the question of judges legislating from the bench. Is it 
really the duty of judges to use their position to essentially subvert the will of Parliament 
(the people’s direct representatives) through legal interpretation? This is a hard question 
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to answer, as legal interpretation is an essential part of most legal systems, thus a 
necessary corollary of the nature of law generally. 
 
Moving on from Hart’s exposition on the nature of law, The Bramble Bush by 
Karl N. Llewellyn (hereinafter referred to as KNL) is also a classic exposition on the 
nature, characteristics and the essence of law.106 KNL introduces the concept of law to his 
audience by employing humor as well as everyday examples, thereby painting a vivid but 
somewhat chaotic picture of the law, in the minds of new law students, who generally 
have no idea whatsoever about the complex nature, as well as the philosophical basis of 
law. Right from the onset, KNL attempts to disabuse the minds of his readers by 
suggesting that the study of the law is not just easily compartmentalized as the study of 
some abstract rules. Rules, he acknowledges are important for the effective functioning of 
any legal system; but it is how these rules are actually applied in real life situations that 
gives us a semblance of the true meaning and purpose of law.107 
 
This is an important point simply because of the misconception in the minds of 
many people, as to what law really is. Thus, by breaking down the study of law into 
substantive and procedural (or as he put it “adjective”) law, one is left in no doubt that the 
study of law encompasses not just mere rules that regulate human conduct and behavior 
on a day to day basis, but also rules as to how to proceed when a legal dispute arises. 
KNL also suggests that, it is the resolution of these legal disputes, and their subsequent 
study thereof that enables us to easily predict how similar disputes will be resolved in the 																																																								
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future, and also somewhat forces us to act in a manner consistent with the law.108 By 
cleverly suggesting that the law is what the judges, lawyers and other law officers 
actually do in practice, I believe KNL exposes us to an element of judicial activism as 
opposed to restraint, and this is largely in tune with his concept of legal realism which 
underpin most of his works – including this one.109 
 
KNL skillfully encourages the student to read case law, because therein lies the 
law. He attempts at opening up the minds of law students to engage in critical thinking, 
whilst distilling the various rules that case law inadvertently establishes. This, I believe is 
necessary because of the peculiar nature of the common law legal tradition that places 
particular emphasis on judicial precedent – a concept he introduces his readers to as 
well.110 By delving into the law’s ancillary issues like logic and the philosophical 
underpinnings of some of the most important theories of law, KNL lays the foundation 
for critical thinking as to the essence and purpose of the law. It is however my opinion 
that, delving into the law’s deep ocean at such an early stage in legal studies, albeit 
introductory, generally tends to make that which is confusing even more so – which to his 
credit, he gracefully admits, and prescribes a remedy for.111 
 
Ronald Dworkin, on the other hand, addresses the nature and characteristics of 
law in his work Hard Cases112 from the premise of the general belief and assumption that 
the authority of judges extends only to the application of law, and not the making of law. 																																																								
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However, this is not always possible due to the complex nature of adjudication. For 
example, judges are often confronted with novel cases and situations, which inevitably 
require the making of new law and the application of conceptions of morality, if such 
cases are to be resolved. Conventional wisdom however suggests that judges must not 
seek to usurp the power of the legislature, which is the proper law-making institution. It 
follows therefore that judges act as “deputies” to the legislature, which of itself shows a 
certain level of subordination; but also in hard cases, they also actually act as a “Deputy 
Legislature” in the sense that they are inadvertently required to make law on the basis of 
the facts and evidence presented before them, which is likely to motivate a legislature to 
make that particular law any way assuming they were faced with similar facts. 
 
Dworkin’s central thesis however seems to me to be the fact that, he does not 
think judges should be or act as a deputy legislature. He is thus of the view that, the 
popular assumption that when judges go beyond political decisions already made then 
they are legislating from the bench is misleading and inaccurate. According to him, it 
misses the fundamental distinction between principle and policy – concepts that are 
central to Dworkin’s work. According to the author, a hard case is one where there exists 
no settled rule that dictates a decision one way or the other. In such situations, policy or 
principle will help generate the proper and appropriate decision. Dworkin however favors 
the reliance and use of principle rather than policy in judicial decision-making, especially 
in the hard cases.          
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Dworkin also explores the view that adjudication should be unoriginal in a 
democratic community by discussing briefly the major objections to judicial originality 
i.e. the fact that judges are unelected officials and as a result the concept of accountability 
will be defeated if they are to legislate from the bench; and the fact that retrospective 
application of new law unfairly punishes losing parties for violation of new duties created 
ex post facto. He is however dismissive of these criticism, and I tend to agree with him. 
The fact is that, judges in the course of adjudication will often be confronted with 
numerous hard cases. The question that needs to be resolved in such situations is: how do 
they go about resolving disputes without overstepping boundaries? Dworkin’s distinction 
between collective goals and individual rights may be of extreme help in such situations. 
Collective goals for example are grounded in policy objectives, which seek to attain some 
common ideals that are of benefit to society as a whole – this may involve conceptions of 
a collective form of morality. On the other hand, individuated rights often seek to uphold 
and most often reaffirm individual liberty, and may be based on conceptions of private 
morality. 
 
In my opinion, these two often-competing interests are two sides of the same coin. 
For example, the right to equality and freedom from discrimination is aimed at protecting 
individuals from some acts that tend to impinge on the right. By extension, society as a 
whole (a collection of individuals) also benefit from the existence of this right. This, in 
my mind, represents a principle. However, this right may be limited in its application, in 
the sense that it may be the case that it is not absolute. Thus, a policy objective may exist 
which limits the right and provides for differentiation in the treatment of people, which 
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actually negates the idea of equality and non-discrimination. These similar, but 
competing interests I believe should be balanced on a case by case basis, so that we do 
not create a system of de facto and de jure majoritarian oppression. 
 
Judges when faced with hard cases, often have to make a choice as to the best 
possible approach in the resolution of the dispute. Statutory interpretation for example 
even tends to further obfuscate the lines between judicial decision-making, and legislative 
functions. For when a judge interprets the law in situations where lacunas may exist, he is 
in actual fact making law, whether we want to believe it or not. It would be unreasonable 
therefore to suggest that cases of such nature need not be resolved simply because there is 
no controlling law applicable to the novel issues that such cases generally present. 
 
Moving on from Dworkin’s perspectives on the nature of law, Freeman suggests 
that positivist philosophers such as Austin and Kelsen in their attempt to define law 
adopted an essentialist approach.113 Austin's command theory of law for example has 
consistently been criticized and berated, even though there remains some support and 
justification for the Austinian conception of law. As already noted, Austin defines law as 
a command by a sovereign backed by sanctions. Thus, commands that do not emanate 
from a sovereign and are not backed by some form of sanction(s) cannot conceivably be 
referred to as law. This command theory of law is put in the following manner: ‘Laws 
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proper or properly so called are commands. Laws which are not commands are improper 
or improperly so called.’114  
 
Austin thus divides these commands into two broad categories – those prescribed 
by God on one hand, and those enacted by man. It is this second category of commands 
that he famously refers to as “positive law”.115 His definition of law is that it is ‘a rule 
laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power 
over him.’116 Three core ideas can be deduced from this definition, which lies at the heart 
of Austin’s conception of law i.e. that in any society there are superior and inferior 
subjects; secondly, that there are superiors who constitute the ruling class; and thirdly, the 
relationship between the superior ruling class and inferior subjects is one premised on 
politics.  
 
However, fellow positivist theorists have criticized John Austin, notably amongst 
them H.L.A. Hart on the three concepts listed above. Hart highlights the fact that laws are 
not limited to commands backed by sanctions. He recognises broadly the existence of 
Austinian rules as primary rules and other rules as secondary rules. According to him, 
these secondary rules include laws which confer powers on private individuals to alter 
their legal relationship in relation to other people via the creation of wills, contracts, or 
marriages as well as laws which confer powers to officials, e.g. to a judge to try cases, to 																																																								
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a minister to make rules and so forth. To him, treating law as a matter of orders backed 
by threats obscures this feature of law. 
 
He also challenged whether laws really express any legislator's actual desires, 
intentions, or wishes. ‘Would an enactment duly passed not be law if (as must be the case 
with many a section of an English Finance Act) those who voted for it did not know what 
it meant?’ 117  he enquires. This question also becomes important for other critics 
especially of the utilitarian school of thought in a sense that the legislator's desires wishes 
and intentions may be contrary to the benefit to be derived from a particular piece of 
legislation. This is because some laws may be enacted merely on the basis of utility and 
not necessarily because it expresses the sovereign's desire, intentions or wishes. In its 
extreme form, Hart argues that Austin's argument would deny that the rules of the 
criminal law, by their usual wording, are genuine laws. Similarly, Hans Kelsen adopts the 
argument that law is the primary norm that essentially stipulates sanction. He suggests 
that there is no law prohibiting certain kinds of conduct but rather there are laws directing 
officials to apply certain sanctions in certain circumstances to those whose actions or 
inactions so require. This line of thinking implies that genuine laws are conditional orders 
to officials to apply sanctions.  
 
Kelsen's theory has been seen as the climax of Bentham and Austin's theories. 
According to Kelsen, a norm becomes a legal norm only because it is birthed of a definite 
procedure and a definite rule. Law is valid only as positive law i.e. a statute or 
(constituted) law. He eliminates anything else and refers to them as alien elements; hence 																																																								
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his ideology is referred to as the pure theory of law.118 Thus, theoretically, a positivist 
definition of what the law is would be easier to determine in any jurisdiction because it 
eschews matters of ethics, social policies, metaphysics and morality.119 Hence, law that 
seems morally reprehensible will however continue to have the force of law until the law 
is altered by existent legal means.120 
 
Another interesting theorist is Karl Marx. Marx's jurisprudence focused on 
studying the nature of law within a society in flux.121 He considered law as a tool 
developed by persons in the ruling class to dominate members of the working class, to 
their utmost benefit or to maintain their superiority. However, his theory focused on the 
dependence of the formation of states on a class system. He posited that after this process 
and the use of a legal system to repress the lower class, there would be a socialist 
revolution that would lead to a collapse of both the classes and the repressive legal 
apparatus. This would result in the withering away of the state. Marx's theory has been 
criticized and classified as one that rejects the rule of law and endorses a continuous 
abuse of human rights. 
 
Could it be that based on the choice or disposition of a sex worker and to serve 
the interests of those in the higher classes of society, sex work may be commercialized 
either for financial, sexual or other gains? Marx described sex work as being merely a 
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specific expression of the general prostitution of a labourer.122 He also perceived that the 
abolition of sex work was a necessary part of ending capitalism. Moreover, in The 
Communist Manifesto, he referred to prostitution as the "complement" of the bourgeois 
family. However, some have used Marxist theory to defend sex work by referring to it as 
the selling of a service and not of the sex worker.123  
 
Also, it is important to remember that industrialism and modern capitalism have 
incited labourers to collectively bargain for rights to ensure safe working conditions and 
that there is a shield from employers who ignore the well-being of the workers in favour 
of profit.124  Female sex workers, unlike other labourers, are at perpetual risk of violence 
at the hands of both their employers and their clients. Notably, this risk is not incidental. 
It is the consequence of the literal commodification, the woman’s body and self - and not 
just her labour.125 We may view this, in light of Marx's theory as a form of oppression of 
the prostitute by persons in the upper classes or persons who at any point have the upper 
hand and can afford their services. Thus, the example of sex work feeds into Marx’s 
conception of law as a tool used for the oppression of the working class by the ruling 
class. 
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Moving away from Marx's jurisprudence, the rise in modern science came an 
apparent unanimity on the use of scientific methods for the study law and legal 
philosophy. With this in hand, philosophers of the sociological jurisprudence school of 
thought such as Montesquieu, Jhering and Roscoe Pound have laid out their thoughts on 
what law is as well. However, Sociological jurisprudence has been spoken of as one that 
is not necessarily legal philosophy but rather attempts to use the various social sciences to 
study the role of the law as a living force in society and seeks to control this force for the 
social betterment.126 It views law as an instrument of social control, backed by the 
authority of the state, directed towards achieving certain ends. It seeks to achieve these 
ends by methods, which may be enlarged and improved through a deliberate effort.127 
 
Roscoe Pound talked about “the end of law” as a topic that is more political than 
jurisprudential.128 He explains that in the stage of equity and natural law the prevailing 
theory of the nature of law apparently answers the question of what the end of the law is. 
In his view, ideas of what law is for or its ends are so largely implicit in ideas of what law 
is. Based on this, he propounded twelve conceptions of what law is or how law 
distinguishes itself from other social phenomena. According to him, first and foremost, a 
law is the idea of a divinely ordained rule or set of rules for human action, citing the 
Mosaic law, or Hammurabi’s code as examples.129 	
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Second is the concept of law as traditions of the old customs approved by the 
gods and hence point the way in which man may walk without bringing harm upon 
himself. For primitive man, for instance, acting contrary to these customs would have 
incurred the wrath of the gods. Third is the concept of law as recorded from traditional 
custom of decision and custom of action and wisdom of the sages of old. He cites the 
example of Demosthenes in the fourth century BC describing the law of Athens in this 
manner. The fourth idea of law has to do with the conception of law as a philosophically 
discovered system of principles, which express the nature of things so that men conform 
their conduct, accordingly. In addition, the fifth idea, conceives law as a body of 
'ascertainment’s and declarations of an eternal and immutable moral code.130  
 
The sixth idea of law is a democratic version of the identification of law. It refers 
to a body of agreements of men in politically organized society as to their relations with 
each other. This according to Pound supports the political idea and the inherent moral 
obligation that a promise would be invoked to show why men should keep the 
agreements made in their popular assemblies.131 Seventh is the idea that law is a 
reflection of the divine reason governing the universe; which determines the “ought” 
addressed by that reason to human beings as moral entities, as opposed to the “must” 
which it addresses to the rest of creation.132 Such was the conception of Thomas 
Aquinas.133 The eighth concept is that law is a body of commands of the sovereign 
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authority in a politically organized society as to how men should conduct themselves in 
that society.134  
 
A ninth idea of law comes in variant forms and has been classified by Pound as 
dividing the allegiance of jurists with the command theory.135 It conceives law as a 
system of precepts discovered by human experience.136 The tenth is the idea that law is 
a system of principles, discovered philosophically and developed in detail by juristic 
writing and judicial decision.137 Within this ideology, the external life of man is measured 
by reason, or in another phase, the will of the individual in action is harmonized with 
those of his fellow men.138  
 
The Eleventh idea of law aligns with Marx's theory. This idea portrays law as a 
body or system of rules imposed on men in society by the dominant class for the time 
being in furtherance, conscious or unconscious, of its own interest.139 Finally, the twelfth 
idea of law is made up of the dictates of economic or social laws as regards the conduct 
of men in society.140 Pound’s concept of law is thus discovered by observation, and finds 
expression in precepts worked out through human experience of what is or is not feasible 
in the administration of justice.141  Pound thus underscored that the aim of these theories 
was that they enabled us to understand a body of law or that institution and to perceive 
what the men of the time were seeking to do with them or to make of them. In sum, 																																																								
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Pound thought of law as a social institution to satisfy the claims and demands involved in 
the existence of civilized society. He noted that this was done by giving effect to as much 
as we may, with the least sacrifice, to order human conduct in a politically organized 
society or for efficacious social engineering.142      
  
B) WHAT IS MORALITY?          
 
Morality or moral values, as it is sometimes referred to as, points to behaviour 
that may be good or bad, right or wrong. This concept of morality has evolved from a 
basis or reference to deity and nature, and currently is more self-referencing perhaps, than 
any other concept in legal and social philosophy. Thus, discovering what is moral from a 
self-referencing perspective is difficult to achieve and is an entirely personal and 
subjective exercise. Attempting to do this for a society in a manner that represents it as a 
whole may prove to be a daunting task, and rather impossible to achieve. Many have 
therefore argued that there is no objective moral truth or authority. Therefore, there is no 
objective legal truth or authority. It is wholly a personal and subjective exercise, just as 
any moral viewpoint is a wholly personal and subjective viewpoint.143 
 
Positivists argue that private moral views are not a proper basis for legislation and 
moral disapproval alone is an improper basis on which to deny rights. According to them, 
given that our whole human history is essentially a litany of opposing moral camps 
waging war upon one another and the most powerful moral groups oppressing and 																																																								
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terrorizing the less powerful, positivist would prefer that societal rules be spared similar 
chaos. Morality seems to lack consistency because it is largely based on people’s opinion 
about good or evil. What one considers moral may change depending on the time and 
many other circumstances. Law on the other hand must reflect consistent rules that 
govern human behaviour.144 Where there is lack of consistency it may lead to chaos and 
disrespect of the law.  
 
However, some theorists perceive positive law classically as a very potent tool for 
shaping morality of people145. In their view, it advises society on the content of morality; 
provides examples of how to act morally, and actually helps people to become moral 
through its unique ability to motivate people to act in accordance with the dictates of 
morality.146 This advice model has to do with propositional knowledge (i.e. knowing 
what to do). The second is the emulation model of moral expertise. The emulation model 
is about performative knowledge (i.e. knowing how to do something). It is therefore 
suggested that some experts – perhaps the best experts – know both what to do and how 
to do it.147 Positive law provides the avenue to do this.148 
 
The motivational power of law might contribute to helping people to be moral 
through directly communicating coercive orders to us; through the indirect pressure to 
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respect the law exerted by wider society; and through the law’s role in supporting 
mutually beneficial practices by underpinning duties of reciprocity.149 Once people 
recognise a corpus of instructions as law, they inevitably experience the effects of the law 
because as they abide by it, they begin to live in a particular way. Kant could not put it 
more tacitly: ‘A good constitution is not to be expected from morality, but, conversely, a 
good moral condition of a people is to be expected only under a good constitution.’150  
 
Natural law doctrine generally suggests that there are principles of law stronger 
than statute to which the latter must conform.151 Natural law theorists test the validity of 
law by referring to “absolute value” such that any law that lacks such values or does not 
match up with this threshold is wrong and unjust.  Aquinas, for instance, thought of law 
as an aspect of God's plan for mankind. He categorised law into lex aeterna which is 
God's rational direction for all things; lex divina, which is God's law as revealed in 
scripture; lex humana, which is human law which must conform with reason and God's 
law; and lex naturalis; which emerges from man's exercise of his reason in light of God's 
word. According to Aquinas law must be good and for the common good.152   
 
Aquinas viewed marriage, for example, as a primary human good, which had two 
ends.153 One of such ends is procreation and nurturing of children in a manner aimed at 
their good. The other is fides.  This word implies faithfulness in terms of exclusivity and 
permanence but is not limited to it. It also implies commitment to being united with one's 																																																								
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spouse in mind, body, and a mutually assisting domestic life. He cited fides as good and 
sufficient reason to engage in usus matrimonii or the sexual act intended for a husband 
and wife to experience, actualise and express the good of their marriage.154 Against this 
backdrop, he described depersonalised human acts such as sex work as instances of 
'willing against the good of marriage.'155 This is because, according to him, promoting 
sex work would be against reason's directive to respect and pursue the good of marriage 
i.e. contra bonum matrimonii.156  
 
In Aquinas' day, as in ours, many hold the view that mutually agreed/negotiated 
sex could be classified as a moral issue. Even though Aquinas did not overlook this, he 
noted that acts contra bonum matrimonii were wrong because individuals and societies 
depended on the institution of marriage to flourish. It is also worth noting that Aquinas 
gave credence to the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of the four virtues, on which morality 
and all other virtues are based. These virtues constitute: understanding the reasons and 
principles behind making and implementing choices (prudentia); a steady and lasting 
willingness to give others what they are entitled to (justice); the integration of passions 
(not just sexual passion) with reason to avoid becoming enslaved by it (temperamento); 
and the quality of keeping disinclinations in check (fortitudo). Flowing from his moral 
argument, Aquinas would certainly refer to any legislation permitting sex work, as bad 
law.  
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Aquinas' account of law also set out four areas of focus for finding the meaning of 
law. First, he notes that law is an appeal to the mind choice and moral strength of persons 
subject to it.  Second is that, law is for the common good of a community. Third is that 
law is posited by the responsible authority. Finally, it must be coercive. However, if the 
lawmaker is not concerned for the community's common good or if while acting for the 
common good there is an infraction as regards the fairness of the law, then the law is 
unjust and lacks moral authority. According to Aquinas, ‘Laws can be unjust because 
they are contrary to the divine good. In no way is it permissible to observe them.’157  
Thus, when laws are just and are made by a just State, there is an obligation to obey 
them; otherwise, the obligation is extinguished. To some positivists, this dissention to 
obeying law as a command is characterised by disobedience, which is arguably immoral. 
Disobedience, even to a so called bad law, sets an example and inclines other people to 
disobey those laws as well as break “good laws” together with “bad ones”.158  
 
The assertion ‘an unjust law is no law at all’ has the same logic as, for instance, 
‘a disloyal friend is not a friend’ or ‘a quack medicine is not medicine’.159  It assumes 
that there is a particular moral standard that law must meet. This moral standard 
determines the validity of the law. Thus, Kant has argued that even the most unjust laws 
create an obligation to obey, which is both legal and moral. He rejects a right to resist 
unjust laws and the denial that they are fully legal.160 Immanuel Kant, although a 
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naturalist, however aimed to render morality undogmatic – to ground it in the fact of 
reason. This led Kant to develop a theory of subjectivity. Kant's theory of the subject 
relies heavily on his theory of epistemology. In Kant's view, we only know things by our 
thought of them (the phenomena). We never know the things in themselves (the 
noumena). Both Kant and Aquinas believed that virtue's priority should not be reduced to 
happiness or self-fulfilment, which is important but must be considered with others in our 
order of priorities.161 Kant noted that the fact that humans have reason and will and not 
just instinct proved this point.162 
 
The above notwithstanding, those who consider the virtue of utility as a basis of 
law hold a contrary view. According to Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, 
utility is ‘that property of any object whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, 
pleasure, good or happiness; or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil or 
unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in 
general, then the happiness of the community; if a particular individual, then the 
happiness of that individual.’163 He equated pleasure with good, and pain with evil.164 
Using his felicific calculus, an algebraic sum of all the good a person suffered together 
with their pain would be calculated to arrive at whether or not an act had good or bad 
tendencies.165 This arithmetic applied to societies as well such that the summation of 
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individual happiness would give the social sum.166 Based on this theory, he posited that 
the science of legislation is knowledge of the good and the art of legislation was his 
method of arriving at the good.167 The foundation he proffered for legislation was the 
principle of utility.168 
 
According to Bentham, legislation must prevent evils or unhappiness but rather 
promote happiness.169 With this aim legislation must reflect a desire to attain subsistence 
or abundance, diminish inequalities and provide security.170 However, he was opposed to 
natural law concepts especially that of human rights. He argued that these could not be 
philosophically proven and held them out as concepts, which oppose political sovereignty 
and its practices.171 However, his theory was very relevant in transforming criminal law. 
His theory rather influenced the evolution of more utilitarian sanctions.172 He also posited 
that acts, which had a high possibility of producing harm, ought to be prohibited.173  
 
Pleasure and pain are very subjective and the felicific calculus seemed and was 
manifestly impracticable. Riding on these as well as an attempt for a clearer view of the 
moral standards set out by utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill restated the concept.174 Instead 
of the quantitative approach, Mill adopted a qualitative approach.175 In this approach, he 
classified pleasure into superior or high-quality ones and inferior ones so that mere 																																																								
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pleasure would cease to be the standard of morality.176 The higher pleasures to him, were 
those derived from more intellectual activities whereas the inferior ones had to do with 
basic needs such as food, drink, sex and so on.177 He added that it is the true expression 
of our faculties that would lead to true happiness.178 Both Bentham and Mill believed that 
a person should pursue their own happiness in relation to the happiness of the community 
as well. 
 
However, as regards his views on law, Mill wished to infuse general principles 
into social and legal practices.179 According to him these practices ought to balance the 
interest of every individual with that of the whole.180 Also, he diverged from Bentham's 
perception about rights and justice. To Mill, Justice encompassed considerations of what 
was not only right or wrong to do but also that which an individual can claim as his moral 
right.181 These considerations are important because legislators must decide what or 
whose policy, virtue or morals must inform legislation relating to sex work, and abortion 
for example. With regards to sex work, should the issue be approached as a question of 
protecting rights of sex workers as victims or a question of protecting persons who should 
be at liberty to do whatever they please with their bodies? Practically, how should society 
react if children start saying: 'I want to be a sex worker when I grow up?’ Should society 
be alarmed at this depending on the approach which it adopts? 
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C) THE LAW AND MORALITY DEBATES 
 
Hart noted in the preface of his book, The Concept of Law that his aim for writing 
the book was to further the understanding of law, coercion, and morality as different but 
related social phenomena.182 According to him, the essence of legal positivism is the 
“separation thesis”. This thesis is illustrated below:  
 
Having a legal right to do 'x' doesn’t entail having a moral right to do it, and vice 
versa; having a legal obligation to do something doesn’t entail having a moral 
right to do it, and vice versa; having a legal justification to do something doesn’t 
entail having a moral justification, and vice versa; and so on.183 In order to know 
what your legal rights are, you need to look at what laws your society has. In 
order to know what your moral rights are, you need to figure out what is the true 
morality. You might have legal rights that the true morality says you shouldn’t 
have (e.g. the right be a commercial sex worker, to own slaves to have an 
abortion, the right to be mutilated), and your society might deny you legal rights 
that the true morality says you should have (e.g. the right to be free, to stand by 
what you believe, to own one’s own body and labour power).184 
 
In a world of relative morality, one common ground has been the fact that the law is 
applicable to all within a jurisdiction. People turn and run to the law whether it speaks to 
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an issue or is silent on it, and almost regardless of what field may be more applicable in 
finding a solution to any dilemma in society.  
 
Williams J. noted in a speech he delivered that, ‘My concern is that, as we turn 
increasingly to the “Temple” of the law for solutions to social problems and as a guide to 
conduct, we give less and less recognition to any concept of values and morality above 
the law; and that is a trend which is unhealthy for the law and for the society.’185 The 
heavy reliance on law should be expected because law is such a basic foundation required 
in statehood, as John Locke's social contract theory suggests. However, history also 
teaches us that law when allowed to be put in force and operate within a vacuum can 
cause more damage than anticipated. There is also the other extreme of running into error 
by basing legal operations on moral dictates. How then do we solve this dilemma? Or 
must we just allow the wrangling of these concepts to continue and use the back and forth 
as a vehicle to shape the law?  
 
These questions regarding the nature of law rear their heads in the practice of the 
law. These are demonstrated by what Hart refers to as an appeal by men who experience 
hell-created by other men - on earth.186 Some of these difficulties are demonstrated in the 
following examples. First is the case of Oppenheimer v Cattermole.187 The contention in 
this case, was whether an English Court should disregard Nazi laws that stripped a 
German Jewish refugee of his citizenship in line with German Basic law at the time. The 																																																								
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House of Lords felt itself bound to hold that Oppenheimer had lost his citizenship. Lord 
Cross stated in obiter that the Nazi law constituted so grave an infringement of human 
rights that the Courts ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all. In light of this 
Freeman writes:   
 
But what are 'human rights'...and what is sufficiently 'grave' infringement ... Is 
such a law not a law at all? And if it is not, are citizens released from their 
obligation to obey? Indeed, do citizens have a reason to obey law and if so what is 
the nature of this obligation and is it absolute or qualified and if qualified in 
which ways?188 
 
This example seems light compared to the genocidal atrocities committed by the Nazi 
regime. However, Hart argues that the spiritual message of liberalism must not be 
overvalued. He insists that Law is not morality and society could equally refuse to allow 
it to supplant morality. 
 
However, Radbruch's conception of law underscored the essential moral principle 
of humanitarianism.189 This principle was applied in practice by German courts in certain 
cases in which local war criminals, spies, and informers under the Nazi regime were 
punished.190 Notably, persons accused of these crimes claimed that what they had done 
was legal under the laws of the Nazi regime when their actions were performed.191 The 
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position of the courts was that their actions lacked legal validity because their stance 
contravened the fundamental principles of legality and morality.192 One of such cases 
cited by Hart based on which the Hart-Fuller debate ensues is the case concerning the 
Grudge informer. 
 
In 1944 a man made insulting remarks about Hitler while home on leave from the 
German army. With the aim of getting rid of her husband, his wife denounced him to the 
authorities based on those remarks. His utterances were apparently in violation of statutes 
that criminalized statements detrimental to the government of the Third Reich; however, 
she had no legal obligation to report him. The man, upon arrest, was sentenced to death, 
pursuant to these statutes. Though he was not executed upfront, he was sent to the front. 
In 1949 the wife was prosecuted in a West German court for the offense of illegally 
depriving a person of his freedom under the German Criminal Code of 1871, which had 
remained in force since its enactment. According to the reasoning of the court, the statute 
‘was contrary to the sound conscience and sense of justice of all decent human 
beings.’193  
 
Though this reasoning was followed in many cases and has been regarded as a 
triumph for the doctrine of natural law, Hart spells out two other choices. Firstly, the 
courts could have let the woman go unpunished; and the other was to face the fact that if 
the woman were to be punished it must be pursuant to the introduction of a retrospective 
law and with a full consciousness that the basic principles of Nullum crimen, nulla poena 																																																								
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sine lege were sacrificed in securing her punishment in this way. Indeed, very precious 
principles of morality endorsed by most legal systems had been sacrificed. Hart's point 
was that there may well be moral reasons to revolt against such oppressive legal systems 
but that it would be absurd to say that no legal system existed at all - because parts of it 
were unjust. 
 
However, herein lie the seeming contradictions, which Lon Fuller points out.194 
Fuller explains by reiterating Hart's warning about thoughts expressed regarding the 
maintenance of distinctions between positivism and morality when he posits that 'we may 
lose a "precious moral ideal," that of fidelity to law.'195 Fuller notes that even though 
there is no reason why the argument for a strict separation of law and morality cannot be 
rested on the double ground that this separation serves both intellectual clarity and moral 
integrity those who find the "positivist" position unacceptable base their argument on 'the 
double ground that its intellectual clarity is specious and that its effects are, or may be, 
harmful.'196 
 
My position is that, even though law and morality are essentially different, it is 
difficult and at times absurd to completely alienate them from each other. Untainted 
positivism has implications of disregarding the merits or demerits of law and its effect on 
society - even across different jurisdictions. Whereas the other extreme may lead to some 
form of oppression as well. Thus, the Hart-Devlin Debate on the other hand was sparked 
off by the Report to the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution 																																																								
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(hereinafter, the Wolfenden Report), which recommended some changes in British law 
on sexual offences.197 The Wolfenden report was premised on these: first, that the 
function of criminal law as regards prostitution and homosexual offences was to 'preserve 
public order and decency, and to protect the citizen from what is offensive or injurious 
and to provide sufficient safeguards against the exploitation and corruption of others.'198 
The second theory was that 'unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting 
through the agency of law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, there must 
remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not 
the law's business.'199  
 
Even though Devlin was in favour of easing sanctions for certain homosexual 
crimes, he rejected the philosophy of the report. He noted that England's criminal law had 
from the beginning concerned itself with moral principles. He also contended that in the 
interest of preservation of order and the smooth running of society, certain activities had 
to be regulated. Hart rejected Devlin's approach decrying his views and reasoning that it 
was not morally permissible to enforce the tenets of morality. Devlin inquired whether 
there ought to be a public morality or whether morals were always a matter for private 
judgement. Secondly, he queried whether if society had a right to pass judgment it also 
maintained a right to enforce it. Third, if the second question were answered in the 
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affirmative, must society use this in all cases or only in some; and for what reasons may 
the cases be distinguished?200  
 
Devlin answered his first two questions in the affirmative.201 His view was that 
the Wolfenden report took the existent public morality, which condemned both 
homosexuality and prostitution at the time for granted. In defending his answer to the 
second question, Devlin noted that society may use its laws to protect morality in the 
same manner in which it protects other things essential to the community's existence. To 
the third question, he underscored the necessity to discuss how the society's moral 
judgements could be ascertained making reference not necessarily to the reasonable man 
but perhaps the man in the jury box or the “right thinking man”. Hart disagreed and felt 
that Devlin's approach could not adequately solve the problem. Hart argued, on various 
points among which was his agreement with utilitarian concepts that the punishments for 
sexual misdemeanours often resulted in disproportionate social misery. Hart also 
cautioned legislators to pause and think on what the nature of general morality is as well 
as the concept of the “right thinking man'”. 
 
Thus, in Chapter eight The Concept of Law,202 captioned “Justice and Morality”, 
Hart once again challenges the notion that in analyzing or elucidating the concept of law, 
the necessary focal point is the connection between law and morality.203 He states as 
follows: 
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The claim that between law and morality there is a necessary connection has 
many important variants, not all of them conspicuous for their clarity. There are 
many possible interpretations of the key terms ‘necessary’ and ‘morality’ and 
these have not always been distinguished and separately considered by either 
advocates or critics. The clearest, perhaps, because it is the most extreme form of 
expression of this point of view, is that associated with the Thomist tradition of 
Natural Law. This comprises a twofold contention: first, that there are certain 
principles of true morality or justice, discoverable by human reason without the 
aid of revelation even though they have a divine origin; secondly that man-made 
laws which conflict with these principles are not valid law. “Lex iniusta non est 
lex.” Other variants of this general point of view take a different view of both the 
status of principles of morality and of the consequences of conflicts between law 
and morality. Some conceive morality not as immutable principles of conduct or 
as discoverable by reason, but as expressions of human attitudes to conduct which 
may vary from society to society or from individual to individual.204 
 
Critiquing these ideas, Hart examines the concept of justice and suggests that it is 
essentially an element of morality and is subjective depending on the perspective one has. 
He uses several real-life examples like race relations, slavery and inequality between the 
sexes in arriving at his conclusions. He concludes that justice is only one aspect of 
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morality focused not on individual conduct per se, but rather on how classes of 
individuals are treated.205 
 
Hart also suggests that moral rules and legal rules are both similar, but yet 
dissimilar. Their similarity in scope is what he attributes to their “common vocabulary”, 
and also the fact that conformity to both is dictated by serious social pressure. However, 
he differentiates law and morality in the following manner: whereas legal rules require 
external behavior, morality does not require any specific external action. He goes on 
further to examine four essential features that he believes distinguishes morality not just 
from law, but also from all other social rules.206 I therefore agree with his conclusions 
that some aspects or derivatives of morality are personal to the individual and may not 
necessarily mirror that of society. Finally, in chapter nine, Hart discusses law and 
morality in some more detail and concludes that any conception of law must have at its 
core the idea that the invalidity of a law can be distinguished from its immorality. This he 
says will ‘enable us to see the complexity and variety of these separate issues; whereas a 
narrow concept of law which denies legal validity to iniquitous rules may blind us to 
them.’207 Regardless of all the criticisms to Hart’s approach, I tend to agree with him on 
the distinction between law and morality. 
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On the other hand, Lon Fuller’s The Morality of Law,208 one of the most oft-cited 
jurisprudential works in any inquiry into the nature and character of law and its 
relationship with morality, essentially challenges Hart’s views. Fuller’s central argument 
revolves around eight canons of a legal system properly so-called or legal procedure for 
that matter. These eight canons can be deduced from the long narrative/parable about a 
good-natured King (Rex) who intends to make law for his subjects, which Fuller 
describes in the book.209 The canons are as follows: (1) laws should be general; (2) laws 
should be promulgated in a way that the citizens know the standards to which they are 
being held; (3) retroactive laws or rule-making and application should be minimized; (4) 
law should be easily comprehensible; (5) laws should not be contradictory; (6) laws 
should not require behavior or conduct beyond the capabilities of those affected; (7) laws 
should be stable and predictable i.e. they should remain constant for long periods; and (8) 
promulgated laws and their actual application must have a convergence point.210 
 
According to Fuller, failure to adhere to these eight canons essentially deprives a 
legal system of the legality it requires, hence his idea of the ‘internal morality’ of law. He 
puts it this way: ‘A total failure in any one of these eight directions does not simply result 
in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a legal system at 
all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void contract can still be said to 
be one kind of contract.’211 This “inner” or “internal” morality of law is what according 
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to Fuller makes law whole.212 Law must therefore have a moral content, which must be 
ensured by those who make law, who according to Fuller have a moral duty so to do.213  
 
Fuller has however been criticized for failing to adequately define his concept of 
morality in a clear and coherent manner. Dworkin for example states that: 
  
It is difficult to see how the argument from Rex justifies these moral 
characterizations and designations: it is difficult, indeed, to see what they mean. 
Fuller seems not even to recognize that such terms present difficulties of 
interpretation–he moves from the language of strategy to the language of morals 
without the slightest caesura of transition. We are left on our own to work out and 
identify the claims latent in the terms he uses. He cannot mean, by speaking of an 
“internal morality” without which even bad law would not be possible, that a 
tyrant who curbs his instincts for iniquity only to the extent necessary to maintain 
a legal system has done anything morally praiseworthy.214  
 
H.L.A. Hart also criticizes Fuller’s internal morality of law as being ‘unfortunately 
compatible with very great iniquity.’215 
 
Another major work that has captivated my attention and influenced my thoughts 
is The Path of the Law by Oliver Wendell Holmes.216 This work is striking for several 																																																								
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reasons. The structure of the address and the underpinning philosophical contradictions 
that I believe are inherent in the work makes for interesting, but sometimes poignant 
reading. As a result, my critique is structured along the lines of Holmes’ arguments on 
law & morality only; as I do not think it necessary to focus on his arguments relating to 
the content and growth of the law and on the study of jurisprudence.  
 
On Law & Morality, Holmes begins by suggesting that, law is simply the study of 
‘dogma and systematized predictions.’217 By far his most famous words ‘the prophecies 
of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the 
law’218 exposes us to his deep-seated belief in judicial activism, by pitting two contrasting 
views of law against one another i.e. judicial restraint towards legislation on one hand, 
and strict constructionism of legislation on another hand. Holmes suggests that the law is 
what the judges say it is, and not necessarily what the legislature intended it to be.219 To 
buttress his point, Holmes spectacularly dispels the confusion naturally associated with 
the law and morality by giving us “the bad man/good man” analogy.220 We must note 
that, Holmes’ bad man has little or no regard for morality.221 
 
Although, he admits that morality has played a crucial role in the development of 
the law and cannot wholly be divorced from it, he nonetheless envisages a time where 
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law would be devoid of the moral ambiguity that some legal concepts portend.222 
Enforceability of the law is also at the heart of Holmes argument, and I totally agree with 
this aspect – for what is the value of a law that is incapable of enforcement? 
Enforceability however, intrinsically is premised somewhat on morality. Holmes views 
here can thus be juxtaposed with some classical natural law theorists like Augustine & 
Aquinas who both suggested that an immoral law was no law at all. Thus, the right to 
disobey laws that are devoid of any moral content or value/that runs counter to common 
sense had long been established in legal thought before the time of Holmes.  
 
Holmes also tries to draw a distinction between legal positivism and natural law. 
In this regard, he considers some well-established legal concepts by approaching it from 
the point of view of the bad man. He asks whether the bad man can draw a distinction 
between a penalty and a tax.223 In my mind, to suggest that a man of little or no morals is 
incapable of, or totally oblivious to the fundamental legal distinction between a tax (a 
compulsory levy imposed by the State to aid development) and a penalty (a punishment 
for breaking the law – which may be monetary in nature) suggests to me that Holmes 
could care less about the reasoning ability of persons not conversant with the law.  
          
D) SEX WORK, THE LAW AND MORALITY 
 
There are various ways of viewing sex work, leading to different kinds of 
reactions. If sex workers are viewed as victims it implies they have to be protected by 																																																								
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society. If they are merely workers in a trade a different regime of protection arises. Also, 
if they are seen as culprits and merely as an affront to the moral standards of the society a 
different legal regime is employed to protect society from them. Therefore, various States 
have used different approaches in dealing with sex work. Most secular States are moving 
away from laws based on morality or religion to either the sex work model or the sexual 
exploitation model; while others stop at some point within the continuum between the 
two.  
 
Each model corresponds with a particular legal approach. The best way to end this 
industry is debatable. The sex work approach favours across-the-board decriminalization 
with structured legalization. The goal of this model is to remove criminal sanctions from 
all actors in the sex industry. Consequently, sex work, under this model, will become as 
legitimate as any other mode of livelihood. Various countries and communities that have 
adopted this model in various forms include The Netherlands, Germany, New Zealand, 
and Victoria in Australia. Also, about ten counties in Nevada, United States, have 
adopted versions of this approach, although some are retreating from it.224 
 
The sexual exploitation approach seeks to abolish sex work. However, key 
features of this model include criminalizing the demand (including the buyers) — as well 
as the sellers (pimps and traffickers), while decriminalizing prostituted people—the 
sold—and providing them services and job training that they require. This is popularly 
known as the Swedish approach as it is believed to have been pioneered in Sweden. 																																																								
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Countries that have adopted this model include Iceland and Norway. The U.K. seems to 
be leaning in this direction as well.  
 
 In August 2014, the Guardian noted that without the correct information, myths 
abound and debates on sex work become polarised.225 This, according to the news 
agency, was illustrated by the recent reactions to Amnesty International’s endorsement of 
decriminalising sex work.226 The recommendations by Amnesty International included 
among others the need for States to refrain from enacting and/or review and repeal laws 
that make sex workers vulnerable to human rights violations.227 Also, States were to 
protect every individual in their jurisdiction from discriminatory policies, laws and 
practices which increase vulnerability to human rights violations while engaged in sex 
work and limit options for voluntarily ceasing involvement in sex work.228 Moreover, 
States were to incorporate into their strategy, the harm reduction principle.229 They are 
also to prevent and combat trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and to 
protect the human rights of victims of trafficking.230  
 
 Also, States have been tasked to criminalize the sexual exploitation of children; 
recognizing that a child involved in commercial sex work is a victim of sexual 
exploitation, entitled to support, reparations, and remedies, in line with international 																																																								
225 Sex workers’ rights: mapping policy around the world <https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development-professionals-network/2015/sep/15/laws-against-sex-workers-can-a-map-help-to-move-the-
discussion-forward> 
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human rights law, and that States must take all appropriate measures to prevent sexual 
exploitation and abuse of children.231 Finally, Amnesty International urged States to take 
appropriate measures to realize the economic, social and cultural rights of all people so 
that no person enters sex work against their will or is compelled to rely on it as their only 
means of survival, and to ensure that people are able to stop sex work if and when they 
choose.232 
 
Some of the reactions to this have included the reiteration of public morality. 
Thus, there is evidence that decriminalisation causes trafficking to skyrocket in any 
country – this has been noted in countries such as the Netherlands who employ the sex 
work model.233 Also, proponents of the feminist agenda such as Catherine MacKinnon, 
Andrea Dworkin and Katherine Berry have done extensive work in this area and also 
present formidable arguments for seeing sex workers - especially females - as victims 
(the sexual exploitation model). Mackinnon, for example, notes that whichever way sex 
commercialisation is regarded, it impacts not only the law but also the culture and the 
policy of any people. She does not contend that States should not adopt measures to 
realize the economic, social and cultural rights of all people so that no person enters sex 
work unwillingly. However, she challenges the notion that people enter into or remain in 
sex work willingly.  
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According to research, most sex workers enter the system as minors234 who 
according to many jurisdictions are incapable of consenting or willingly able to enter 
such a trade. Truly few people may ever enter willingly; however, many females began 
sex work as infants or many suffered abuse while they were minors and this has 
catapulted them into the trade.235 According to Mackinnon, carving out a definition of 
prostitution is not necessarily profitable as people usually took advantage of inadequacy 
of definitions to perpetuate this level of trafficking. However, she described it as 
essentially any sexual act, the consideration for which is not sex. Sexual intercourse is an 
interaction (call for and response with sex) between consenting people. Therefore, she 
notes, as regards the sexual act itself, that money or the consideration provided coerces 
the sex worker rather than guarantees their consent. When people pay for sex, they would 
demand value for their money. That demand is well against the will of any sex worker. 
 
She proves this by noting that a vast majority of sex workers suffer from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The degree of their suffering is comparable to that 
which is suffered by victims of rape and veterans of war. This has led many of them to 
become dependent on drugs and pimps who would give them more drugs to numb their 
pain at the cost of their freedom. These facts are similar to facts gathered in Sweden 
according to which usually young women or girls below 25 years who were sex workers 
were also found to be drug addicts.236 This plunges them deeper into the sex trade. She 
therefore alludes to the fact that many of the female sex workers who voluntarily engage 																																																								
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in sex work are victims, essentially blinded by a false consciousness. These facts, in her 
view, point to sex work as systemic dehumanisation and objectification of persons 
especially females regardless of their age.237   
 
Furthermore, the concept of “elimination of harm”, which Amnesty International 
recommends, is not central to the sex work agenda because it is incoherent with sex for 
sale. It has been argued that when sex work is understood as sexual exploitation we 
recognise that it cannot be made safe. According to the statistics on the multiplication of 
trafficking, decriminalising legislation seems to be a failed experiment.238 Where pimping 
and brothel keeping were legalized, trafficking increased and the welfare of sex workers 
suffered.239 In 1999, when Sweden passed a law criminalizing the buying but not the 
selling of sex, many outsiders were sceptical of this regime. However, in recent times the 
Swedish model has gathered lots of momentum. Norway and Iceland subsequently 
adopted it. Critics are however of the view that, such laws increases the stigma on sex 
workers, with occasionally grave repercussions.  
 
On the basis of the Utilitarian theories of Mill and Bentham, and the 
Deontological views of Kant, some people have suggested that sex work is unethical.240 
Mill's theory of utilitarianism proposes the concept of a higher form of pleasure. He 
categorised these into two: first, duties of good-will, or benevolence, and second, duties 
of indebtedness or justice. Bentham subscribed to the first as well - which he referred to 																																																								
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as altruism.241 Actions falling under the first group were benevolent; those falling under 
the second are righteous and compulsory, according to Kant. Kant adds that, the chief of 
these duties is respect for the rights of others. It is our duty to regard them as sacred and 
to respect and maintain them as such.  
 
Kant also proposes a test for determining whether or not something is ethical. 242  
The first of these is, whether the act in question allows for the universality of moral 
judgments, whether it is applicable to anyone, anywhere, and at anytime.  The second test 
is whether the act deals with all persons in ways that treat them as ends. In other words, 
persons cannot use people for their own benefit.  Applying Kant's standards, first the act 
sex work will be deemed unethical because it is not universal. According to Kant, if the 
intent of an action in question can without self-contradiction be universalized, it is 
morally possible; if it cannot be so universalized without contradicting itself, it is morally 
impossible.243 It is ridiculous to think that everyone could be a sex worker or partake in 
sex work. Indeed, if children began to say to their parents that they would like to be sex 
workers in future, many parents would either be in a state of shock or take really drastic 
measures to avoid this. 
 
Kant also disagreed with the use of people to satisfy the sexual desires of others. 
He asked: ‘May a man for instance, mutilate his body for profit? May he surrender 
himself at a price to the highest bidder?’244 Sex work, like slavery, consists of one person 
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selling their body to another and this violates even their duty to themselves, according to 
him. He underscored that, 'If a man for gain or profit submits to all indignities and makes 
himself the plaything of another, he casts away the worth of his manhood.’ 245 Kant's 
position is that sex workers give up their freedom and perhaps give away bits of their 
person because of the inherent objectification. Kant adds that sexual love makes the 
person an object of appetite, and as soon as that appetite has been stilled the person is cast 
aside as one cast away a lemon which has been sucked dry.246   
 
It has thus been suggested that sex workers have enormously restricted life 
choices, and many of these women have been physically coerced into the profession. 
Coupled with statistics on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), stigmatisation and the 
prevalence of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, sex work seems to cause more pain than 
pleasure. While it causes one party pleasure, which may be fleeting, it is argued that it 
causes the other equal - if not more - pain. To some writers these qualities negate each 
other. Using this analysis, some have argued that Bentham, Mill and Kant would oppose 
sex work because of its lack of utility and because it is unethical.247     	It	 is	 important	 to	 however	 note	 that	 most	 of	 the	 theoretical	 frameworks	regarding	 violence	 against	 women	 emanated	 from	 feminist	 theories.248	Feminist	theory	is	broad	and	largely	inter-disciplinary	in	approach.	Its	goal	is	to	understand	
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the	 roles,	 experiences,	 and	 values	 of	 individuals	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 gender.249	In	 the	arena	of	sexual	exploitation,	the	main	feminist	question	is	whether	sex	work	or	any	exchange	 of	 sex	 for	 something	 of	 financial	 value	 is	 or	 can	 be	 voluntary.250	This	discussion	actually	sets	the	tone	on	what	legal	approach	should	be	used	by	States	in	addressing	 issues	 regarding	 sex	 work.	 With	 regard	 to	 sexual	 exploitation	 or	 sex	work,	 scholars	 and	 advocates	 are	 generally	 divided	 into	 two	 opposing	 theoretical	camps.	One	group	condemns	all	 forms	of	voluntary	and	 involuntary	sex	work	as	a	form	 of	 oppression	 against	 women.	 This	 group	 is	 usually	 referred	 to	 as	 neo-abolitionists.	According	to	them,	sex	work	 is	never	entirely	consensual	and	cannot	be	 regarded	 as	 such.251	The	 other	 group	 contends	 that	 a	 woman	 has	 a	 right	 to	choose	sex	work	as	a	form	of	employment	or	even	as	a	career.		 	 	 	 		Out	 of	 these	 two	 camps,	 four	 strands	 of	 feminism	 have	 however	 been	identified,	 each	 of	which	 approaches	 the	 issue	 of	 sex	work	 somewhat	 differently,	according	to	Professor	Patricia	Cain.252	They	are	Liberal,	Cultural,	Postmodern	and	Radical	 feminism.	 Liberal	 feminism	 concerns	 itself	 with	 equal	 rights	 and	opportunities	 and	 the	 intensification	 of	 constitutional	 rights	 to	 women.	 Radical	feminism	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 stresses	 that	women	must	 be	 perceived	 as	 one	 class	dominated	 by	 another	 (Marxist	 feminism),	 with	 resulting	 class	 struggle.	 It	 also	advocates	 changes	 in	 laws	 that	 favour	 the	 male	 class	 to	 curtail	 inequalities	 of	
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power.253	Neo-abolitionist	perspectives	with	regard	to	sexual	exploitation	of	women	and	girls	emerged	from	Radical	and	Marxist	feminism.	Radical	feminism	sees	social	organization	 and	 structure	 as	 inherently	 patriarchal,	 as	 sexism	 exists	 to	maintain	male	 privilege	 and	 the	 patriarchal	 social	 order. 254 	This	 theory	 stipulates	 that	violence	against	women	is	a	systemic	form	of	men's	domination	and	social	control	of	women.	Thus,	 assaults	occur	primarily	because	of	 institutionalized	male	privilege,	as	men	believe	it	is	their	right	to	inflict	violence	against	women.	 	 	 		The	perception	is	that	sexual	commerce	provides	a	patriarchal	right	of	access	to	 women's	 bodies.	 Hence,	 it	 perpetuates	 women's	 subordination	 to	 men.255	Like	radical	feminism,	Marxist	feminism	is	another	neo-abolitionist	stance	that	generally	views	all	 forms	of	 sexual	 commerce	as	a	 form	of	violence	against	women.	Marxist	feminists	have	contended	that	sexuality	corresponds	to	 feminism	in	 the	way	work	does	 to	 Marxism	 i.e.	 that	 which	 is	 most	 one's	 own	 and	 yet	 is	 taken	 away.256	According	 to	 Marxist	 feminism,	 women's	 oppression	 stem	 from	 economic	dependence	on	men	in	a	male-centric	society257	and	capitalism	continues	to	be	the	overarching	oppressor	of	women.	Marxist	 feminists	thus	postulate	that	 for	so	 long	as	capitalism	exists,	women	will	live	in	a	patriarchal	state	and	economically	depend	on	men	in	a	society	structured	around	social	class.258 
 																																																								
253 Gerassi, supra, note 248. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
	 81	
Flowing from this, Marxist feminists believe that economic exploitation takes up 
many forms such as sex work and pornography. This to them is the oppression of sex and 
class as 'Women's sexuality and sexual energy is appropriated by the men who buy or 
control the sexual services exchange (i.e., pimps) just as any worker's energy is 
appropriated to the capitalists for their profits, leading to alienation of one's bodily 
capacities and very bodily being.'259 Catherine MacKinnon, who has been described as a 
Marxist feminist legal scholar, argues that all forms of pornography, sex work, and sex 
trafficking are abuses of sex and a form of power taken away from women.260         
  
Critics have however argued that these forms of feminism do not support the 
autonomy of women currently or previously engaged in sex work when they choose to 
leave the field or provide any subsequent form of advocacy work.261 In response to these 
criticisms, and adding to an entrenched debate of feminism, choice, and freedom, a new 
feminist framework arguing for women's right to choose sex work has emerged.262 The 
pro-sex work perspective, or sex positivism is one of its off shoots.263 Advocates of this 
perspective hold that all forms of sexuality – whether paid or unpaid is consensual in 
many cases and that a woman should be free to make her own decision regarding the type 
of work in which she chooses to partake.264 According to this school of thought, any 
mandate or perspective dictating to women that their choice of work is wrong remains 
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dangerous and inherently patriarchal.265 Sex positivists shift the model of sex work from 
a typically neo-abolitionist model that rescues and protects victims from sex work and 
sexual exploitation to providing services for women who work in the sex industry.266 
  
The Neo-abolitionist view is very critical of sex positivism however, hence the 
tension in the approach of dealing with pornography and sex work.267 Mackinnon argues 
for example that the presence of consideration creates a demand for sex and negates 
consent.268 The consent is purchased as opposed to being granted. Others have argued 
that sex positivism and the issue of consent cannot be addressed without also considering 
the high rates of sexual assault and abuse histories, in addition to a lack of economic 
options. 269  Moreover, some religious organizations contend that this framework 
jeopardizes sexual integrity on a national level because moral culture is damaged when 
sex becomes commercialized. 270         
  
Intersectionality, as another model of conceptualizing sex work, adopts various 
opposing feminist views to explain a woman's varied experiences based on her race, 
class, sexual orientation or other identity she holds in addition to her sex.271 This 
framework has been criticized for its lack of a defined intersectional methodology and 
empirical validity, and the fact that, primarily, it has been used to address Black women's 
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experience and is not politically and empirically inclusive of other identity intersections, 
such as sexual orientation or race.272 It is further criticized for contributing to or creating 
additional hierarchies for women.        
  
On another hand, the political economy perspective or framework recognizes 
important principles of intersectionality and argues that violence against women occurs 
because of the economic welfare and political processes driving the State.273 Marxist 
feminism and the political economy perspective are alike in this sense. However, the 
political economy perspective is mainly based on capitalistic differences in wealth alone, 
as opposed to systemic oppression against women, which are engendered by disparities in 
wealth. They highlight the lack of cultural or social capital of women who struggle 
against economic, social, and sexual oppressions. They believe that women are 
compelled to sell sexual or erotic services because the political environment at the policy 
level does not offer equal opportunities for women to gain social capital generally. 274 
This framework like the Marxism or Radical Feminism also questions the woman's 
ability to choose. For this reason, they face similar criticism on those grounds.   
  
These contrasting theoretical frameworks drive the debate with regard to the 
prohibition, decriminalization, partial criminalisation, partial legalization, or complete 
legalization of prostitution and commercial sex work. Although various States apply the 
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theories in variant forms, the debate would never really end.275 With the exception of 
parts of Nevada, the United States currently maintains a prohibitionist	 stance on sex 
work, as anyone who participates in the promotion or participation of sexual activities for 
profit in the U.S. may be charged with prostitution and commercial vice. No distinction is 
made between those who buy, sell, or facilitate the selling of sex acts. Exceptions include 
cases that involve: (1) minors, in which any commercial sex act is illegal; and (2) adults, 
only when elements of force, fraud, or coercion are present. Many other States adopt this 
model.276            
  
Those who support prohibition of sex work base their arguments on the high rates 
of homelessness; mental health trauma, drug addiction and sexual/physical assault over 
the course of sex work and indicate that most people engaged in sex work do not freely 
consent.277 According to them, legalization and decriminalization would not decrease its 
harm to women and girls.278 The Sex positivist movement however argues that countries 
like the U.S. set a high standard or burden of proof for trafficking victims and criminalize 
the activities of women who sell sex and those who may also be in need of services. Also, 
because sex workers would have a criminal record they may never be able to exit the 
trade. Others argue that these standards are detrimental to women because they are 
viewed and treated as criminals unless there is proof of force or coercion. 279  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: A NEW MORALITY 
 
A morally neutral public policy framework underpinning laws is an ideal that many 
scholars in recent times have argued is impossible to achieve and even undesirable.280 
Some commentators even suggest that it amounts to a moral claim to suggest that law 
ought to be neutral.281 However, in advocating for “moral neutrality” and a public policy 
regime for regulating human conduct with that as its basis, I am not suggesting that there 
is a universally accepted construct of morality, free from value judgments. What I 
however mean and intend to do is to remove or dissociate the underlying “moral” content 
of some laws which are predicated on religious and/or cultural conceptions of morality, 
from the conduct that is the subject matter of the law in question or the criminal 
prohibition thereof.282 Thus, the conduct devoid of religious and/or cultural overtones 
will then have to be examined within the context of our pluralistic society in order to 
determine the values that must replace or augment some aspects of the religious and/or 
cultural values that usually frown upon or prohibit such conduct.  
 
Social mores however are usually developed over a long period of time and in 
many instances have been entrenched without much debate. In Ghana for instance, the 
impact of religion is arguably part and parcel of the identity of the people.283 Many 																																																								
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Ghanaians are therefore not afraid to tout their religious beliefs and be guided in their 
day-to-day interactions adhering to religion imposed moral codes. As an undergraduate 
student at the University of Ghana a few years ago, I once interacted with another student 
who vehemently opposed any notion that the supreme law of Ghana was the Constitution, 
1992. To this person, as a Christian, it was the Bible that was the supreme law and no 
human or earthly edict could claim supremacy over it. I was at pains to explain the 
position that Ghana was a secular state and as such it was the Constitution that was the 
supreme law; but I was rebuked and described as a blasphemous person for daring to 
suggest what I was suggesting.284 Such is the common misunderstanding and blurring of 
the lines and issues that is commonplace within the Ghanaian society where secular law 
and religion conflate.285  
 
Similarly, Ghanaians are proud to boast of our culture, which we deem virtuous 
and which influences our views and opinions regarding contemporary and controversial 
issues.286 Cultural validity is thus a jealously guarded treasure of national import, and this 
has been the justification for the condemnation of several conduct that do not meet 
standards of our conception of cultural morality.287 Thus, cultural morality continues to 																																																																																																																																																																					
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be one of the underlying values that influence public policy making, which in turn 
justifies the existence of certain laws.288 The questions that need to be addressed as a 
result are as follows: should conceptions of religious and cultural morality continue to be 
the only factors that determine public policy, and subsequently determine conduct that 
are deemed not to be in the public interest and as a result criminalized? If the answer to 
this first question is in the negative, then what other variables must we consider in public 
policy making? 
 
In this chapter, I delve into public policy making and examine certain prima facie 
“morally neutral” variables which I believe must be considered and balanced against the 
religious and cultural justifications that will continue to play a role where the morality of 
Ghanaian laws and specific intimate conduct are concerned.289 I thus examine sexual 
morality generally, from the religious and cultural perspectives, and briefly discuss 
feminist jurisprudential thoughts within this field as well. In order to propose my 
framework for the proper regulation of sexual morality, I draw inspiration from the 
making of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which is significant 
because many diverse groups of people for the first time were able to agree on a 
framework for the promotion and protection of human rights, despite their many 
differences including religious, cultural, language and other barriers.290 The lessons from 
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the UDHR drafting process are important because it shows the possibility of achieving a 
rational public policy framework for the regulation of controversial human conduct 
involving individual autonomy.291  
 
In summary, my proposal for a new form of morality first considers that all 
human beings are created and born equal. Equal in dignity, equal in rights, and equal in 
terms of their individuality and the ability to potentially act in an autonomous manner 
free from external influence. Thus, Dignity, Individual autonomy and Equality (D.I.E.) 
are the core standards and variables that I propose must be considered when determining 
the morality of laws generally. Intimate human conduct, involving no victims per se, 
which is sought to be regulated through the criminal law must measure up to these 
standards. Hence, the criminalization must ensure dignity, not unreasonably be an affront 
to individual autonomy, and must have the quality of equality about it. I therefore 
postulate that it is only when these values subsists in the law that the religious and 
cultural conceptions of morality underpinning the law in question can be deemed valid. 
The absence of these fundamental human values invalidate, in my opinion such 
repressive laws, for religious and cultural conceptions of morality alone cannot be a good 
yardstick for social ordering.  
 
A) SEXUAL MORALITY GENERALLY 
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The Black's law dictionary offers three very general definitions of the word 
“morality”. It describes it as 'conformity with recognized rules of conduct' or as 'the 
character of being virtuous especially in sexual matters.’ 292  According to its third 
definition, “morality” is a system of duties or ethics.293 The origins of the word morality 
can however be traced to the Latin word Mos (plural Mores) which means customs or 
people’s values and traditions, people’s heritage or ways of life and conduct in a given 
community. 294 Although these definitions seem helpful in describing morality generally, 
and examples of moral conduct and behaviour, morality is generally a very subjective 
concept or ideal that differ from person to person, community to community etc. 
However, the general consensus is the fact that the word encompasses some core values 
that individuals and communities accept as regulating their day to day lives. It is likely 
for this reason that many scholars from time immemorial have equated morality to moral 
law.295 They equate morality with a system of law or regard it as a species of internal 
legislation.296 Taylor expresses this succinctly by suggesting as follows: 
 
The jurist inevitably gravitates towards the view of morality as a code of rules of 
conduct, either established directly by divine legislation, or revealed by reason. 
For him all the significance of morality is contained in the moral law, and is 
summed up in a series of comprehensive ‘Thou-shalt-not’s'.297 
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The definitions of morality inevitably highlight its communal nature. Indeed the 
term “public morality” has been used to describe ‘the total set of ethical-moral, legal-
human rights values, customs or traditions which define, describe, promote and defend a 
given society’s or community’s common good, shared values and vision, their public 
ethos, and the common pursuit of the good in order to achieve their full potential and 
civilization.298 However, it must be noted that it is individuals that come together to form 
communities, societies and ultimately States. Thus, a collective sense of public morality 
has invariably been recognized as the standard, which regulates behaviour and values of 
both the community and the individual.299 
 
Many, including the present author, however hold the view that moral values vary 
from community to community and from time to time.300 However, especially with 
regard to Africa, Professor John Waliggo has noted that among people who share a 
common heritage, cultures or religious beliefs, some of these values cut across 
communities.301 For others, the prevalent law is the determinant of what the standard of 
morality for the community is.302 In other words, law determines what standard of 
morality prevails within the time and space in which the law is operating.303 The general 
idea of the link between law and morality is that in some way the law exists to ‘promote 
morality, to preserve those conditions which make the moral life possible, and thus to 
enable men to lead sober and industrious lives. The average man regards law as justice 																																																								
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systematized, and justice itself as a somewhat chaotic mass of moral principles.’304 That 
notwithstanding, morality is not only a community based or public phenomenon. This 
idea has however been debated and questioned in legal scholarship due to the difficulty in 
ascertaining especially for pluralistic communities what the moral standard is at any 
given time.305 Indeed it was the crux of the debate between Hart and Devlin in regard of 
the Wolfenden report.306  
 
John Stuart Mill for instance is known for his criticisms of collective or public 
morality whilst advocating for a system of individualized or personal morality.307 Mill 
notes that the tyranny of the majority can likely operate not only through laws or acts of 
the public authorities, but also through society’s collective tyranny over individuals 
within it.308 He noted that a social tyranny, more formidable than many kinds of political 
oppression, could exist where societies enforce their own commands or customs.309 
Although such rules may not attract extreme penalties, Mill noted that such community-
wide “accepted” norms make few exceptions, infiltrate the details of life and enslave the 
soul itself. 310 His concern seems to flows directly from the manner in which these 
collective commands or values infringe on the independence of individuals without 
limits. Mill thus manages to secure a basis for protecting fundamental human rights of 
minorities especially within Bentham's Utilitarian school of thought.311 
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This human rights consideration is important because sex or sexuality are usually 
very sensitive topics, and more so within an African context. Sexuality is by far the most 
intimate feature of humanity.312 People usually guard their sexual secrets and intimate 
experiences very closely. They may do this so well that even their partners in long-term 
relationships, may never share all their sex related experiences, or admit to themselves 
their longings for a particular kind of arousal or pleasure, because it seems 
inappropriate. 313  In fact, a few decades ago, women usually had difficulty with 
acknowledging to themselves that sex was in general something they wanted.314 In Ghana 
for instance, women have been socialized from time immemorial to believe that actively 
discussing sex or having sexual desires was attitude unbecoming of a good woman. Thus, 
the patriarchal nature of the society dictates that it is men who should want and freely talk 
about sex without any consequences whatsoever.  
 
It is however a fallacy to pretend that only men have sexual desires, or can 
appropriately voice out such desires. In fact, a few years ago a number of international 
experts at a meeting convened by the World Health Organization (WHO) adopted a 
definition that addresses sexuality on four different levels:315 1) Sexuality is a central 
aspect of being human throughout life and encompasses sex, gender identities and roles, 
sexual orientation, eroticism, pleasure, intimacy and reproduction; 2) Sexuality is 
experienced and expressed in thoughts, fantasies, desires, beliefs, attitudes, values, 
behaviours, practices, roles and relationships; 3) Sexuality is influenced by the interaction 																																																								
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of biological, psychological, social, economic, political, cultural, ethical, legal, historical 
and religious and spiritual factors; and 4) Sexuality includes the basic need for human 
affection, touch and intimacy, as consciously and unconsciously expressed through one’s 
feelings, thoughts and behaviour.316 
 
Sexuality therefore may either bring joy, happiness and fulfilment or pain and 
suffering as the case may be. Sexual experiences vary greatly and as a result it is difficult 
to determine the utility of sexual acts since these are the most private of human 
behaviour. However, it cannot be dismissed that certain values cut across the various 
communities of the world, as a result of our common humanity, religion, culture etc. The 
issues that must however be addressed regarding the morality of sexual conduct are: 1) 
whether there a universally accepted construct of what is sexually moral conduct; and 2) 
If there is, to what extent are they divergent? For natural law theorists and thinkers, 
legislation must always be in conformity with principles of morality. After experiencing 
the Nazi tragedy, the German philosopher, Gustav Radbruch, was of the view that ‘the 
fundamental principles of humanitarian morality were part of the very concept of legality 
and that no positive enactment or statute, however clearly it expressed and however 
clearly it conformed with the formal criteria of validity of a given legal system, could be 
valid if it contravened the basic principles of morality’.317 
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Traditional African culture seems to embrace this position in that they emphasize 
morality more than legislation.318 In Africa children are socialized from a tender age to 
acquire habits, attitudes, beliefs, skills and motives that enable them fit into the 
community. Morality has been and remains an integral part of African communities.319 
Contrary to Austin's argument that law is a command of the sovereign backed by 
sanctions, in traditional African societies, there seems to be no clear-cut distinction 
between law and morality since the rules of moral conduct in a way amount to law.320 
Usually, if a person behaves contrary to moral standards, they would be isolating 
themselves from their community and the society was structured such that no one could 
exist outside a community.321 For this reason, banishment or exclusion of a person from 
their community or communal life was a grave punishment feared by all.322 This also 
perhaps explains the nature of some of our laws criminalizing sexual behaviour such as 
sex work and unnatural carnal knowledge.  
 
Sexual Morality is however one of those concepts that remains very controversial 
and topical all around the world. Even in countries with liberal policies regarding sex and 
its many manifestations, there remains some form of State control over sex, and its 
expressions thereof.323 Thus, the question of what is sexually moral generally, and to wit 
private individual sexual morality takes on a whole new dimension when viewed, for 
example, within the context of State laws that criminalize private consensual homosexual 
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acts, private consensual heterosexual acts that are not in conformity with “traditional” 
forms/notions of sex, and even sex work.324 By far, religious and cultural conceptions of 
sexual morality are what have greatly influenced the outward prescription of a uniform 
code of sexual morality in a country like Ghana; therefore “officially” subjugating the 
individual’s inherent propensity to be “sexually immoral”, in line with the religious and 
cultural proscriptions. 
 
Feminist jurisprudential thought has also arguably contributed greatly to the issue 
of sexual morality, although this is not an aspect of legal philosophy that much attention 
has been paid to within the Ghanaian legal academy. However, any discussion of the 
regulation of sex work will be incomplete without engaging that strand of feminist 
jurisprudence that asserts that sex work fits into the patriarchal nature of almost all 
societies, and that it maintains male dominance over females, is degrading, dehumanizing 
and treats women merely as objects of male desire in the same way as pornography 
does.325 To this strand of feminism, it is the historical heterosexual male erotic desire that 
has systematically transformed women into mere pleasure objects. 326  Women who 
engage in sex work freely and voluntarily are thus considered as victims who have been 
coerced into that line of work as a result of societal patriarchy and male subjugation of 
women generally.327 The partial truth in this statement is quite evident, as admittedly 
women have generally been oppressed and discriminated against from time immemorial, 
in terms of employment opportunities, for example.  																																																								
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However, there has always been another wave of feminism (sex-positive 
feminism) that believe that women who choose to engage in sex work must not be 
considered as oppressed, coerced or even victims per se, but rather should be seen as 
expressing their inherent sexual freedom and/or making rational economic decisions.328 
Hence, male subjugation of women is what has actually led to female empowerment in 
the field of sex work for example, manifested by the proliferation of sex worker activists 
and movements across Africa for instance.329 Similarly, this movement is further fueled 
by the attempt by the same male dominated society to redress the social inequalities it 
created, through rehabilitation programs for sex workers, which in itself arguably 
continues the trend of male dominance and female subjugation. Chi Mgbako puts it in the 
following manner: 
 
In order to be eligible for a rehabilitation program’s skills-training courses, 
participating sex workers often must agree to stop engaging in sex work. But 
there’s long been a running joke among sex workers that participants in these 
programs do so during the day only to surreptitiously return to the streets at night 
where they continue to earn more money through sex work. The reason many sex 
workers in rehabilitation programs revert to sex work is that the income from 
these programs’ alternative livelihoods simply can’t match the money sex workers 
make. As I’ve noted in earlier chapters, African sex workers who enter the 
industry are in many cases choosing sex work over other forms of low wage work 
because sex work pays more. They are making economic decisions that are utterly 																																																								
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rational in light of the financial pressures they face. This same economic rationale 
applies to the rehabilitation context. A sex worker with financial responsibilities 
will likely not permanently leave the industry if the beadwork or candle-making 
skills she’s acquired through a rehabilitation program don’t generate the type of 
income she enjoys as a sex worker.330 
 
It is clear therefore that sexual morality is a contested claim even within feminist 
jurisprudential thought, as the anti-pornography/anti-prostitution wing and the sex-
positive feminist have engaged in the so-called “sex wars” for more than three decades. 
Hence, these seemingly contradictory positions must also be briefly explored, together 
with the religious and cultural conceptions and understandings of sexual morality in order 
to fully appreciate the landscape regarding sexual morality generally, so as to present us 
with a backdrop from which the proposal for a rational public policy framework for 
regulating or de-regulating sexual morality may be made. 
 
1. Religion and Sexual Morality331 
Religion is a great force that from time immemorial has influenced and continues 
to influence human conduct and behavior. As already noted, many Ghanaians profess to 
be religious and thus largely belong to one religious group or another. Many therefore 
acknowledge religious conceptions of morality as being the standard by which activities 
like sexual conduct must be measured against. Indeed, almost all the major religions of 
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this world conceive of sexual morality within the context of marriage; non-conformity 
amounts to sexual immorality and is thus frowned upon.     
  
In Christianity for example, sex is the preserve of married heterosexual couples. 
Infidelity, adultery and even pre-marital sex are greatly frowned upon. Similarly, 
homosexuality, sex work and other forms of non-procreative sex are all abhorred and 
participants in these “deviant” expressions of sexuality are rebuked and considered 
immoral persons. Thus, according to PG Nelson there are eleven (11) sexual prohibitions 
in the Bible that essentially confine sexual activity to marriage with the intent of 
protecting married life. 332  They are: Adultery; 333  Bestiality; 334  Homosexuality; 335 
Incest; 336  Pre-Marital Sex; 337  Prostitution; 338  Rape; 339  Shrine Prostitution; 340 
Transvestism;341 Unclean Acts;342 and Violation of Betrothal.343    
  
These manifestations of sex, sexuality or incidents of both are prohibited in 
Christianity because of their inherent immorality. Thus, Christians must therefore refrain 
from the doing of any of these acts; and there is no doubt that Judeo-Christian beliefs in 
this regard have from time immemorial been the basis for laws that seek to criminalize 
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certain sexual behavior and/or regulate such conduct. But by far the most important fact 
about sexual morality within the context of Christianity is the marriage nexus that it 
espouses. Thus, sex or all forms of expressions of human sexuality thereof must conform 
to certain laid down standards and must occur within the context of marriage between a 
man and a woman.          
  
i. Christianity and Sexual Morality       
In Christianity, every moral question is necessarily connected with the Christian 
God at some point because it is He that created everything including sex. For instance, 
Ravi Zacharias a Christian apologist in a talk on Absolute Moral Law & the existence of 
God, in answering a question on why there is so much evil if God exists noted as follows: 
 
If there is a thing as evil, there is a thing as good. If there is a thing as good, there 
is a thing as a moral law which provides the standard by which we ascertain that 
there is good or evil. If there is a moral law, then there is a moral law giver.344 
 
Indeed, Jesus Christ summed up the Christian moral law into two distinct, but 
interconnected parts in the New Testament.345 First is to love God with all of one's heart, 
soul, and strength and the second was to love thy neighbour as thyself.346  
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Another Christian philosopher differentiates between laws.347 C. S. Lewis notes 
that there are laws peculiar to man's human nature that is not shared with animals or 
vegetables or inorganic things, and man can disobey if he chooses. He notes that it was 
previously referred to as the law of nature because people thought that everyone knew it 
by nature and did not need to be taught it. He acknowledged that just as there are a few 
people who are colour-blind or have no ear for a tune there must definitely have been 
some individuals who did not know this law of nature. However, generally, the human 
idea of decent behaviour was obvious to everyone. According to Lewis, if these were not 
right, the First World War would be nonsense. He notes that there was no sense in 
‘saying the enemy were in the wrong unless right is a real thing which the Nazis at 
bottom knew as well as we did and ought to have practised.’348  
 
Due to differences in civilisations and different ages, culture, beliefs and self-
relativist ideas, the idea of a law of nature or decent behaviour known to all men appears 
unsound, and many argue that there are, have been and will be different moralities. Lewis 
however notes that though there have been differences between their moralities, these 
have never amounted to anything like a total difference. According to him, the moral 
teaching of the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Hindus, Chinese, Greeks and Romans, 
are similar to each other as well as to ours.349 He also points to human anxiety as regards 
their eagerness to make excuses or shift responsibility for not having behaved decently as 
another pointer to human conception of a general law of nature. He underscores the two 
points: ‘First, that human beings, all over the earth, have this curious idea that they 																																																								
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ought to behave in a certain way, and cannot really get rid of it. Secondly, that they do 
not in fact behave in that way. They know the Law of Nature; they break it.’350 
 
Lewis thus fully agrees that we learn the rule of decent behaviour from parents 
and teachers, and friends and books, as we learn everything else. However, according to 
him, some of the things we learn are mere conventions which might have been different: 
such as learning to keep to the left of the road, but it might just as well have been the rule 
to keep to the right He distinguishes this from other facts of humanity such as 
mathematics, which he refers to as real truths.351 He further argues that if this were not 
the case, there could never be any moral progress. He defines progress not just as change, 
but change for the better. Flowing from these he argues that if no set of moral ideals were 
truer or better than any other, there would be no sense in preferring civilised morality to 
savage morality, or Christian morality to Nazi morality. He points out the fact that all 
humans believe that some moralities are better than others. He then adds that once a set 
of moral ideas can be better than another, it is in fact implied that both ideas are being 
measured by a standard; with the undeniable conclusion being that one of them conforms 
to that standard more nearly than the other.352 Essentially he argues that it is one thing to 
implicitly admit that there is some higher standard and quite another thing to admit that 
because of reasons that we may give, we may prefer other standards. 
 
With regard to Christian sexual morality, Lewis notes that this must not be 
confused with the social rule of "modesty" or propriety/decency. He describes the social 																																																								
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rule of propriety for example as those rules that lay down how much of the human body 
should be displayed and what subjects can be referred to, and in what words, according to 
the customs of a given social circle. He underscores that even though the rule of chastity 
has been the same for all Christians at all times, the rule of propriety changes. He gave 
the following example:   
 
A girl in the Pacific islands wearing hardly any clothes and a Victorian lady 
completely covered in clothes might both be equally "modest," proper, or decent, 
according to the standards of their own societies: and both, for all we could tell by 
their dress, might be equally chaste (or equally unchaste). Some of the language 
which chaste women used in Shakespeare's time would have been used in the 
nineteenth century only by a woman completely abandoned. When people break 
the rule of propriety current in their own time and place, if they do so in order to 
excite lust in themselves or others, then they are offending against chastity. But if 
they break it through ignorance or carelessness they are guilty only of bad 
manners. When, as often happens, they break it defiantly in order to shock or 
embarrass others, they are not necessarily being unchaste, but they are being 
uncharitable: for it is uncharitable to take pleasure in making other people 
uncomfortable. I do not think that a very strict or fussy standard of propriety is 
any proof of chastity or any help to it, and I therefore regard the great relaxation 
and simplifying of the rule which has taken place in my own lifetime as a good 
thing.'353 
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Lewis also describes chastity as the most unpopular of the Christian virtues. He sums it 
up as follows: ‘Either marriage, with complete faithfulness to your partner, or else total 
abstinence.’ He observes that this is so difficult and so contrary to our instincts that one 
may conclude that either Christianity is wrong or our sexual instinct, as it now is, has 
gone wrong.354 
 
In his view, human appetite is in ludicrous and preposterous excess of its 
function. To illustrate this he notes as follows:  
 
You can get a large audience together for a striptease act — that is, to watch a girl 
undress on the stage. Now suppose you came to a country where you could fill a 
theatre by simply bringing a covered plate on to the stage and then slowly lifting 
the cover so as to let everyone see, just before the lights went out, that it contained 
a mutton chop or a bit of bacon, would you not think that in that country 
something had gone wrong with the appetite for food? And would not anyone 
who had grown up in a different world think there was something equally queer 
about the state of the sex instinct among us? If the evidence showed that a good 
deal was being eaten, then of course we should have to abandon the hypothesis of 
starvation and try to think of another one. In the same way, before accepting 
sexual starvation as the cause of the strip-tease, we should have to look for 
evidence that there is in fact more sexual abstinence in our age than in those ages 
when things like the strip-tease were unknown. But surely there is no such 
evidence. Contraceptives have made sexual indulgence far less costly within 																																																								
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marriage and far safer outside it than ever before, and public opinion is less 
hostile to illicit unions and even to perversion than it has been since Pagan times. 
Nor is the hypothesis of "starvation" the only one we can imagine. Everyone 
knows that the sexual appetite, like our other appetites, grows by indulgence. 
Starving men may think much about food, but so do gluttons; the gorged, as well 
as the famished, like titillations.355 
 
Lewis is clearly suggesting that there is more sexual abstinence in our age than in those 
ages when things like the strip-tease were unknown, and if this is so then his view is that 
we could not possibly accept the starvation hypothesis because now more than ever all 
forms of sexuality and sexual intercourse have been greatly facilitated. Thus, people are 
less appalled at the mention of homosexuality, bestiality and other forms of sex 
considered as sexually immoral by the Christian faith; some of which would have carried 
a penalty of death in times past. 
 
That notwithstanding, in Christianity, there is a clear nexus between sex and 
marriage.356 Christianity frowns on premarital and extramarital sexual activity. The 
Christian standard is a rather high one such that immorality does not begin only in sexual 
acts but in all lustful thoughts towards a person who is not the spouse of the one engaging 
in the lustful thinking. According to the Bible, Jesus taught his followers: ‘But I tell you 
that anyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in 
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his heart'’.357 The Bible also notes that: ‘Marriage should be honoured by all, and the 
marriage bed kept pure, for God will judge the adulterer and all the sexually immoral’.358 
Paul in his first letter to the Corinthians, in the 6th chapter, notes that the body was not 
made for sexual immorality. Fornication, adultery and homosexuality or all forms of 
sexual acts that do not conform to or are contrary to heterosexual sex within the context 
of marriage, are seen as directly infringing upon the marriage covenant with the sole 
purpose of satisfying immoral sexual desires.359  
 
These arguments are in line with the Bible, specifically in the Book of Romans, 
where it is noted as follows:  
 
For although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to 
him, but their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened. 
Although they claimed to be wise, they became fools and exchanged the glory of 
the immortal God for images made to look like a mortal human being and birds 
and animals and reptiles. Therefore God gave them over in the sinful desires of 
their hearts to sexual impurity for the degrading of their bodies with one another. 
They exchanged the truth about God for a lie, and worshiped and served created 
things rather than the Creator—who is forever praised. Amen. Because of this, 
God gave them over to shameful lusts. Even their women exchanged natural 
sexual relations for unnatural ones. In the same way the men also abandoned 
natural relations with women and were inflamed with lust for one another. Men 																																																								
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committed shameful acts with other men, and received in themselves the due 
penalty for their error.360 
 
The Hebrew and Christian Bibles contain many examples of the moral code of the Jewish 
and Christian religions. In the Book of Leviticus (20:10–17), for example, there are 
explicit prohibitions against adultery, incest, sexual activity with people of one’s own 
gender, and bestiality. The Bible is however seemingly silent on oral sex and 
masturbation;361 although it may be inferred from the Christian conception of sexual 
morality that such acts will necessarily be deemed immoral and unwholesome. However, 
other parts of the Bible such as Paul's letter to the Corinthians bring to the fore the 
concept that a Christian's body is a miniature temple of their God and must not be a tool 
for sexual immorality or prostitution for that matter.362   
 
ii. Islam and Sexual Morality 
As a religion, Islam recognizes the sexual needs of human beings and believes 
this natural instinct should be nurtured, not suppressed and be fulfilled in a responsible 
way.363 In Islam, sex is neither expressly nor impliedly or apparently equated to inherent 
evil or sin; as has been taught by the Qur'an, the Prophet Muhammad and his Ahlu'l-bayt. 
Islam however highly recommends marriage as a good deed and thus very strongly 
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opposes celibacy and monasticism.364 The legal term for marriage in Islam is "nikah" 
which literally means sexual intercourse. According to the Quran 24:32, Allah says, 
‘Marry the spouseless among you...if they are poor, God will enrich them of His bounty’. 
The first word of this verse begins with "ankihu" (Marry). This is an imperative form of 
the word ''nikah''. According to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, any 
communication in imperative form from God can have two levels of meaning. It may be 
an obligatory command or a very high recommendation. By implication, celibacy is not 
considered a virtue. Flowing from the verse, the Prophet continues by saying that, 
‘Whoever refrains from marriage because of fear of poverty, he has indeed thought badly 
of God.’ Again, Allah says: ‘... Then marry such women as seem good to you two, three 
or four. But if you fear that you will not do justice between your wives, then marry only 
one.’365 
 
It is also worth noting that Islam forbids celibacy366 and monasticism is also 
forbidden for both men and women. 'Uthman bin Maz'un, a close companion of the 
Prophet, had his wife complain that he was abstaining from sexual relations during the 
night as well as the day. The Prophet was angered and is reported to have said, ‘O 
'Uthman! Allah did not send me for monasticism, rather He sent me with a simple and 
straight. I fast, pray and also have intimate relations with my wife. So whosoever likes my 
tradition, then he should follow it; and marriage is one of my traditions.’367 Since 
																																																								
364 Id. 
365 Surah An-Nisa [4:3]. 
366 Id. See also, Maulana Feizel Chothia, Sex and Sexuality in Islam, < 
https://www.scribd.com/document/324458106/BOOK-Sex-Sexuality-in-Islam-pdf> Accessed on1 
December, 2017, 9-19. 
367 Wasa ‘il ul-Shi’a, Vol. 14, p. 10. 
	 108	
Uthman was already married, the word "marriage” in this Hadith can only be applied to 
sexual relations. Thus, marriage and sex are among the signs of God's power and 
blessings in Islam. The Qur'an (30:21) says, ‘And among His signs is that He has created 
for you spouses from among yourselves so that you may live in tranquillity with them; 
and He has created love and mercy between you. Verily, in that are signs for those who 
reflect.’ From these few verses of the Qur'an, it is apparent that according to Islam sex is 
limited to marriage and marriage is a manifestation of God's power and blessings. Also, 
sexual urge is a creative command of God placed in human nature and cannot be equated 
with guilt, sin or evil. 
 
In Islam, sexual desire can be enjoyed both in this life and the afterlife. In the 
Qur’an [3:14], Allah says, ‘The love of desire of women has been made to seem fair to 
people.’ The sexual act can however only be realized only in marriage between a man 
and at most four women. Islam frowns upon divorce. It is seen as ‘the lawful thing most 
hated of Allah’. A famous saying of the Prophet recommends: ‘Always marry, never 
divorce. Allah certainly does not love tasters’, that is, those who marry simply to “taste” 
a variety of women. The Quran also provides explicitly that: ‘Marry the spouseless 
among you and your slaves and handmaidens that are righteous; if they are poor, God 
will enrich them of His bounty. A pious son must watch over the chastity of a father who 
has been made a widower by helping him to marry again. This duty of the ta’fif (sexual 
purity) is no less important than that of the kafala (food pension).  
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There are also recommendations in Islam intended to integrate fantasy in the 
sexual relations between spouses and to revive extinct desire by provoked desire. An 
example of this is as follows: the analogy that if a man sees a woman who attracts him, 
he should run home quickly and make love with his wife, and that will appease the ardour 
he feels in his heart. Islam does not therefore repress the libido. According to Islamic 
beliefs, even in the afterlife or in paradise our desires will be accommodated or taken 
seriously. In paradise everyone will have at least one companion, for it is believed that 
there is no celibacy in paradise. Paradise, it is believed, is the time of suspended 
pleasure.368 Hence, it is also the place of perpetual arousal and orgasm that is believed to 
lasts for twenty-four years.369 Earthly orgasm therefore gives us a foretaste of paradise 
and thus, life in paradise is potentially an infinite, eternal orgasm according to Islamic 
jurisprudence.370  
   
With regard same-sex relations, Islam views homosexuality as unnatural, impure 
and against the law of nature in which we have been created. Sodomy is an atrocious sin 
that warrants Allah's wrath because it is suggested that Allah will not have mercy on a 
man who lusts after other men or have anal sex with a woman. These acts are considered 
detestable and persons who engage in them are seen as wicked. Homosexuality is seen as 
a selfish and unworthy attitude, which is both useless and positively harmful to the 
collective morality.  
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2. The Ghanaian Cultural Conception of Sexual Morality 
It is true that sex is one of man’s basic instincts and inclinations, but nonetheless 
the influence of factors such as morality, be it religious or cultural, as well as traditional 
beliefs, superstitions and even folklore cannot be entirely discounted.371 Societies differ 
in how sex is perceived. Even in homogeneous communities, there are usually differences 
regarding sexuality and perceptions of what conduct is deemed sexually moral or 
immoral. In Ghana for example, such differences persist. Therefore in some communities 
in Ghana, polygamy (specifically polygyny) is accepted as generally the norm.372 In other 
communities, a widow is expected to marry the brother of her deceased husband,373 and a 
man can marry his wife’s sister(s).374 The Krobos are particularly noted for their 
“Coming of Age” events called “Dipo”, which is meant to showcase naked adolescent 
girls to the world as a sign of their maturity and eligibility for marriage. It is therefore not 
possible to point to a distinct “Ghanaian culture”, but rather it is the amalgamation of 
many different and diverse cultural practices that is usually collectively referred to as 
“Ghanaian culture”. The Constitution of Ghana recognizes this and provides for the 
protection of all cultural practices, as long as they are not inimical or injurious to the 
well-being of the individual, and do not violate provisions of the Constitution.375  
 
Thus, even though the Ghanaian cultural and traditional perspective regarding 
sexuality is often times obscured by religious judgements or prejudices, the traditional or 																																																								
371 What Is Human Sexuality? <https://catalogue.pearsoned.co.uk/assets/hip/gb/hip_gb.../0205909469.pdf>	
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cultural conception of sexual morality however differs significantly from the religious 
ones discussed in the previous section. For instance, many of the ethnic groups do not 
practice female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM) while the practice is prevalent in the 
three most Northern regions in Ghana.376 The reasons behind the practice of FGM are 
many and very complex.377 They include the belief of some parents that the practice 
empowers their daughters, ensures their ability to get married and protect the family’s 
reputation or serves as a rite of passage into womanhood.378 In some communities, it is 
also performed to apparently preserve a woman’s chastity by restraining or curbing her 
sexual behaviour and appetite/desire.379 The practice of this custom may also be due to 
the patriarchal nature of African culture generally, especially in respect of how both men 
and women are perceived, with regard their sexual organs i.e. the penis and the vagina.380 
Generally, men can be polygamous, and are often expected to be. The penis is therefore 
spoken of freely and even sang about.381 Good women however, are expected to keep 
their feelings in check to the point of suppression. Female sexual pleasure is thus 
disregarded or taken for granted because the vagina is seen to serve no useful purpose but 
receive the male penis, for the purpose of reproduction.382 
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Despite the constitutional prohibition of unwholesome cultural practices, FGM 
continues to be practiced in some communities in Ghana, where it is believed to lower a 
woman’s sexual desire. Moreover, in other communities, uncircumcised women are 
sometimes perceived as being impure and treated as outcasts. Though the major religions 
in Ghana have all condemned the practice, religion has also been used to perpetuate the 
practice. Hence, some communities in Ghana still hold on to the belief that in order to be 
a good Muslim, one must circumcise their daughters.383 On the other hand, among the 
Sisala people, located mainly in the Northern regions of Ghana, it has been noted that 
premarital sex may not necessarily be an immoral activity. As part of the Sisala custom, a 
man who sees a girl he deems attractive to him may approach her with a small "love gift" 
known as helating, which he purchases himself.384 Mendosa has noted that between the 
time the ''love gift'' is given and when the marriage is formally conducted and 
consummated the man may have had pre-marital access to her by virtue of the "love 
gift".385  
 
In light of Africa’s general attitude towards sexuality, it has been suggested that 
sexual relations are not necessarily regarded as moral issues. However, Bediako-Akoto 
believes that this is misleading. He argues that sexuality is a very serious subject and is 
usually considered sacred. Taboos that have existed, according to him, have served as 
barriers to, or limitations on unaccepted sexual behaviour.386 Some of these taboos 
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include prohibitions on oral sex, incest (mogyafra), adultery among others. The various 
ethnic groups in Ghana however have different perspectives regarding sexual morality. 
Pleasure for women is not necessarily immoral. However, actual or overt talk about sex is 
what is usually frowned upon.387 Also, chastity may not be a virtue that cuts across these 
communities. Usually it only does till before puberty, such that there are rites of passage 
such as “Dipo” and “Bragoro”, which celebrate not only the girl's puberty but her 
chastity as well.388 
	
Ghanaian culture is however really an amalgamation of several different and 
distinct beliefs and value systems that has over a long period of time seemingly morphed 
into a somewhat homogenous one. However, the cultural conception of sexual morality 
from the traditional and age-old Ghanaian context is best understood through the lenses 
of polygamy; specifically polygyny. A.B. Ellis for example observes among the Akans 
thus:            
  
It is commonly supposed that where polygamy prevails conjugal fidelity is, as a 
consequence, very lax; but it appears that the infidelity which prevails amongst 
polygamic people is due to the low state of civilization of such peoples; to the 
degraded condition of women, who are regarded as property, and frequently as 
mere beasts of burden; to the absence of domestic affection; and to the general 
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want of abstract ideas of morality rather than to polygamy, which does not, of 
itself, seem to favour immorality….[I]n fact, the women prefer polygamy to 
monogamy.389          
  
Historically, polygamy was therefore not necessarily considered immoral in itself, or the 
sexual promiscuity that occurs as a consequent thereof regarded as manifestations of 
immorality. How then did ‘Ghanaian culture’ become a yardstick for the measurement of 
sexual morality generally, or the acceptable norm regarding Ghanaian sexuality in 
particular?            
  
This must have occurred as a result of contact with foreigners, in particular 
Europeans. The introduction of Christianity and the subsequent Missionary activities that 
took place in the Gold Coast from the 17th Century thereabout had a significant impact on 
the cultural practices and beliefs of the inhabitants of the Gold Coast generally. It has 
been noted that:          
  
After an intercourse of some years with Europeans, the Tshi-speaking inhabitants 
of the towns and villages in the vicinity of the various forts, added to their system 
of polytheism a new deity, whom they termed Nana-Nyankupon. This was the 
god of the Christians, borrowed from them, and adopted under a new designation. 
The great superiority manifested by the whites in their weapons, ships, 
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manufactures-in short, in every respect–convinced the natives with whom they 
had intercourse, that they must necessarily be protected by a deity of greater 
power than any of those to which they themselves offered sacrifice; since their 
own deities had not, except very remotely, helped them to attain such prosperity. 
They, therefore gladly enrolled themselves amongst the followers of the god of 
the whites; and, being informed that he dwelt in the heavens above, they 
denominated him Nana-Nyankupon, which may be freely translated “Lord of the 
Sky.”390          
  
Hence, contact with the Europeans brought about the advent of Christianity to the Gold 
Coast and this had the effect of permeating all aspects of the culture of the people, 
including imposing a sexual moral code, which hitherto may have been absent as A.B. 
Ellis alludes to.391          
  
As already noted, Christian sexual morality restricts sex and sexual activities to 
marriage; to wit monogamy. Thus, the importation of Christian morals into the culture of 
the native people, in particular the Akan people, transformed to some extent their concept 
of sexual morality, or lack thereof. Thus, even though polygamy still remains in almost 
all the ethnic groups that make up present day Ghana, many people have accepted 
monogamy in accordance with Christianity and its ethos in relation to sexual morality – 
at least on the surface. Hence, the cultural conception of sexual morality in present-day 
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Ghana has been conflated with religious conceptions of sexual morality to a large extent. 
   
That notwithstanding, when it comes to morality within the context of sex or 
sexuality, traditional Ghanaian culture that permits polygamy does not necessarily 
consider a man engaged in such plural marriages immoral. In the same vain, it is a 
notorious fact in contemporary Ghana, that society does not necessarily see a man in a 
monogamous marriage, who has extra-marital affairs as immoral. The same goes for a 
single man who maintains multiple sexual partners. However, the same cannot be said for 
females; for they are rebuked, ridiculed and deemed immoral if they engage in extra-
marital affairs or are considered as having more than one sexual partner in the case of 
single women. Ghanaian culture therefore today is generally patriarchal in its outlook in 
terms of how it characterizes and differentiates what is sexually moral according to the 
sexes.            
  
3. Feminism and Sexual Morality 
There are various strands of feminist ideology and they have their peculiar 
perceptions on what may be moral or otherwise. According to Professor Patricia Cain, 
there are four stands of feminism. These are Liberal, Cultural, Postmodern, and radical 
feminism.  The following paragraphs would focus briefly on the liberal and radical 
feminist views on what may be right or wrong as regards sexual morality.  Liberal 
feminism concerns itself with equal rights and opportunities and the intensification of 
constitutional rights for women. Radical feminism on the other hand stresses that women 
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must be perceived as one class dominated by another (Marxist feminism), with a resulting 
class struggle. It also advocates changes in laws that favour the male class, to curtail 
inequalities of power.392         
   
Thus, for more than three decades, feminist jurisprudential thought has been 
dominated by the debate regarding the role of sex and sexuality in a male dominated 
world. The so-called “sex-wars” between the different strands or wings of feminism, 
begun as a result of the diametrically opposing nature of both points of view regarding 
sex. On the one hand, sex is viewed as a tool of oppression used by the male dominated 
society to subjugate women. To this school of thought therefore, depictions of sex in 
pornography for example, has the aim of perpetuating the aforementioned status quo. Sex 
work, however voluntary it may be, is also seen as a means of the continuous control 
and/or suppression of female sexuality by men.      
  
On another hand, there is a different school of thought who view sex from a 
positive angle. The sex-positive feminists thus consider sex, female sexuality or its 
expressions thereof as a means towards entrenching female independence and autonomy. 
To this school of thought, sex work is not necessarily a social construct that seeks to 
perpetuate inequality amongst the sexes; but even if it was, it nonetheless provides an 
avenue for females who voluntarily participate in sex work the opportunity to take 
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control of their sexuality and even profit from it i.e. the rational economic choice 
theory.393 
 
Radical feminism however sees social organization and structure as inherently 
patriarchal, as sexism exists to maintain male privilege and the patriarchal social 
order.394  With this in mind, it is not surprising that radical feminists have been 
historically associated with the lesbian-feminist community that essentially rejects male 
dominated heterosexual sex.395 Radical feminists are inclined to condemn pornography, 
prostitution, sadomasochism, promiscuous sex with strangers and even sexual role-
playing396 and the use of sex robots.397 This is because of the nexus they make between 
dominant-subordinate power relations and the perpetuity of male dominance. For 
example according to Catherine Mackinnon ‘pornography conditions male orgasm to 
female subordination.'398          
 
Liberal feminists, on the other hand support any form of consensual activity so 
long as the participants derive pleasure from their activities. These may include 
pornography, sex work, sadomasochism, promiscuous sex with strangers and sexual role-
playing. According to them the morals of radical feminists stigmatises sexual minorities 																																																								
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such as the butch-femme couples, sadomasochists and man-boy lovers. The key word that 
legitimises any sexual activity regardless of form is consent according to them.399 Though 
this seems to be a simplistic view, consent is seen as a morally decisive factor because it 
has been noted to play that role in other contexts. For instance Primoratz notes that 
consent makes all the difference between murder and voluntary euthanasia, between 
battery and sport, or between theft and gift.400 This liberal view that valid consent is 
sufficient to morally legitimize any sexual act is challenged and disputed by three major 
philosophies regarding sex: the Christian (Catholic) perception – which views sex as 
ordained for procreation purposes and properly confined to marriage; the romantic view 
of sex – which considers sex as a corollary of love; and the radical feminist analysis of 
sex – which considers sex as perpetuating the continuous domination of women by 
men.401 
 
Catharine MacKinnon, a leader of the radical feminist school of thought has 
devoted attention to sexuality, sexual morality and the subordination of women. For 
example, she suggests that ‘sexuality is to feminism what work is to Marxism: that which 
most one’s own, yet most taken away’.402	Here, she tries to draw out a similar trajectory 
that legal theory grounded in Marxism and Feminism usually takes. For instance, she 
suggests that the underlying idea of Feminism as a legal theory is the inherent and 
inalienable right of females to have absolute control over their sexuality and the means 																																																								
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they choose to express it. However, an aspect of this same expression of sexuality is what 
has essentially ensured that society, according to Feminist legal theorists, is organized 
into two sexes i.e. male and female.  
 
On the other hand, Marxism has at its core the control of capital (which is the 
means of production) by the bourgeoisie, who have also essentially organized society into 
a class-based system, where the proletariat (the majority of the people) are manipulated 
and exploited for gain. The parallel that can be drawn between Feminism and Marxism 
from the point of view of feminist legal theory is that, sex roles have been somewhat pre-
determined and controlled by men, in the form of gender identity and conceptions of 
family and family life – the end result being reproduction; and all this organized on the 
basis of a heterosexual structure of society.  
 
I thus tend to generally agree with MacKinnon especially when she suggests that 
Marxism and Feminism are both theories of power resulting in the “domination of the 
dominant” by the more privileged classes of society (i.e. men), the end result being social 
inequality and inequity. Thus, a fundamental issue regarding these two distinct, yet 
similar legal theories come to the fore: the fact that males are the common denominator. 
Despite the apparent accuracy of this observation, there still exists a seemingly deep-
seated mistrust between proponents of these two schools of thought. Marxists for 
example often accuse feminists of dividing the proletariat front, through their means of 
advocacy, especially for ideals, which according to Marxists generally fits into the aims 
of the bourgeoisie. However, MacKinnon raises a question: Whether it would make a 
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difference if females, for example were at the forefront of running modern capitalist 
systems. 
 
In contemporary times in Africa, females have been increasingly ‘liberated’ from 
the shackles of total male domination, and have in many instances taken control of, and 
directed how and the means through which they express their sexuality. This is not 
however to suggest that feminism as a legal theory is not valid, but rather it is a 
recognition of the important and somewhat radical role and impact that feminist theory 
has had on legal theory as a whole. For example, far gone are the days when a female’s 
role was circumscribed – i.e. as a caregiver, the primary duty of which was to nurture and 
raise children and stay at home.  
  
In recent times, women cannot necessarily be categorized as the dominated 
gender class. That is not also to suggest that chauvinistic and misogynistic attitudes have 
been completely eradicated. However, even in Africa, it can be observed that many 
women have on their own chosen to ‘deviate’ from the ‘pre-determined’ sex roles that 
heterosexuality all but prescribes. For example, some women choose to stay single and 
thereby avoid subordination in the form of the delimited gender roles that have from time 
immemorial existed. Others express their sexuality in a homogeneous manner by relying 
on their innate being and personality. Similarly, some females voluntarily choose to 
become single mothers through the reliance on artificial insemination for example. 
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Quite clearly, female autonomy has increasingly become topical, and many even 
view this as a driving force for development, generally speaking. However, an important 
observation seems to be the fact that, not all women have been or are generally liberated 
to the point of autonomy, bodily or otherwise. This somewhat ties in with some of the 
Marxist criticisms of feminist legal theory – i.e. that it emphasizes and focuses on only a 
few educated women, who themselves resemble and constitute a subset of the 
bourgeoisie class – thus ensuring a divided front against oppression of the minority.  	
Thus, Janet Halley in Split Decisions explores the contours of classical feminism 
and its relationship with other movements that have drawn inspiration from it, or sought 
to challenge particular tenets of its theory.403 One argument she makes that strikes a cord 
is the position long adopted by “Governance Feminists” who have sought to address the 
issue of sexual exploitation of women by men that tend to scar the former perpetually. 
However, Halley seems to double down on the effect that this brand of feminism has on 
the wider society by suggesting that: ‘Unless it Takes a Break from itself, it can’t see 
injury to men. It can’t see injury to men by women. It can’t see other interests, other 
forms of power, other justice projects’.404 
 
Following from this, another important aspect of the whole feminist debate that 
seems problematic, which Halley alludes to is the anti-pornography stance adopted by 
MacKinnon & Dworkin. For example, the definition of pornography and the criteria of 
materials that potentially have a subordinating effect in respect of women as outlined in 																																																								
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the Indianapolis ordinance (which is a subject on inquiry) seem quite out of touch with 
social realities in contemporary times.405 For example, all the six second second-order 
criteria that according to the ordinance depict women negatively can equally be 
applicable to men.406  
 
Also, the concept of sadomasochism cannot be ignored in any discussion of 
contemporary feminism. In popular culture, it is increasingly becoming a trend for 
females to play the role of the sadist or the dominant person in sadomasochistic 
relationships or situations, who invariably derive sexual pleasure by humiliating, 
degrading and/or inflicting pain and suffering upon the subservient or submissive partner 
(usually a male, or even a female). However, admittedly, women have probably been on 
the receiving end of such treatment far longer than men – feminists would invariably 
argue.  
 
In traditional African societies, like Ghana for example, it is a known and 
notorious fact that some women actually desire to be subordinated in ways that radical 
feminists will find disgusting and probably explain away through the use of the 
controversial “false consciousness” concept. However, it is not unusual to hear some 
women in Ghana even suggest that their husbands do not love them if they do not 
physically abuse them one way or the other. As shocking as this may seem, it remains a 
constant reminder of why Halley suggests that feminism (especially, radical feminism) 
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needs to take a break from itself in order to explore and internalize some of these social 
realities.  
 
On the issue of marriage for instance, it has already been noted that customary 
law in Ghana permits polygamy in the sense that a man can take more than one woman as 
a wife, but the reverse is not true. The point of sympathy with traditional feminists 
however is the societal attitudes towards a woman who dares to explore her sexuality by 
even engaging in sexual relations with more than one man at the same time. It is deemed 
an abomination and a deviation from traditional and stereotypical assigned gender roles. 
This tends to reinforce the classical radical feminist position of subordination of the 
female.		
Thus, although Halley tries to find a middle ground between radical and liberal 
feminism by suggesting that the whole idea of feminism needs to take a break, it is 
nonetheless difficult in practice so to do, or even reconcile these two diametrically 
opposing views. It seems as if there is not much middle ground that can be found. The 
critical point however is that sexual morality from the feminist perspective seems to be 
bifurcated in nature, and as such very difficult to construct. This is because the ‘evils’ 
associated with sex work have been greatly espoused, and its nexus with human 
trafficking for example, and even child prostitution cannot be overlooked – although their 
confluence point seems rather fluid. At another level of abstraction however, it is difficult 
to understand how and why we should theorize rational economic choices and decisions 
made voluntarily (arguably), through the lenses of doctrinaire legal theory 
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B) SOME LESSONS FROM THE MAKING OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS (UDHR)          
  
The many and major events that triggered both World Wars of the Twentieth 
Century have been well documented. However, it was not until the aftermath of the 
Second World War that the International Human Rights movement gained real traction. 
This was as a direct consequence of the widespread Nazi oppression of Jews and other 
minority groups as well as the rise of fascist regimes and their attendant oppressive and 
discriminatory policies; reasons that united the Allies in bringing the war to an end.407 
Thus, in 1942, the Allies issued a joint declaration that victory in the war was necessary 
in order to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom.408 To ensure that 
these ideals were jealously guarded and protected, the Allies had to overcome several 
political, ideological, cultural and economic challenges.409 Hence, the initial draft of the 
United Nations Charter did not expatiate on human rights per se. However, the principle 
of self determination was guaranteed by the Charter,410 and it was agreed that a Human 
Rights Commission be set up as a major body of the UN.411  
 
Thus, during the drafting of the UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference of 
1945, representatives of Cuba, Mexico, and Panama each proposed the inclusion of a 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Nations and a Declaration on the Essential Rights 																																																								
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of Man.412 President Harry Truman of the United States, in his final remarks for the 
conference, also anticipated that an International Bill of Rights would be attached to the 
Charter; whilst Field Marshall Jan Christiaan Smuts of South Africa envisioned the 
addition of a human rights instrument to the Charter. However, the Conference decided to 
adopt Article 55 and 56 of the Charter, which provide for the promotion of universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights, and impose obligations on member States to 
take joint and separate action for the achievement of the purposes of the UN set forth in 
the Charter, including the promotion of human rights.413 The Charter also refers to human 
rights in the Preamble as well as in articles 1, 13, 62, 68, and 76. However the idea of 
universal human rights was not enumerated on in terms of exactly what they entailed.414 
An International Declaration on Human Rights or an International Bill of Rights, which 
would enumerate specific instances of human rights, was deferred until the establishment 
of a Commission on Human Rights by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).  
 
The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 was 
therefore arguably the most important step that was taken in the post-war era in ensuring 
a common standard of treatment of individuals and states alike. This is however in no 
way a suggestion that the formation of the United Nations (UN) itself was not a 
monumental step towards a universal claim of human rights; for the UN paved the way 
and made it possible for the adoption of the UDHR in the first place. The UDHR is 
however of monumental import also in the sense that it arguably represented a first and 
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somewhat successful attempt at developing a regime of human rights protections that 
would be applicable to and available for all persons regardless of race, ethnicity, sex, 
language, religion etc.415 It essentially reconciled varied perceptions of law and morals in 
a fragmented post-war world. 
 
However, the road towards the making of the UDHR was not a smooth one. In 
fact, many obstacles and disagreements characterized the work of the Human Rights 
Commission, which was the body that had been established by the ECOSOC of the UN 
specifically to oversee the drafting of a binding legal document that protected and 
promoted the human rights of all the peoples of the world.416 But this was a herculean 
task in the sense that even though the UN Charter had announced the idea of human 
rights for all, there was no categorical mention in the Charter of exactly what these rights 
were as has already been noted.417 How was the Human Rights Commission therefore 
going to be able to determine the substantive content of human rights that were to be 
considered universal and acceptable by the diverse nations of the world at the time, and 
																																																								
415 Suffice it to note that prior to the adoption of the UDHR in December 1948, American States had 
adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in April 1948, even though this 
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from its adoption. 
416 It is important to note that in February 1946, ECOSOC established a Commission on Human Rights and 
a Sub-Commission on the Status of Women (referred to collectively as the nuclear Commission on Human 
Rights), which was mandated to consider its terms of reference, composition and structure and report back 
to ECOSOC on the possibility of adopting a binding human rights instrument. After presenting its report 
(document E/38/Rev.1) to ECOSOC on 21st May 1946, ECOSOC adopted a resolution on 21st June 1946 
establishing a standing Commission on Human Rights. 
417 A careful reading of the United Nations Charter will reveal that the provisions that the only specific 
human right that is explicitly mentioned therein is the right to equality and equal protection of the law. All 
other reference to human rights in the Charter are general in nature. See for example, articles 56, 62(2) and 
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those yet to come? The Commission’s first task was to draft a Bill of Human Rights and 
devise a means for its implementation.418  
 
Luckily, the resolution establishing the Commission on Human Rights made 
provision for reliance on a ‘Working Group of Experts’. Clause 3 of the Resolution 
provided as follows: ‘The Commission is authorized to call in ad hoc working groups of 
non-governmental experts in specialized fields or individual experts, without further 
reference to the Council, but with the approval of the President of the Council and the 
Secretary-General.’ By February 1947, a drafting committee had been set up by the 
commission to produce a draft Bill on International Human Rights.419 Around this time, 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) had 
also created a theoretical and philosophical committee that will prove crucial in 
informing the final draft of the Declaration. 
 
Thus, UNESCO as well as the Human Rights Commission conducted ideological 
investigations to gain a picture of whether there was such a thing as universal human 
rights; if the concept was not mainly a western idea; and also what the substantive 
content of human rights were in different contexts. To the amazement of the UNESCO 
committee, they found out through the responses they received that there generally 
existed in all parts of the world certain basic rights and values, which were broadly 
similar even thought their foundations were different by virtue of differences in 																																																								
418 U.N. Weekly Bulletin, August 12, 1946, 14.	
419 The initial members of this committee were Eleanor Roosevelt of the United States, Pen-Chun Chang 
from China, and Charles Malik from Lebanon. This committee was however enlarged at the instigation of 
Eleanor Roosevelt to include representatives from the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, Chile 
and Australia. 
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ideology.420 Regardless of these differences the driving idea, as summed up by Glendon 
was as follows:  
 
If there are some things so terrible in practice that virtually no one will publicly 
approve of them, and some things so good in practice that virtually no one will 
oppose them, a common project can move forward without agreement on the 
reasons for those positions. An international declaration of rights would provide a 
“framework within which divergent philosophies, religious, and even economic, 
social and political theories might be entertained and developed.” The challenge 
was to make the framework “sufficiently definite to have real significance both as 
an inspiration and a guide to practice” but “sufficiently general and flexible to 
apply to all men, and to be capable of modification to suit people at different 
stages of social and political development.”421 
 
It is important to note that the UNESCO Committee had sent out questionnaires 
seeking the views of the many peoples of the world with different political and socio-
cultural backgrounds, including but not limited to, Chinese, Indian, Hindu, America, 
European and Socialist perspectives.422 The responses the committee received were 
impressive as several leading scholars and philosophers made submissions in response to 
the questionnaire. These included submissions from Mohandas Ghandi, Aldous Huxley, 
Benedetto Croce and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.423 Although the views and positions on 
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human rights varied, the UNESCO committee concluded that they were convinced that 
there was a common denominator that bound together all the varying ideologies and that 
the members of the United Nations did share ‘common convictions on which human 
rights depend’.424 The committee summed up what they had discovered in the following 
terms: 
 
Varied in cultures and built upon different institutions, the members of the United 
Nations have, nevertheless, certain great principles in common. They believe that 
men and women all over the world have the right to live a life that is free from the 
haunting fear of poverty and insecurity. They believe that they should have a 
more complete access to the heritage, in all its aspects and dimensions, of the 
civilization so painfully built by human effort. They believe that science and the 
arts should combine to serve alike peace and the well-being, spiritual as well as 
material, of all men and women without discrimination of any kind.425 
 
They thus observed that it was possible to achieve cross-cultural understanding and 
agreement on the core of human rights that man ought to be entitled to. 
 
Ghandi for example had submitted that any conception of universal rights must go 
hand in hand with the idea of duties, rather than be construed as fundamental 
entitlements. He posited thus: ‘I learned from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights 
to be deserved and preserved came from duty well done. Thus the very right to live 																																																								
424 Maritain, supra, note 420, 268-271. 
425 Maritain, supra, 259.	
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accrues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship of the world. From this one 
fundamental statement, perhaps it is easy enough to define duties of Man and Woman 
and correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be first performed. Every other 
right can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for’.426 
 
Despite the many different submissions from all parts of the world, it must be 
stated that at the time of the drafting of the UDHR, there weren't many independent 
countries at the time in Africa.427 As a matter of fact, during the negotiating stages of the 
UN Charter, there were less than 100 so states in the world at the time. However, the UN 
Secretariat nonetheless forwarded the opinions of the groups without consultative status 
and even individuals to the Commission on Human Rights for their consideration. During 
the final vote on the draft Bill, the Commission approved the draft by 13 votes, with none 
against; although the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Byelorussia, the 
Ukraine and Yugoslavia all abstained.428 The General Assembly, in its third meeting, 
adopted the Declaration on December 10, 1948 after 48 States approved the draft with 
none against, but eight abstentions.429 The USSR, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 
(UKSSR), the BSSR, Yugoslavia, Poland, Saudi Arabia and South Africa abstained.430 
None of these countries voted against the Declaration. However, it is worth noting that 
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abstaining delegations had participated and cooperated in the various drafting 
processes.431 
 
Some of the abstentions were revolved around the view that the UDHR did not go 
far enough. For example, the communist abstentions were due to the fact that the 
Declaration ought to have explicitly condemned fascism and Nazism in order to be 
effective.432 They abstained because there was no such explicit condemnation in the text. 
Some also called for a legal positivist approach regard human rights. To this group, 
human rights should not be conceived outside the State, because the very concept of 
rights and law was necessarily connected with the State. However, this positivist 
interpretation of human rights is counter intuitive as the Nazi regime would thus be 
deemed a legal one, acting in accordance with the basic law of Germany at the time. 
Thus, the only way that Nazism could be effectively condemned was the route the 
Declaration took i.e. conceptualizing human rights as rights as transcending existing 
national law and geographical jurisdictions.  
 
Also, whereas some countries with majority Muslim populations, such as Syria, 
Iran, Turkey and Pakistan all voted for the Declaration, the Saudi Arabian delegation 
abstained in the final vote mostly for two reasons. First, they disagreed with the wording 
of Article 16 in relation to equal marriage rights for both men and women, and they also 
objected to the clause in Article 18 that permitted or empowered individuals to change 
their religion or belief. In a similar vein, the Union of South Africa abstained from 																																																								
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approving the document, because it knew other countries such as the United States would 
use it as a basis of condemning South African practices of apartheid and racial 
discrimination.433 Whereas the Communists thought the Declaration did not state enough, 
the South African government was of the opinion that it stated far too much.434  To them, 
it was clear from the provisions that social, cultural, and economic rights had never been 
intended to be included in the draft declaration. 
 
A close examination of the South African reveals a lack philosophical basis, but 
rather as an attempt to protect their system of apartheid, which clearly violated several 
articles in the Declaration.435 For example, the right of a person to participate in the 
government of his or her country was not a universal right according to the South African 
representative on the Third Committee.436 According to this position, the right was 
conditioned not only by nationality and country, but also by qualifications of franchise 
including race.437 It suffices to note that the South African Constitution at that time only 
permitted individuals of European descent to be members of the House of Assembly or 
the Senate.438 This abstention by the Union of South Africa, it has been argued, detracted 
from the claim to universality of the Declaration. However, their abstention cannot be 
said to actually detract from the universality of the UDHR as a whole, because racism 
had by then been unanimously rejected as wrong and untenable.  
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What then are some of the lessons that can be drawn from the work of the Human 
Rights Commission, and in particular the UNESCO philosophers committee that worked 
towards the adoption of the UDHR? The first important thing to note in my view is the 
acceptance of culturally relative approaches towards universal human rights. What I 
mean by this is that the various positions espoused during the preparatory and drafting 
phases of the UDHR centered on a discussion of what was “moral” and what should be a 
legal entitlement or right. Hence, many different socio-cultural perceptions of morality 
clashed, but the underlying value that all races and peoples considered paramount in the 
ordering of their affairs and ensuring fundamental human rights for all, was the principle 
of equality and non-discrimination. Equality of cultures, and non-distinction on the basis 
of specific human differences like origin, race, ethnicity, sex, religion etc. 
 
Yet, the UDHR has been continuously criticized as ‘an arrogant attempt to 
universalize a particular set of ideas and to impose them upon three-quarters of the 
world’s population, most of whom were not represented at its creation’.439 Makau Mutua 
for example suggests that ‘Muslims, Hindus, Africans, non-Judeo-Christians, feminists, 
critical theorists, and other scholars of an inquiring bent of mind have exposed the 
Declaration’s bias and exclusivity’.440 He further suggests that: 
 
Non-Western philosophies and traditions particularly on the nature of man and the 
purposes of political society were either unrepresented or marginalized during the 
early formulation of human rights… There is no doubt that the current human 																																																								
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rights corpus is well meaning. But that is beside the point…. International human 
rights fall within the historical continuum of the European colonial project in 
which whites pose as the saviors of a benighted and savage non-European world. 
The white human rights zealot joins the unbroken chain that connects her to the 
colonial administrator, the Bible-wielding missionary, and the merchant of free 
enterprise…. Thus human rights reject the cross-fertilization of cultures and 
instead seek the transformation of non-Western cultures by Western cultures.441  
 
Is this statement an accurate reflection of the contemporary human rights movement 
spearheaded by the UDHR? And is the Declaration really bias and not inclusive as Mutua 
suggests? Evidence suggests the contrary.  
 
For instance, even though a majority of the people of the world were not 
necessarily represented in the UN at the time of its adoption, the drafting process of the 
UDHR involved some of the most influential and independent minded theorists and 
philosophers of the time. Thus, by the time the draft Declaration was presented to the 
General Assembly, hundreds of individuals from diverse backgrounds had 
participated.’442 Hence, even though not all States and peoples as we know them today 
were represented during the drafting phase of the Declaration, it cannot be true that the 
Declaration is biased and non-inclusive. Charles Malik thus notes: 
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The genesis of each article, and each part of each article, was a dynamic process 
in which many minds, interests, backgrounds, legal systems and ideological 
persuasions played their respective determining roles.443 
 
What is certain is that the drafters considered the many different philosophical, cultural 
and ideological worldviews on rights, and sought to balance these in a way that was fair 
and inclusive. 
 
 As a result, the Declaration has been referred to as a Dignitarian rights instrument, 
which seeks a middle ground between the two most prominent competing philosophical 
foundations of human rights i.e. individualism and collectivism. Mary Ann Glendon puts 
this in the following manner: 
 
Dignitarian rights instruments, with their emphasis on the family and their greater 
attention to duties, are more compatible with Asian and African traditions. In 
these documents, rights bearers tend to be envisioned within families and 
communities; rights are formulated so as to make clear their limits and their 
relation to one another as well as to the responsibilities that belong to the citizens 
and the state…. In the spirit of the latter vision, the Declaration’s “Everyone” is 
an individual who is constituted, in important ways, by and through relationships 
with others. “Everyone” is envisioned as uniquely valuable in himself (there are 
three separate references to the free development of one’s personality), but 
“Everyone” is expected to act towards others “in a spirit of brotherhood.” 																																																								
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“Everyone” is depicted as situated in a variety of specifically named, real-life 
relationships of mutual dependency: families, communities, religious groups, 
workplaces, associations, societies, cultures, nations, and an emerging 
international order. Though its main body is devoted to basic individual freedoms, 
the Declaration begins with an exhortation to act in “a spirit of brotherhood” and 
ends with community, order, and society. Whatever else may be said of him or 
her, the Declaration’s “Everyone” is not a lone bearer of rights…. [The] departure 
from classical individualism while rejecting collectivism is the hallmark of 
dignitarian instruments such as the Declaration.444 
 
The Declaration has therefore achieved global acceptance, and some scholars even argue 
that some of its principles derived from the provisions thereof have attained the status of 
customary international law.445  
 
It is important to also note that the universality of the Declaration as was 
envisioned by the drafters was not one that sought to impose a uniform system of human 
rights upon the peoples of the world. Rather, by adopting the principles contained therein 
and practicing promotion and protection of human rights, the various States could 
accumulate experiences that will all together enrich the Declaration’s purpose by 
achieving its aim of human rights for all. Another important lesson that can thus be drawn 
from this is the fact that the drafters recognized humanity’s commonness as a unifying 
factor that transcended all barriers including racial, religious, linguistic, gender etc. The 																																																								
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common humanity denominator thus manifests itself in ensuring the right balance 
between individual freedoms and liberty on one hand, and the collective good of the 
society as a whole on the other. Thus, it is possible to view variables such as human 
dignity, individual autonomy and equality from a “morally and culturally neutral” 
standpoint, just like the UDHR did. 
 
The UDHR in contemporary times is truly seen as universal and has been to a 
large extent accepted as customary international law.446 It is the UDHR that influenced 
treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The UDHR 
has clearly strengthened the human rights regime, specifically with respect to the 
enforcement and implementation of human rights. As a result of the different 
perspectives on morality, humanity, human dignity and human rights throughout the 
world, various steps had to be taken in order to develop a uniform framework for defining 
and enumerating human rights. There were enquiries, consultations, investigation etc. in 
order to develop a rational framework to fulfil the purpose of promoting and protecting 
human rights for all. Thus, to develop a rational public policy framework for regulating 
human morality, a similar approach must be taken in order to incorporate the various 
worldviews and take them into account when making laws. 
 
Therefore, laws that operate to oppress minorities on the basis on general 
conceptions of morality must be looked at again with an open mind. We need to repeal 																																																								
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laws that have yielded terrible results in practice (in terms of their unenforceability 
among other factors) and enact ones that will avert oppression of minorities.  To borrow 
the words of UNESCO, those laws that have outcomes that serve no useful purpose in 
society practically, must give way to laws that protect all persons from the oppression of 
the majority, which no reasonable man will oppose. Stakeholders must be assembled with 
this purpose to allow a common project to move forward with or without agreement on 
the reasons for their positions on the defining issues. 
  
Ultimately the framework for developing a rational public policy approach with 
regard laws that seek to regulate human morality must be one that considers divergent 
philosophies, cultures, religions and even economic social and political theories. It must 
be sufficiently definite to have real significance both as an inspiration and a guide to 
practice. However, it must also be sufficiently general and flexible to apply to all 
individuals and be capable of modification to suit people at different stages of social and 
political as well as cultural development. So, even though we place great emphasis on a 
particular idea of what amounts to moral conduct in Africa generally, accepting divergent 
and minority views and positions on moral questions seem to be more firmly grounded in 
the African context even more than we are aware. For instance, with regard the general 
African misconception that human rights and human dignity are a western concepts, it 
has been suggested that:  
 
The Mandingo people of Mali, in West Africa, had proclaimed similar principles, 
in 1236 that affirmed the freedom and dignity of “every human being” and not 
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just the Mandingo nobility. Freedom of religious thought existed in the kingdoms 
of Congo and Ndongo, in Central Africa, before the Portuguese came there in 
1492. Different sexual orientations existed in the Kingdom of Buganda before 
European missionaries brought Christianity to that East African kingdom, in the 
late nineteenth century.447 
 
However, genuine fears of a breakdown of morality must be anticipated and 
addressed. For instance, some theorists fear that the overemphasis on human rights for all 
with regard moral questions would undermine social or legal interventions in society. 
One of these interventions is affirmative action. It has thus been noted that the search for 
neutral principles conflicts with affirmative action and accounts for most of the hostility 
and criticisms that have been expressed against it. Another fear may be based on the 
theory that laws have a potential for creating a sub-culture.  Thus morally neutral laws 
would erode our existing culture and create an alternative sub-culture, which is 
diametrically opposed to the status quo. In this regard, there must be a societal stock 
taking in order to ascertain what the culture was as distinct from what the culture really is 
today.  
 
Also, perhaps a different outlook on the role culture should play must be 
highlighted. For instance morality entails issues not only communal in nature but also 
personal to individuals. As a result, the factor of autonomy should be looked at in light of 
culture. The effects of culture in shaping individuals cannot be over-emphasized as this 
generally leads to accepted norms in different cultures. However, we must not lose sight 																																																								
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of the role the individual plays in society, and the fact that, we cannot necessarily 
generalize when it comes to intimate human conduct bordering on morality. Thus, just as 
the UN Charter paved the way and served as the foundation and basis of human rights for 
all by including human rights lingua (albeit in general terms), the Constitution of Ghana 
can serve a similar purpose. In our context however, our Constitution is replete with 
human rights protections, including respect for human dignity, equality and individual 
autonomy to a large extent. With these in mind we can now focus on the various 
objectives that should serve as the basis of a rational public policy framework for 
regulating intimate human conduct. These are: (1) the objective of preserving and 
promoting the inherent dignity of the individual; (2) the objective of ensuring that the 
individual’s ability to act in an autonomous manner free from social coercion is reflected 
in laws; and (3) the objective of achieving equality when dealing with personal choices 
that do not conform with societal standards. 
 
C) TOWARDS MORAL NEUTRALITY      
 
Morality entails or is an amalgamation of a collective sense of societal beliefs and 
value systems, which in many instances dictates public policy and invariably influences 
the types of laws in most societies. This collective sense of morality however has the 
tendency of imposing what I refer to as moral oppression on minorities within that 
society who may not be inclined to or be susceptible to conformity with such vague and 
autocratic societal standards. Thus, for so long as the possibility of moral oppression exist 
in a particular society, and they do exist more often than not, fidelity to the law demands 
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a neutral form of morality, no matter how imperfect such a concept may be, in order to 
balance the scales. Moreover, this type of moral oppression that societies tend to 
superimpose on all is usually predicated on some variables that may not necessarily be 
universally accepted after all.  
 
For example, the proliferation of religions and religious values and standards 
remain controversial, in respect of its impact on law in the modern secular state. How 
then do we achieve a moral construct that considers not just such religious values and 
beliefs of admittedly the majority of the people, but also the individual moral worldviews 
of the minority? Let's take the example of the institution of marriage in Ghana. 
Traditional conceptions of this institution envisage pluralistic marriages in the form of 
polygamy, as has already been noted.448 Hence, it has been authoritatively held that 
customary marriages in Ghana are potentially polygamous.449 It is therefore possible for a 
Christian man to be customarily married to two women without necessarily feeling 
morally blameworthy of fornication or adultery under the customary law of Ghana, even 
though Christianity prescribes monogamy and considers deviations from this immoral. 
 
Critics of this postulation may very well suggest and point to the existence of 
ordinance marriages in Ghana that provides that such marriages are strictly monogamous 
– hence true Christians will subscribe and adhere to that.450 Pushing the argument further, 
Islamic marriages are also permitted under the Marriages Act of Ghana, under which a 																																																								
448 It must be noted here that the specific form of polygamy permissible in Ghana by the various ethnic 
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Muslim man is entitled to marry as many women as he is capable of looking after fairly 
and equitably.451 Thus, aside the external pluralistic character of marriages in general in 
Ghana (three types of marriages), there is also an internal pluralistic nature of a majority 
of the types of marriages in Ghana (Customary law marriages and Islamic marriages). 
How then does a society with a mixed and diverse sense of morality (when it comes to 
marriage, for example), and with it – sexual morality452 purport to embody a common 
strand of morality either based on religion or culture? Such a position, I believe should be 
rejected and not countenanced especially in the 21st century where individual autonomy 
and equality has gained much prominence in human right discourse.453  
 
Thus, laws especially criminal laws that purport to prohibit certain intimate and 
sexual conduct because "society" finds it morally opprobrious, misrepresent the public 
policy demands of the 21st century. Public policy must not just reflect the religious views 
and subjective cultural perceptions of the collective group; but it must also mirror the 
independent moral or amoral outlook of the minority as well whatever that may be, no 
matter how unflattering and controversial it may seem. Hence, it must be dignitarian in 
outlook. In making public policy for the purposes of regulating human behavior, it is my 
position that certain morally neutral values must be explored and should form the basis of 
laws that seek to intrude and inquire into the most intimate of all human desires – sex. 
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Although it can be argued and it has indeed been argued that all principles, values, 
variables and concepts at a certain abstract level are laden with subjective and/or 
objective value judgments of morality, we can nonetheless attempt construing some of 
these variables from a neutral standpoint, applying contemporary perspectives to the 
inquiry. Three such key concepts that I propose as fundamental in ensuring a more 
rational public policy framework for regulating intimate human conduct are (1) Human 
Dignity; (2) Individual Autonomy; and (3) Equality. These, to me, must form the core of 
any public policy approach towards the regulation of intimate human conduct. This is 
because, at the heart of the debate regarding sexual morality from the perspectives of 
religion, culture and feminism lay these three ideals.  
 
As has already been discussed, both Christianity and Islam invariably preach the 
need to uphold the dignity of the individual in the form of sexually moral conduct. 
Religion thus considers sexual immorality in the form of adultery, pre-marital sex, sex 
work, homosexuality etc. as undignified, irresponsible and reprehensible. Sexual morality 
can only be attained within the confines of heterosexual marriage. Similarly, the core 
ideals that the two most vocal and important wings of feminism have been fighting for 
over the years with regards to sexual morality is female autonomy. Thus, radical 
feminists argue that females are a subordinated sex and ought to break free of the chains 
of patriarchal gender roles i.e. sex work, pornography etc., whilst liberal feminists simply 
assert that most females engaged in sex work, for example, are asserting their autonomy 
by making those individual choices free from coercion. Also, traditional African culture’s 
prescriptions for sexual morality is more fluid as promiscuity is not necessarily prohibited 
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as can be ascertained from the existence of polygyny. However, sexual morality from the 
cultural perspective has been greatly influenced by religion – which as I’ve noted places a 
great emphasis on the dignity of the individual and the community at large. 
 
However, contemporary human rights place an even greater emphasis on equal 
rights, equality and non-discrimination. It is for this reason that no discussion of sexual 
morality can be had without considering this ideal/variable. Thus, religious, feminist and 
cultural conceptions of sexual morality must be considered alongside the contemporary 
and basic human need for equal rights of all persons, and non-discrimination on the basis 
of sexuality and how one chooses to express it. These three variables at the core of the 
discussion of sexual morality (dignity, autonomy and equality) must be re-examined and 
made “morally neutral” as far as possible (having in mind the religious, feminist and 
cultural viewpoints) in relation to specific intimate human conduct, This will ensure that 
the framework that is developed in relation to the regulation of criminalized intimate 
human conduct of a sexual nature, is more productive and will be a far better basis than 
what presently exists, which only has religious and/or cultural conceptions of morality 
alone as its backbone and justification.  
 
1. Human Dignity 
In human rights discourse, the idea of human dignity is a reference to the primary 
characteristic of human beings i.e. their humanity, which entitles us to respect so we are 
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not taken for granted or abused by others.454 The idea of human dignity is a nod to the 
recognition and respect for the inherent humanity that all humans possess, and an 
affirmation of the inherent or fundamental value of human beings generally.455 This 
concept is universally accepted as a basic ethical and legal principle, and a yardstick for 
assessing the efficacy of human rights. As Lebech has noted, 'it clearly is in everyone’s 
interest to be respected as having human dignity, i.e. as having the highest value due to 
an inalienable humanity.'456 The principle of human dignity, as a universal affirmation 
that human beings have the highest value, has thus been the basis and underlying 
principle for many international human rights instruments. Consequently it has been 
adopted in the national legislations and constitutions of a vast majority of the States of 
the world.457  
 
One of the first applications of human dignity however in international 
instruments can be found in the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations (1945), 
where it states in part that: 
 
We the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to 
mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
																																																								
454 Mette Lebech, What is Human Dignity? < http://eprints.maynoothuniversity.ie/392/> Accessed on 15th 
January 2018. 
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457 It must be noted that, the idea of human dignity can be found as far back as 1486, in a speech (‘Oration 
on the Dignity of Man’) given by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, an Italian Renaissance philosopher. 
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worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small…458 
 
Also, parts of the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provide that 
‘Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world..’.459 Article One of the UDHR also states: ‘All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’  
 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) further 
reiterate the point that the inherent dignity of humans is to be recognized as the 
foundation of human rights itself. Thus, both Covenants provide in their preamble the 
following words: ‘Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the 
human person...’.460 Furthermore, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man (1948) declared that ‘the American peoples have acknowledged the dignity of the 
individual, and their national constitutions recognize that juridical and political 
institutions, which regulate life in human society, have as their principal aim the 
protection of the essential rights of man and the creation of circumstances that will 
permit him to achieve spiritual and material progress and attain happiness’.461 This 
																																																								
458 Preamble of the United Nations Charter, 1945. 
459 Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
460 Preamble of the ICCPR and Preamble of the ICESCR. 
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convention also provides that ‘All men are born free and equal, in dignity and in rights, 
and, being endowed by nature with reason and conscience, they should conduct 
themselves as brothers one to another’.462 
 
In Africa, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, also known as the 
Banjul Charter, stipulates that, ‘Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the 
dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of 
exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited’.463 The inherent 
and inalienable nature of human dignity is therefore not in doubt as all the major human 
rights instruments confirm. 464  Human dignity thus encompasses the essential 
characteristics of human beings. It is important to however note that all these human 
rights instruments do not state what exactly human dignity consists of. 465  That 
notwithstanding, the bottom line is that human dignity is fundamental, essential and 
inalienable to all humans. Some authors have also argued that the specific incidents of 
human dignity are socially constructed in accordance with particular cultural and 
historical contexts and that it is not possible to ascertain only one “true” meaning of 
human dignity.466 The argument is that what constitutes human dignity is culturally 
determined in each society and thereby widely differs. Shultziner for instance has posited 
that the term human dignity is used in the legal parlance – as a justification for human 																																																								
462 Id. 
463 Article 5, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981. 
464 The European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 also recognizes the inherent dignity of man and 
thereby prohibits degrading treatment and punishments that seek to infringe on the dignity of the human 
being. 
465 Lebech, supra. 
466 Id. 
	 149	
rights in legal documents; and in the moral-philosophical parlance – as related to rights 
and duties, honour and a degrading attitude or humiliation of human worth.467 However, 
because human dignity provides a minimum legal standard by which people should be 
treated, it seems a reliable basis for neutrality.  
 
In promoting the respect for and promotion and protection of human rights for all, 
it has been suggested that theoretical examinations of the concept of human dignity may 
be troublesome, irrelevant and even a distraction.468 For example, Kateb summarizes the 
postulations of this school of thought as follows: 
 
[T]he first contention is that despite the efforts of Kant, the idea of human dignity 
adds nothing but a phrase to the theory of human rights; it surely does not 
provide, or help to provide, an indispensable foundation. The second is that the 
historical record shows such human savagery toward human beings that to speak 
of human dignity is to mock human suffering by refusing to make paramount the 
moral difference between victims and victimizers; we must grant dignity only to 
those persons who have acted morally. The only human beings who have human 
dignity are those who are morally blameless or at least much less guilty; violators 
of rights, the victimizers, have forfeited their chance to acquire dignity. The 
theory of rights must distinguish between those who have dignity and those who 
have (not yet) lost it. The third contention is that the affirmation of human dignity 
																																																								
467 Doron Shultziner, Human Dignity - Functions and Meanings, Doron Shultziner Volume 3, Global Jurist 
Topics, Issue 3, 2003. 
468  George Kateb, Human Dignity, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, and London, England 2011. 
	 150	
is dangerous because, when extended to the human species vis-à-vis other species, 
it leads to monstrous human pride, which drives people to exploit nature for 
human purposes and hence to ravage nature and ultimately make the earth 
uninhabitable for many species, including humanity. The fourth contention is that 
human species’ pride is not only dangerous but false: there is no basis for thinking 
that the human species is anything special; or that it alone has dignity among all 
the species; or that if the human species does have dignity, that its dignity is 
greater than, or even incomparably greater than, the dignity of any other 
species.469 
 
In response to these arguments, Kateb notes that the human species is indeed something 
special, and ‘possesses valuable, commendable uniqueness or distinctiveness that is 
unlike the uniqueness of any other species’.470 To him, human dignity is higher than the 
dignity of all other species, or is a qualitatively different dignity from all others.471 He 
adds that the two basic propositions that make up the concept of human dignity are that: 
‘All individuals are equal; no other species is equal to humanity’.472   
  
Kateb also observes that in comparison to other species, humanity has a stature 
beyond comparison. He also posits that human dignity is an existential value and that ‘the 
idea of human dignity insists on recognizing the proper identity of individual or species; 
recognizing what a person is in relation to all other persons and what the species is in 																																																								
469 Id, 4. 
470 Id, 5. 
471 Id. 
472 Id.	
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relation to all other species’.473. He adds that:      
  
The truth of personal identity is at stake when any individual is treated as if he or 
she is not a human being like any other, and therefore treated as more or less than 
human. The truth of identity is also at stake when a person is treated as if he or she 
is just one more human being in a species, and not, instead, a unique individual 
who is irreplaceable and not exchangeable for another.474    
  
Therefore, these two notions of commonness and distinctiveness, according to Kateb, 
work together in constituting the idea of equal individual status.475    
  
Many other scholars have however in recent times also identified three general 
characterizations of human dignity in human rights discourse. The first of these is the 
idea that human dignity and human rights bear some equivalency and are similar in 
certain respects i.e. regarding the standards or norms that fall under both. So for example, 
Tobin cites language used in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
as evidence of such equivalence.476 The second characterization or function of human 
dignity is succinctly captured by Jürgen Habermas.477 Tasioulas sums it up in the 
following manner: 
																																																								
473 Kateb, supra at p. 10. 
474 Id. 
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[T]he idea of human dignity is a “portal” or “conceptual hinge”, one that 
discharges a ‘mediating function’ between a morality of duties that pervades all 
human life, on the one hand, and the limited schedule of enforceable legal rights 
properly enacted by a democratic constitutional state, on the other. So understood, 
human dignity is a threshold at which the operative grounding values – the 
morality of equal respect – give rise to the rights that individuals can claim in 
virtue of their status as citizens of a democratic state.478    
  
This idea of human dignity constituting enforceable legal rights has been rightly 
criticized as “offering little in the way of substantive criteria for determining the content 
of those rights”.479          
  
The third meaning of human dignity treats the concept as the most fundamental 
value of human rights, or even as its exclusive normative basis.480 Thus, both the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has been pointed to as evidence of human rights in general deriving from the 
inherent dignity of man.481 This characterization of human dignity places emphasis on the 
fact that all human rights derive from the dignity of man. Can we therefore say that the 
inherent dignity of man is a principle or value that is neutral? Better still, can human 
rights really be claimed to deriving from inherent human dignity? 																																																								
478  J. Tasioulas, Human Dignity and the Foundations of Human Rights (2013), discussing Jürgen 
Habermas. P.1324. 
479 Id. 
480 Id. at pp. 1324-1325. 
481 See the ICCPR and the ICESCR. 
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The answers to the aforementioned questions seems obvious to the idealistic pro-
human rights advocate. The neutrality of human dignity is seen, for example, in the fact 
that regardless of the circumstances of one’s birth, that quality of life that is personified 
by the individual must remain intact and be guaranteed by the State. It is also as a result 
of the inherent dignity associated with man that the idea of human rights is manifested – 
for if humans have no dignity, there will be no need for rights in the first place. The 
inherent dignity of man, to me, is therefore a neutral value in the sense that it is the 
fundamental basis for the existence of human rights in the first place, and this is 
manifested in both the commonness and distinctiveness notions of equal individual status, 
as espoused by Kateb.          
  
Human dignity is therefore neutral, as no one can convincingly argue that humans 
are bereft of dignity. As a matter of fact, even the down trodden and poor in society retain 
this essential characteristic of humanity. It is therefore not surprising for example that, 
aside age restrictions or mental health hindrances, all persons in society are given the 
opportunity to take part, whether through their representatives or otherwise, in making 
policies and governing the society generally. Inherent dignity of man should thus be 
above subjective analysis and unnecessary theorizing, although I admit that theoretical 
discussions can advance the frontiers of the concept generally and enhance 
understanding. Therefore, even though human dignity can be considered as a moral ideal, 
it is also morally neutral because its conceptualization places strong emphasis on the 
value and worth of man, without any distinction whatsoever.    
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2. Individual Autonomy 
In recent times the European Court of Human rights has been noted for suggesting 
autonomy as the underlying principle of the European Human Rights Convention.482 
Even though it has not clearly defined it within its jurisprudence, its prevailing notion of 
autonomy originated in a case concerning the United Kingdom.483 The legal system of the 
UK is that of the common law. Autonomy has featured within its jurisprudence and that 
of analogous systems.484 The principle of autonomy was given legal effect in the ECtHR 
by virtue of the often-cited dictum of judge Cardozo J.: ‘every human being of adult 
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.'485 
In the decision of United Pacific Railway Co v. Botsford,486 the Supreme Court of the 
United States of America noted that:         
  
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, 
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, 
free from all restraint of interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law.487 
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Again, in the case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey488 it was held that ‘matters, involving 
the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central 
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
amendment.’489          
  
Autonomy is the quality of deserving respect for one's own ability to decide for 
oneself, control one's life, and absorb the costs and benefits of one's choices.490 Children -
for instance lack autonomy, and as a result invite sympathy, pity, or invasive 
paternalism.491 There are various notions of Autonomy. There is the distinction between 
local and global autonomy, for instance. 492 The former has to do with autonomy as 
applied to a person's life as a whole; whereas the latter has to do with autonomy 
associated with specific actions or decisions.493 There is the idea of basic autonomy that 
is the minimal status of being responsible, independent and able to speak for oneself.494 
There is also ideal autonomy: “an achievement that serves as a goal to which we might 
aspire and according to which a person is maximally authentic and free of manipulative, 
self-distorting influences.”495  
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Individual autonomy thus connotes the idea that human beings are capable of 
acting in an autonomous manner, and free from external influences or pressures. The 
ability of an individual to make rational decisions based on the choices he or she is 
presented with on a daily basis is what epitomizes this concept. Admittedly, at an abstract 
level, all life decisions and choices are influenced one way or the other by external 
forces. One’s experiences therefore shape his or her worldview, sometimes even sub-
consciously. Thus the question is: Is there really individual autonomy?   
  
My answer to this question is two-fold. First, the sum total of once experiences is 
what distinguishes an individual from another person. As a result of the internalization of 
life’s lessons, experiences or even inherent beliefs or those made on the basis of mere 
whims, an individual’s autonomous nature is created. This autonomy is easily manifested 
when that person is faced with choices regarding what school to go to, what kind of 
employment to seek etc. Hence, the first dimension of my response is that external 
influences and forces inevitably shape the ‘inherent’ autonomous nature of an individual. 
   
Secondly, individual autonomy exists because humans are mostly motivated by 
self-interest. Thus, when faced with a difficult decision, human beings have the 
propensity of choosing the path that will lead to some benefit, or at least will provide the 
least unpleasant consequences – especially in situations where the options available are 
equally bad. Although, any decision made under the circumstances just described could 
be based on some external influences that have been internalized by the person 
concerned, I believe that humans are instinctively wired to pursue self-preservation and 
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place their self-interest above any other; and this is an inherent characteristic of humanity 
generally.           
  
Thus, it is my belief that Individual Autonomy as a variable of social construction 
can be neutral in the sense that all humans, absent the exceptions in relation to mental 
capacity and lack of maturity, must be deemed as possessing the free will to acting in a 
rational manner. The neutrality of the autonomous behavior of an individual must thus be 
respected within broad and rational public policy dictates. Thus, although societal 
influences are a major factor in shaping the behavior of people generally, the capacity to 
act in an autonomous manner in promoting the self-interest of individuals and their 
individuality should be generally respected and not infringed upon. Therefore, even 
though individual autonomy can also be considered as a moral ideal, it is also morally 
neutral because its conceptualization places strong emphasis on the ability of human 
beings to make rational individual choices.   
     
3. Equality 
The concept of equality is probably the easiest right to explain, but the most 
difficult to achieve in our contemporary world. This is because the classical idea of 
equality suggests that all persons are born equal. Equal in rights, and equal in dignity. 
Thus, they must be treated the same without any distinction whatsoever. The problem 
with this is that in actual fact human beings have never been deemed to be equal from 
time immemorial. Hence, humans have been often divided into classes i.e. the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat, men and women, white and black, king and subject etc. 
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Hence, inequality has been one of the essential characteristics of human existence since 
the beginning of time. 
 
Recently in Ghana, the Supreme Court in discussing notions of equality limited 
equality to non-discrimination among equals. According to the court, only equals could 
be treated equally. One would have thought that if humans are human and therefore 
equal, they ought to be treated equally regardless of their different status. The court 
however reasoned as follows:  
 
No two human beings are equal in all respects.  Accordingly, if the law were to 
treat all human beings rigidly equally, it would in fact result in unequal 
outcomes.  Rigid equal treatment would often result in unfair and unequal 
results.  Accordingly, it is widely recognized that equality before the law requires 
equal treatment of those similarly placed, implying different treatment in respect 
of those with different characteristics.  In simple terms, equals must be treated 
equally, while the treatment of unequals must be different.  The law must be able 
to differentiate between unequals and accord them the differentiated treatment 
which will result in enabling them, as far as practicable, to attain the objective of 
equality of outcomes or of fairness.  In effect, equality of opportunity will often 
entail the law treating people differently in order to give them a fighting chance of 
attaining equality of outcomes or of fairness.  If the differentiated legal rights 
arising from such an approach to the law were to be struck down as not 
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conforming with the constitutional prescription that all persons are equal before 
the law, it would be thoroughly counterproductive.496 
 
If equality were explained as inherently intertwined with the concept of 
inequality, it would imply that a state would be able to infringe on the rights of a citizen 
once the state discovers a loophole. One such instance is where a criterion for 
discrimination has not been spelled out. On the other hand, this interpretation seems to 
make room for the operation and justification of concepts such as affirmative action. This 
seems to make the debate a tough one. However it is helpful to remember that it is not the 
apparent inequality within the concept of affirmative action that is the basis of this 
intervention.497 It is rather based on compensatory and distributive principles of justice 
applied in order to restore social equilibrium.  
 
The questions that remain to be answered as a result are: how do we conceptualize 
the idea of equality? Does equality mean treating similarly placed persons in an equal 
manner? Is it right to treat persons not similarly placed differently? My view is that, 
equality as a variable of social construction is fraught with inherent problems, as has been 
witnessed as a result of the inequality that has been part and parcel of man’s history. 
However, when we consider equality within the context of discussions of law and 
morality, we must elevate this variable to the point where rational public policy choices 
are made on the basis of the classical conception of the principle of equality and non-
discrimination. 																																																								
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Thus, laws promulgated in modern secular States must be rational, and equally 
applicable to all persons. Further, law must ensure that the interests of no one individual 
or groups of persons are elevated above others. This conceptualization of equality is 
neutral in the sense that it treats all persons in an equal manner without any distinction 
whatsoever. In practice, this may be impossible to achieve, as a result of systemic 
inequality that has been ingrained in the social ethos of most societies. However, 
pursuing public policy on the basis of an equal applicable standard for all persons 
presents the best opportunity in ensuring and safeguarding individual liberty generally. 
Equality as a principle can therefore be made neutral if adopted and vigorously pursued 
as an inherent good in itself, which all persons are entitled to by virtue of their 
membership of the human race alone. No other qualification factor, in my opinion, is 
required in theorizing that the principle of equality can and must indeed be morally 
neutral. Therefore, even though equality can also be considered as a moral ideal, it is 
nonetheless also morally neutral because of its concern with individual liberty. 
 
D) THE DIGNITY, INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND EQUALITY (D.I.E.) FRAMEWORK 	
Having theorized about moral neutrality, it is important to reiterate that there are 
many who believe that neutrality is itself not neutral. That notwithstanding, some 
scholars regard concepts such as the Rule of Law as value-neutral, even though they 
believe neutrality as a concept is far from neutral.498 However, it has been noted that 
insofar as some people perceive a concept as desirable, they will believe it has some 																																																								
498 Tara Smith, Neutrality Isn’t Neutral: On the Value-Neutrality of the Rule of Law, 4 Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 
49 (2011). 
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value.499 The difference is however in relation to the exact character of that value, in 
particular, whether the Rule of Law as an example offers moral value.500 It has also been 
argued that the neutralists are mistaken, and that theirs is a costly mistake.501 According 
to Smith, governance by the Rule of Law is a valid ideal only because it is a moral good 
that serves a morally worthy purpose.502 Thus, the conception of the Rule of Law as 
value-neutral actually thwarts our ability to enjoy the benefits that it can and should 
provide.503  Smith goes on to suggest that: 
More exactly, its ideal-ness is ambiguous. Is it an ideal which, when satisfied, 
delivers a positive good? A state of affairs desirable in its own right? Such that a 
government that provides the Rule of Law is, in virtue of that, morally superior to 
a government that does not? Or is its value relative to the particular ends of the 
government that it serves, a strictly internal and instrumental value, such that a 
regime that conforms to Rule of Law standards is not thereby better than 
alternatives in any very robust sense? .... [T]he Rule of Law has become 
something of a gold standard of legitimacy. Domestically, as well, over the last 
decade in the U.S., many on both the left and right have charged our government 
with serious breaches of the Rule of Law, whether in regard to detention and 
surveillance policies adopted in the war on terror, the powers assumed by central 
bankers at the Federal Reserve and Treasury Departments in the face of the 2008 
financial crisis, uses of Presidential signing statements, executive privilege, 
reconciliation processes for enacting legislation, or the Supreme Court’s ruling in 																																																								
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Bush v. Gore. My contention is that a hazy grasp of the character of the Rule of 
Law will naturally infect our understanding of its precise requirements and the 
value that is attained by satisfying them. Without a clear understanding of the 
value of this ideal, we cannot accurately identify its necessary conditions, and 
thus we will lack a sound basis for judging whether a given government is or is 
not upholding it.504         
 
Even though her argument centers on the Rule of Law, she highlights the intrinsic 
superiority a principle conveys once it is recognized as better than others. This seems to 
establish rather that the conception of morally neutral concepts may rather be tantamount 
to imposing a ‘new normal moral.’         
  
Again, in a report on neutrality in Germany, Human Rights Watch defined the 
principle of State neutrality as the duty of the State to preserve neutrality in ideology and 
religion. Some proponents of State legislation restricting the headscarf and other religious 
clothing claim that it is designed to ensure the neutrality of the teaching environment and 
public services as well as the political and religious peace of schools and of the State. 
They argue that the wearing of headscarves by teachers must be prohibited. Some Church 
representatives and mainly Christian Democrat politicians justify privileging Christianity 
in terms of such restrictions on the grounds that it is an integral part of German culture 
and the German value system. To them, the headscarf represents a threat to the Christian 
heritage that underpins German constitutional values. By this logic, Christian symbols are 																																																								
504 Id. 
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not considered a threat to the principles of the Constitution because they are cultural 
rather than religious and therefore neutral. Based on this some may argue that underlying 
every concept of neutrality is some standard which renders the concept non-neutral. This 
may not necessarily be the case. The form of moral neutrality as has been discussed must 
necessarily be applicable to individuals because it must respect their autonomy, dignity 
and must have equality as its basis. This leaves no room for the operation of such public 
or mass concepts of morality in general, which leads to the oppression of minorities.  
 
The Dignity, Individual Autonomy and Equality framework for public policy 
making, which I propose, drawing on the lessons from the UDHR drafting process (in 
particular, the work of the UNESCO Committee) therefore, can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
1) All laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct must have at its core the 
objective of preserving and promoting the inherent dignity of the individual; 
 
2) The individual’s ability to act in an autonomous manner free from social coercion 
must be reflected in laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct; and 
 
3) All laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct must have the quality of 
equality about it i.e. it should not criminalize particular groups of people because 
of personal choices that do not conform to societal standards. 
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This framework for public policy making must be applied, employed and be the basis of 
analysis in determining whether laws that seek to regulate morality are generally sound, 
and accord with the public policy demands of the 21st Century. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE REGULATION OF INTIMACY AND SEXUAL 
MORALITY 
 
The Legal System of Ghana as it is today is modeled along the lines of the British 
common law system. Ghana, formerly referred to as the Gold Coast, attained 
independence in 1957. Prior to that, the entity was a colony of Great Britain between 
1843 and 1957. The British thus imported aspects of their political and legal system to 
their colonies, including the Gold Coast, by virtue of their “indirect rule” governance 
style. 
 
A) THE GHANA LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
1. Historical Foundations of the Ghanaian Legal System 
The Gold Coast, now Ghana, is located on the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa. It is 
estimated that the indigenous peoples of this territory first came into contact with 
Europeans somewhere in the fifteenth century.505 The first to arrive were the Portuguese, 
who were subsequently followed by the Danes, Dutch and the British. The early 
Europeans were mainly traders, who sought trade relations with the indigenous people. 
William B. Harvey captures this initial phase of colonialism in the following words:506 
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The first to arrive were the Portuguese, and in the centuries that followed, the 
English, French, Dutch, Swedes, Danes and Brandenburgers competed for 
footholds on the Guinea Coast from which to pursue their trading activities. The 
pattern of contact and exploitation was fairly uniform. The European traders 
established coastal fortified posts, many of which remain today, and developed 
working relations with the chiefs and people of the surrounding area. European 
guns, cloth and spirits were traded for slaves, gold, ivory and pepper. Trade was 
not limited to the people in the immediate environs of the forts, however. Native 
traders from far in the interior brought their human, or other, cargoes to the coast 
to trade with the Europeans. As the region’s early name indicated, gold was an 
important export, as it is today. Through the dark period of the slave trade, 
however, enormous numbers of Africans were sold at the forts and loaded aboard 
ships bound for the new world. 
 
Missionary activity was also an important fixture in the history of the Gold Coast, as the 
so-called ‘explorer-traders’ believed themselves to be “the bearers of Christianity and 
civilization to the pagan people.”507  However, it was not until the middle of the 
eighteenth century that there begun organized missionary activity in the Gold Coast.508 
These included representations from the Society of the Propagation of the Gospel; the 
Basel Missionaries; the Methodist Missionaries; the Breman Missionaries; and the 
Catholic Missionaries.509 
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It is important to note that by the early parts of the nineteenth century, the British 
were virtually the last ‘surviving’ European power in the Gold Coast. Prior to 1821 
however, it was the Company of Merchants trading to Africa (successors to the Royal 
African Company of England) that governed the British trading forts and posts in the 
Gold Coast.510 However, the abolishing of the slave trade in Britain in 1807511 meant that 
the Company lacked the necessary funding and incentive to continuously maintain the 
British forts, and as a result required governmental subsidy for same.512 As a result of 
allegations and accusations of misuse of this subsidy, as well as its failure to prevent 
‘black market’ trade in slaves, the West Africa Act of 1821 was passed. This Act 
dissolved the Company of Merchants, and vested its forts and other possessions in the 
Crown. Furthermore, these possessions of the Crown, as well as future ones located 
between latitudes 20 degrees North and 20 degrees South along the West Coast of Africa, 
were to be annexed and made dependencies of the Colony of Sierra Leone.513 Thus, 
formal British rule in the Gold Coast dates back to 1821, although the territory was at this 
time a dependency of the Colony of Sierra Leone. 
 
In 1828, the British government decided to hand over the administration of the 
Gold Coast to a Committee of Merchants it selected.514 Under the leadership of Captain 
George Maclean, the Committee extended its powers beyond the forts and settlements. In 
1842 however, a Parliamentary Select Committee recommended that the Crown resume 
administration of the Gold Coast, and that it be severed from the Colony of Sierra 																																																								
510 F.A.R. BENNION, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GHANA 4 (1962). 
511 An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 47 Geo. 3, Sess. I, c. 36 (UK). 
512 BENNION, supra note 510, at 5. 
513 Id. 
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Leone.515 The idea was to regularize the “irregular judicial jurisdiction de facto exercised 
by Maclean and the magistrates at the forts.”516 This was intended to be achieved through 
pacts and agreements with the native chiefs, and with the appointment of a British judge 
“who, in administering justice to the African population, should follow the principles, 
while not being restricted to the technicalities, of English law and should be allowed a 
large discretion.” 517  The Report of this Parliamentary Select Committee therefore 
outlined the envisaged relationship between the Crown and the natives in the following 
terms:518 
 
… not the allegiance of subjects, to which we have no right to pretend, and which 
it would entail an inconvenient responsibility to possess, but the deference of 
weaker powers to a stronger and more enlightened neighbor, whose protection 
and counsel they seek, and to whom they are bound by certain definite 
obligations. 
 
Thus, in 1843, the Crown resumed control of the Gold Coast. To enable the effective 
administration of the Gold Coast, there was the enactment of the British Settlements Act 
of 1843519 and the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843.520 Collectively, these Acts made it 
possible for the British to exercise legal and political control over the Gold Coast.  
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518 See SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE WEST COAST OF AFRICA, REPORT, 1842, [551], at iv-vi (UK).  
519 British Settlements Act 1843, 6 & 7 Vict. c.13 (UK). 
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 In order to solidify and legitimize their claim to the political and legal 
administration of the Gold Coast, the British entered into an agreement with some coastal 
chiefs (mainly Fanti chiefs) in 1844. This is what has come to be famously known as the 
Bond of 1844, whereby the chiefs sought the protection of the British against attacks 
from the inland by the Ashanti and other ethnic groups. Thus, irrespective of the many 
British laws that were passed concerning the administration of the Gold Coast, it is this 
agreement that signifies, to a large extent, the cession of the legal administration of the 
Gold Coast to the British, by the natives themselves represented by their chiefs. As a 
result of the importance of this agreement in the legal development of the Gold Coast, it 
is imperative that the full text of the Bond is reproduced below: 
 
1. Whereas power and jurisdiction have been exercised for and on behalf of Her 
Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, within divers countries and 
places adjacent to Her Majesty’s forts and settlements on the Gold Coast; we, 
chiefs of countries and places so referred to, adjacent to the said forts and 
settlements, do hereby acknowledge that power and jurisdiction, and declare that 
the first objects of law are the protection of individuals and of property, that,  
2. Human sacrifices, and other barbarous customs, such as panyarring, are 
abominations and contrary to law, and, that,        
3. Murders, robberies, and other crimes and offences, will be tried and inquired 
before the Queen’s judicial officers and the chiefs of the districts, moulding the 
customs of the country to the general principles of English law.     
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Done at Cape Coast Castle before his Excellency the Lieutenant Governor; on this 
6th day of March, in the year of our Lord 1844. 
 
From this point onwards, a juridical link was formed between Britain and the Gold Coast 
that paved the way for the introduction of the common law, previously unknown to the 
Gold Coast. 
 
Thus, by 1844 the British had essentially ensured that the people of the Gold 
Coast were subject to British rule. However, the official creation of the ‘Gold Coast 
Colony’ was not until 1874, following the defeat of the Ashantis in the Anglo-Ashanti 
war that began on 22nd January 1873, and ended on 13th February 1874.521 The 1874 
Treaty of Fomena that ended the war provided that the Asantehene522 had renounced all 
claims to the coastal territories, including Elmina.523 On the formal creation of the 
Colony, Bennion notes the following:  
 
Having at last achieved the position of sole European power on the Gold Coast, 
and having, at considerable cost in life and resources, at last brought about the 
decisive defeat of the Ashantis, the British Government, disregarding those who 
still pleaded for the abandonment of this troublesome region, decided that further 
temporizing was impossible. By a Royal Charter signed on July 24th, 1874, the 
																																																								
521 F.A.R. BENNION, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GHANA 4 (1962). 
522 The “Asantehene” is the traditional ruler/king of the Ashanti people in Ghana. 
523 BENNION, supra  at 17. 
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Gold Coast and Lagos were separated from Sierra Leone and together constituted 
a separate colony under the title of the Gold Coast Colony.524 
 
The Royal Charter of 1874 also provided for the position of a Governor, and 
established the Legislative and Executive Councils. The Supreme Court of the Gold 
Coast was also re-established by virtue of the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1876, having 
been initially established pursuant to the Ordinance of 1853. The Chief Justice and not 
more than four puisne judges525 constituted the court. The court had both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction within the colony, similar to that of the Courts of Queen’s Bench, 
Common Pleas and Exchequer in Britain.526 Thus, the court’s jurisdiction was equivalent 
to that of the then recently created High Court of Justice in England. 
 
There were to be three divisional courts of the Supreme Court that were to sit in 
each of the three Provinces that the colony had been sub-divided into for the purposes of 
administration. The “Full Court” of the Supreme Court, comprising the Chief Justice and 
one or two puisne judges, was to act as a Court of Appeal, sitting in both Accra and 
Lagos. Also, district commissioners were ex officio commissioners of the Supreme Court 
and, as such, they exercised the powers of a judge of the Supreme Court within their 
respective districts. Decisions of the Supreme Court could be appealed to the Privy 
Council in Britain; and the Petition of Right Ordinance of 1877 made it possible for 
claims to be brought against the colonial Government in the Supreme Court. 
 																																																								
524 Id. 
525 This simply refers to Associate Judges or Justices of a Court. 
526 BENNION, supra at 19. 
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The Gold Coast Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, 1883 (No. 5) regulated the 
administration and dispensation of justice at the local level through the native tribunals 
system. The head chiefs and other divisional and sub-divisional chiefs and their advisors 
within particular localities constituted these tribunals. They exercised both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction, and appeals from their decisions lay in the Supreme Court. A police 
force was also established in the colony pursuant to the Police Ordinance of 1894. This 
ensured that by the beginning of the twentieth century, the formal structure of the Gold 
Coast legal system had taken shape, and was up and running. 
 
2. Structure of the Ghana Legal System 
 By the time the Gold Coast became independent in 1957, the legal system that 
had been put in place in the mid-nineteenth century had taken root. The Ghana Legal 
System today is thus a complex system comprising formal as well as traditional courts 
and written and unwritten laws. The English common law still plays a significant role in 
justice delivery in Ghana today, as many areas of the law have remained unaffected by 
statutory incursions – for example contract law and the law of torts. 
 
i. Sources of Law 
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana provides a definitive list of all the sources of law 
underpinning the legal system in present day Ghana.527 Article 11 of the Constitution 
provides as follows: 
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The laws of Ghana shall comprise– 
(a) this Constitution;          
(b) enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament established by 
this Constitution;           
(c) any Orders, Rules and Regulations made by any person or authority under a 
power conferred by this Constitution;        
(d) the existing law; and           
(e) the common law.  
 
The Constitution is therefore at the apex of the hierarchy of laws in Ghana, as set forth in 
article 1(2), which provides that ‘This Constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana 
and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, 
to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.’ Acts of Parliament or statutory law is second 
in the hierarchy of laws, followed by subsidiary legislation in the form of Orders, Rules 
and Regulations. 
 
 The Constitution defines the “existing law” to comprise ‘the written and 
unwritten laws of Ghana as they existed immediately before the coming into force of this 
Constitution, and any Act, Decree, Law or statutory instrument issued or made before 
that date, which is to come into force on or after that date.’528 Therefore, all the previous 
enactments of the previous Parliaments of Ghana and the Military Regimes as well as 
customary law, to the extent that they are consistent with the present Constitution, are all 
legally valid laws. In terms of the common law, the Constitution states that: ‘The common 																																																								
528 Id. art. 11(4). 
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law of Ghana shall comprise the rules of law generally known as the common law, the 
rules generally known as the doctrines of equity and the rules of customary law including 
those determined by the Superior Court of Judicature.’529 
 
 The English common law rules and doctrines of equity that were introduced and 
assimilated into the legal system of the Gold Coast have endured to this day. However, 
the “common law of Ghana” is defined to include customary law.530 Customary law is 
then defined as ‘the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular 
communities in Ghana.’ 531  It is important to note that modern day Ghana is an 
amalgamation of several distinct ethnic groups, most of them having distinct cultural 
norms, practices and beliefs. The Constitution therefore seeks to recognize these diverse 
cultural systems and their inherent rules so long as they do not offend the Constitution 
and/or ‘dehumanize or are injurious to the physical and mental well-being of a 
person.’532 
 
ii. Court Structure 
Judicial power in Ghana is vested in the Judiciary and ‘neither the President nor 
Parliament nor any organ or agency of the President or Parliament shall have or be 
given final judicial power.’533 The Judiciary consists of the Superior Courts of Judicature 
and the Lower Courts. The Superior Courts of Judicature comprises the Supreme Court, 
																																																								
529 Id. art. 11(2). 
530 Id. 
531 Id. art. 11(3).  
532 Id. art. 26(2). 
533 Id. art. 125(3). 
	 175	
the Court of Appeal and the High Court.534 The Lower Court structure is made up of the 
Circuit Court and the District Magistrates Court.535 There is also the traditional “court” 
system that primarily deals with causes or matters affecting the institution of Chieftaincy 
in Ghana. These “courts” are made up of the National House of Chiefs;536 the Regional 
Houses of Chiefs537 for each of the ten administrative regions of the country; and 
traditional and divisional councils.538  
 
The Supreme Court consists of the Chief Justice and a minimum of nine other 
Justices.539 The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extends to all matters relating 
to the enforcement and interpretation of the Constitution, as well as matters regarding 
whether or not an enactment was made in excess of the powers of Parliament or the 
enacting authority, as the case may be. 540  The Supreme Court also has appellate 
jurisdiction in respect of decisions of the Court of Appeal and those from the National 
House of Chiefs.541 The Court of Appeal is primarily an appellate Court that hears 
appeals from the High Court and Circuit Court.542 The High Court is a court of first 
instance in some matters and has civil as well as criminal jurisdiction, including original 
jurisdiction in terms of the enforcement of the fundamental human rights and freedoms 
provisions contained in the Constitution.543 The Circuit and District Magistrates Courts, 
including the Family Tribunals and Juvenile Tribunals, handle most of the cases in Ghana 																																																								
534 Id. art. 126(1)(a). 
535 Id. art. 126(1)(b). 
536 Id. arts. 271, 272, 273. 
537 Id. art. 274.  
538 Id. art. 274(3)(c). 
539 Id. art. 128(1). 
540 Id. art. 130(1). 
541 Id. art. 131. 
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543 Id. arts. 33, 130(1), 140.  
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since they are more easily accessible to the masses, and are more widely distributed 
across the country.  
 
3. Overview of the Criminal Justice System 
The Criminal Justice System of Ghana is made up of the sum total of laws and 
institutions that exist for the purposes of maintaining social stability, in terms of 
preventing the commission of the criminal offences promulgated, and prosecuting 
offenders. The major institutions that make up the Criminal Justice System of Ghana are 
as follows: the Courts (i.e. District Courts, Circuit Courts and High Courts);544 the Ghana 
Police Service; the Ghana Prisons Service; and the Attorney General’s Department & 
Ministry of Justice.545 On the other hand, the major laws that set out the criminal offences 
in Ghana, and its procedural aspects are: the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29); and 
the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30).546 
 
Crimes in Ghana are classified as follows: offences punishable by death i.e. 
capital offences; first and second-degree felonies; misdemeanours; and offences 
punishable by a fine. These classifications are important because they determine the 
punishment to which one is liable for the commission of a particular offence.547 At 
common law, the offence of treason was the most serious of offences for which a person 																																																								
544 These are the main trial courts where criminal offences are prosecuted. The Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court serve as courts with appellate jurisdiction for the purposes of the criminal law in Ghana. 
545 This is by no means intended to be an exhaustive list of all the institutions that play a role one way or 
the other for the purposes of giving effect to the criminal law of Ghana; but rather it represents the main 
players and key stakeholders. 
546 Once again, this is not an exhaustive list, for several other pieces of legislation proscribe certain acts and 
characterize them as offences.	
547 See Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu, The General Part of Criminal Law: A Ghanaian Casebook (2001). 
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was liable to suffer a death. Under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and the Criminal 
Offences, 1960 (Act 29), the offences that are punishable by death are: high treason, 
treason and murder. 
   
Felonies on the other hand are offences that are punishable by terms of 
imprisonment of up to life imprisonment. Under the Criminal and Other Offences 
(Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30), there are two kinds of felonies: first-degree felonies and 
second-degree felonies. Section 296 of Act 30 provides that the punishment for a first-
degree felony is a term of imprisonment from one day to life imprisonment. A second-
degree felony is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years. 
     
At common law, misdemeanours were offences that were not very serious and 
were thus not felonies. The rule was such that it covered whatever openly outraged 
decency and was injurious to public morals. In Ghana, an offence that is classified as a 
misdemeanour is tried by summary proceedings, and is punishable by a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding three years. Examples of misdemeanours are offences 
against public order such as fighting in a public place. Finally, a fine is a sum of money, 
the payment of which is imposed on an individual for the commission of an offence. 
Under section 297 of Act 30, it may be imposed in addition to any term of imprisonment. 
Where the only penalty for the commission of an offence is a fine, then that offence is a 
very minor one.  
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B) SEX WORK AND THE LAW IN GHANA        
  
1. The History of Sex Work in Ghana       
It has been suggested that sexuality is too powerful a force to leave 
unregulated.548 Regulating sexuality is however a complex task due to the private and 
intimate nature of sex. However, an aspect of human sexuality that from time 
immemorial has been “cosmetically” regulated through the criminal law is the sale and 
purchase of sex. The first comprehensive statute on such matters introduced to the Gold 
Coast by the British, was the Criminal Code of 1892.549 This law was expressed as ‘An 
Ordinance to establish a Code of Offences punishable on Summary Conviction and on 
information.’550 At this point, it must be noted that during the early parts of the nineteenth 
century, the British had already begun a movement towards comprehensively codifying 
sexual offences for its colonies, beginning with India. It is well known, for example, that 
Thomas Babington Macaulay was the one tasked in 1825 to do this.551 He was the 
Chairperson of the first Law Commission of India, and led the drafting process of the 
Indian Penal Code (IPC), which is believed to be the first comprehensive penal code 
produced within the British Empire.552 The draft Indian Penal Code was completed in 
1837 but did not come into force until 1860.553  
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It is however believed that Section 372 and 373 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860, 
captioned “Selling minor for purposes of prostitution, etc.” and “Buying minor for 
purposes of prostitution, etc.” respectively, is what in many diverse forms, influenced 
colonial prostitution laws within the British Empire.554 For ease of reference these 
provisions are reproduced in full below: 
 
Selling minor for the purposes of prostitution, etc. – Whoever sells, lets to hire, or 
otherwise disposes of any person under the age of eighteen years with intent that 
such person shall at any age be employed or used for the purpose of prostitution 
or illicit intercourse with any person or for any unlawful and immoral purpose, or 
knowing it to be likely that such a person will at any age be employed or used for 
any such purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.555 
 
Similarly, the offence of buying minor for purposes of prostitution, etc. provided that 
‘Whoever buys, hires or otherwise obtains possession of any person under the age of 
eighteen years with intent that such person shall at any age be employed or used for the 
purpose of prostitution or illicit intercourse with any person or for any unlawful and 
immoral purpose, or knowing it to be likely that such person will at any age be employed 
																																																								
554 Id. However, it must be noted that the IPC’s influence within the British Colonies was not absolute. This 
is as a result of the fact that even though the penal codes in colonies like Pakistan, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, 
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or used for any such purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of wither description 
for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine’.556 
 
Remnants of this provision and other similar provisions in other codes are what 
still pertain on the statute books in a majority of former British colonies in Africa 
today.557 In the Gold Coast therefore, the Criminal Code of 1892 for the first time 
introduced to the colony, the offence known as ‘Procuration’. Section 183 of the Criminal 
Code (No. 12 of 1892) i.e. ‘Procuration’ provided as follows: 
  
Whoever– 
(1) Procures any female under twenty-one years of age, not being a common 
prostitute or of known immoral character, to have unlawful carnal connexion, 
either within or without Her Majesty’s dominions, with any other person; or 
(2) Procures any female to become, either within or without Her Majesty’s 
dominions, a common prostitute; or 
(3) Procures any female to leave this Colony, with intent that she may become an 
inmate of a brothel elsewhere; or 
(4) Procures any female to leave her usual place of abode in this Colony (such 
place not being a brothel) with intent that she may, for the purposes of 
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prostitution, become an inmate of a brothel, either within or without Her 
Majesty’s dominions, 
shall be liable to imprisonment for two years: Provided that no person shall be 
convicted of any offence under this section upon the evidence of one witness, 
unless such witness is corroborated in some material particular by evidence 
implicating the accused person.558 
 
This provision in this Criminal Code of 1892 is what marked the beginning of the 
criminalization of sex work generally in Ghana that has endured to this day. Following 
the introduction of this law, the Criminal Code was re-enacted in 1898 as Chapter 16 of 
the Laws of the Gold Coast Colony.559 Section 185 (Procuration) of this Ordinance, is 
identical to the corresponding provisions of the 1892 Ordinance. Just like the law of 
Britain at the time, the Criminal Code of the Gold Coast criminalized and punished 
enforced sex work. From the records of decided Gold Coast cases, it is doubtful that there 
was ever a reported case of ‘Procuration’, although this is by no means indicative of the 
absence of such acts in the colony.         
   
That notwithstanding, in Africa today, sex work is generally viewed as immoral, 
and African cultural apologists are quick to add that such behaviour (voluntary or 
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enforced sex work) is foreign and un-African.560 However, this is far from the truth, as 
research has established the existence of traditional forms of enforced sex work for 
example, in pre-colonial African societies; one scholar aptly referring to the sex workers 
within this context as ‘conscripted public servants.’561 The fact therefore is that, enforced 
sex work must have existed prior to the introduction of colonial procuration laws that 
only sought to prohibit this form of sex work. Akyeampong refers to the traditional sex 
workers as “public women”.562 He distinguishes between pre-colonial sex work and post-
colonial sex work in the following manner:    
 
A distinguishing feature of prostitution in the Gold Coast is the relative absence 
of male pimps. Mention can be made of male intermediaries like the ‘pilot boys’ 
of Sekondi-Takoradi in the 1940’s, but they were more like ‘brokers’ who 
brought potential clients to prostitutes for a commission. Their activities peaked 
during World War II with the presence of foreign sailors and soldiers. But the 
pilot boys lacked the control that characterizes the relationship between pimps 
and prostitutes. Instead, prostitutes in the Gold Coast sometimes formed informal 
associations for mutual support; moreover, they controlled their sexuality and 
their earnings. Therein lies one important difference between prostitutes and what 
I refer to as the ‘public women’ of the pre-colonial Gold Coast. Public women 
were often female slaves acquired by the political elite of Akan villages and 
towns, and compelled to provide sexual services for the local bachelors. Their 
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institutionalized role – indeed, their very existence – sheds important light on how 
perceptions of sexuality informed gender relations. 
 
Quite clearly, sex work existed in pre-colonial Africa, but its nature must have evolved 
from the public women phase or conscripted civil servants era, to a more autonomous 
phase, where sex workers controlled their sexuality and earnings, beginning the wave of 
voluntary sex work as distinct from enforced sex work in Ghana. 
 
There is ample proof to buttress Akyeampong’s assertion of the existence of 
traditional forms of sex work in pre-colonial Gold Coast.563 Olfert Dapper for instance 
had this to say about the people of Axim in the 1660’s, albeit in somewhat crude but 
vivid terms: 
 
Although the Blacks along this coast and in the interior marry as many wives as 
they can maintain, it is customary in Atzijn [Axim] and all the surrounding areas, 
as far as the Quaqua Coast, for every village to maintain two or three whores, 
whom they call Abrakrees. They are initiated and confirmed for the conduct of 
this work by their Kabaseros or headmen in the presence of a large crowd of 
people, in the following manner. First, they place these whores, who are certain 
purchased slaves, with many foolish and ridiculous ceremonies upon a straw mat 
and display them. Then one of the oldest among them, standing up, takes a young 
																																																								
563 See, Olfert Dapper, Naukeurige beschrijvinge der afrikaensche gewesten, 2nd edn (Amsterdam, 1676); 
W. Bosman, A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea, Divided into the Gold, the Slave, and 
the Ivory Coasts (London, 1705); and Jean Godot, Voyages de Jean Godot (Paris, 1704): Bibliotheque 
Nationale, Paris, MS francais 13,830–1. 
	 184	
hen, opens its beak with a knife and lets a few drops of blood drip on her head, 
shoulders and arms. At the same time, she utters upon it terrible adjurations, 
saying that [she?] shall die unless she accept as lover for three or four kakraven 
(worth two or three stuivers), notwithstanding the applicants be of rich means; 
and this without excluding their own blood relatives. Everything she gains in this 
way she must hand to the Kabasero, and in return she enjoys the liberty of being 
allowed to take food, whether it stands in someone’s house or in the market, for 
her sustenance, and nobody may prevent her from doing so, upon a fixed penalty. 
When this has happened, one person from the crowd is sent to one side with her 
and, upon their return, testifies that she has been found to be not a man but a 
woman. Then her companion, namely the other Abrakree or whore, takes her 
home; she is washed, and a clean bed-sheet is wrapped around her. She then sits 
down on the mat, a bracelet of beads is put on her arm, and her shoulders, arms 
and breast are painted with lime or chalk. Finally this Abrakree is put on a stool 
and carried by two young men on their shoulders; they run into the village with 
much cheering by those following them, and they greatly enjoy themselves 
dancing and drinking palm or bordon wine. On eight consecutive days thereafter 
she goes to sit at her appointed place, where all passers-by must giver her two or 
three kakraven.564 
 
This elaborate initiation process as described by Dapper gives credence to Akyeampong’s 
assertion that such public women were conscripted public servants; for they existed to 
satisfy the sexual desires of the men in the village. 																																																								
564 Olfert Dapper, Naukeurige beschrijvinge der afrikaensche gewesten, 2nd edn (Amsterdam, 1676) 106.	
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By all indications, this was a system that had been instituted as a means of 
curbing adultery among married men, and providing sexual satisfaction and gratification 
for the unmarried young men in society. Akyeampong, paraphrasing Godot’s discovery 
of the role of public women in the area to the West of Axim, and now present day Ivory 
Coast, states that, ‘the King of Assini maintained six young women in every village and 
town who gave themselves to bachelors. In addition to these six, the French Governor 
was also obliged, according to his means, to maintain one or two more. These women 
went through the towns and villages of Assini and did not risk turning anyone away for 
fear of severe punishment. In order to be distinguished from other women, they wore a 
piece of white linen around their heads. They lived on the outskirts of the towns and 
villages, where they welcomed all bachelors. Married men who were caught patronizing 
them were heavily fined. It was forbidden for these women to demand anything from their 
male visitors, although they could accept gifts when offered.’565 
 
The final proof of the existence of sex work in post-colonial Africa generally and 
in the Gold Coast in particular, comes from the account of Bosman. Although his 
description of the institution of traditional sex work in Axim comes more than thirty 
years after Dapper’s account, the similarities are far too glaring to ignore. He states as 
follows: 
 
When the Mancevos find they want a common whore, they go and petition the 
Caboceroes that they will please graciously to buy one for the publick: upon 
which they buy a beautiful female slave, or else the Mancevos buy one 																																																								
565 Akyeampong supra at p. 149. 
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themselves. The woman no matter by whom she was bought, is brought to the 
publick market-place, accompanied by another already experienced in that trade, 
in order to instruct her how she should deport herself for the future: which being 
perfectly accomplished, the Novice is smeared all over with earth, and several 
offerings offered in order that she may be happy in her future station and earn 
much Money. This over, a little Boy, yet immature for love affairs, makes a feint 
or representation of lying with her before all the people both young and old; by 
which ‘tis hinted to her that from this time forwards, she is obliged to receive all 
persons indistinguishable who offer themselves to her, not excepting little boys. 
Then a little out of the way, a hut is built for her; in which she is obliged to 
confine herself for eight or ten days, and lye with every man who comes thither: 
After which, she obtains the Honourable name of Abelcre or Abelecre, signifying 
a common or public whore; and she has a dwelling place assigned her near one of 
her Masters, or in a separated part of the Village, she being for the remainder of 
her life obliged to refuse no man the use of her Body; though he offers never so 
small a sum.566 
 
It is important to note that the mancevos were the young men in the community and the 
caboceroes were the chiefs and elders of the community. 
  
Aside the existence and proliferation of the so-called public women within certain 
parts of the Gold Coast in pre-colonial times, there are other accounts that describe 
contemporary forms of sex work that existed in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 																																																								
566 Jean Godot, Voyages de Jean Godot (Paris, 1704): Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, MS francais 13,830–1.	
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among the Akan. For instance, some scholars believed that the coastal Akan women were 
quite promiscuous where Dutchmen were concerned, and were even prone to 
whoredom.567 Others have noted that, etiguafo (prostitutes) were different from other 
women by virtue of their ‘fine appearance and their clothing’.568 There were also some 
Elmina, Fetu, Asebu and Fante women who were notorious for providing sexual favours 
for negotiated amounts.569 Bowdich also observed among the early nineteenth century 
Ashanti that ‘Prostitutes are numerous and countenanced. No Ashantee forces his 
daughter to become the wife of the man he wishes, but he instantly disclaims her support 
and protection on her refusal, and would persecute the mother if she afforded it; thus 
abandoned, they would have no resource but prostitution’.570 
 
Despite the various accounts of the existence of contemporary forms of sex work 
between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries in the Gold Coast, there seems to be a 
lack of information that would have made it possible to compare this institution with that 
of the public women. However, what is clear is that this category of sex workers were not 
slaves, but as Akyeampong puts it ‘they were insiders with kinship ties who had been 
forced into prostitution because they asserted their autonomy’.571 Thus, they engaged in 
sex work within their own communities. The public women as described by the accounts 
of Dapper, Bosman and Godot on the other hand, were acquired as slaves from 
elsewhere, and conscripted to provide sexual services in places where they had no kinship 																																																								
567 Pieter de Marees, Description and Historical Account of the Gold Kingdom of Guinea, trans. And e. 
Albert van Dantzig and Adam Jones (Oxford, 1987), ch 7. 
568 Jean Barbot, Barbot on Guinea: The Writings of Jean Barbot on West Africa, 1678-1712, ed. P.E.H. 
Hair, Adam Jones and Robin Law, 2 vols. (London, 1992), ii, 495. 
569 Bosman, New and Accurate Description of the Gold Coast, supra at p. 214. 
570 T.E. Bowdich, Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee, 3rd edn (London, 1966) at p. 303. 
571 Akyeampong supra at p. 156. 
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ties.572 This peculiar feature seems to create parallels with enforced sex work or sex 
trafficking in contemporary times, which is generally prohibited. 
 
It is my belief that it was this peculiar nature of the traditional conception of sex 
work that led to the adoption or imposition of British standards in the Gold Coast in terms 
of the criminalization of procuration during colonial rule. As has already been noted, 
section 183 of the 1892 Criminal Code of the Gold Coast provided that: 
 
Whoever– 
(1) Procures any female under twenty-one years of age, not being a common 
prostitute or of known immoral character, to have unlawful carnal connexion, 
either within or without Her Majesty’s dominions, with any other person; or 
(2) Procures any female to become, either within or without Her Majesty’s 
dominions, a common prostitute; or 
(3) Procures any female to leave this Colony, with intent that she may become an 
inmate of a brothel elsewhere; or 
(4) Procures any female to leave her usual place of abode in this Colony (such 
place not being a brothel) with intent that she may, for the purposes of 
prostitution, become an inmate of a brothel, either within or without Her 
Majesty’s dominions, 
shall be liable to imprisonment for two years: Provided that no person shall be 
convicted of any offences under this section upon the evidence of one witness, 
																																																								
572 K.A. Busia, Report on a Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi (London, 1950), ch. 8. 
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unless such witness is corroborated in some material particular by evidence 
implicating the accused person.573  
  
Despite the criminalization, it will be an understatement to suggest that sex work thrived 
in the Gold Coast in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. This is because, as already 
noted, female sex workers were controlling their earnings in the trade – which was a 
means of asserting their autonomy unlike in previous times. 
 
In fact, the rapid urbanization that was characteristic of colonial rule and the 
proliferation of European as well as other migrant male workers in the Gold Coast 
Colony brought about economic opportunities for women in the sex trade. By rendering 
sexual favours, some women found a way of surviving in the big cities, thereby asserting 
their autonomy and not conforming to the prevailing gender stereotypes. It has been 
noted that ‘the sale of sexual services could secure migrant women their first, temporary 
residence. Unlike the sale of foodstuffs or liquor, prostitution did not necessarily require 
start-up capital’.574 A notable fact that was discovered in both post-colonial and colonial 
Ashanti was the large number of Krobo women engaged in the sex trade.575 It is this fact 
that led to the belief that Okomfo Anokye, a traditional Ashanti priest who helped 
establish the Ashanti Kingdom, had cursed Krobo women with prostitution.576  
 																																																								
573 Criminal Code, Ordinance No. 12 of 1892, in ORDINANCES, supra, section 183. 
574 Akyeampong supra at p. 157. 
575 Akyeampong supra at p. 159. 
576 Id. It suffices to also point out that in 1980, a group calling itself the Dangbe Reformers Association sent 
a memorandum to the Paramount Chief of the Dangbe Traditional Area (the ancestral home of the Krobo 
people), stating that “Our young girls move about without husbands, thus rendering them unemployed and 
consequently engaging themselves in prostitution both in and outside the country”. See, Matilda Pappoe, 
The Status of Female Prostitution in Ghana (1996). 
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However, this assertion is merely symptomatic of the fact that women in post-
colonial and colonial Gold Coast mainly migrated from their towns and villages to 
engage in sex work in other places. Thus, Kru women from Liberia begun migrating to 
Ghana and settled in Takoradi where they engaged in sex work. 577  Akyeampong 
summarizes increased female autonomy in colonial Gold Coast in the following manner: 
 
The absence of social barriers between ‘prostitutes’ and ‘respectable women’ in 
working-class leisure activities in Sekondi-Takoradi facilitated the exchange of 
beliefs and mannerisms. Social life in Takoradi in the 1930s and 1940s revolved 
around spots like Columbia Hotel, famous for its dances. The ‘Liberian Bar’, 
owned by a Liberian in Takoradi, was another active social spot in the 1930s and 
1940s … [A]s prostitutes and non-prostitutes patronized these places, mannerisms 
were exchanged. The ability to chew gum and make it snap was introduced into 
Sekondi-Takoradi by Kru women, but it expanded to become the badge of female 
nonchalance. With their social drinking at popular bars and their fashionable 
clothing, Kru and Nigerian women became the pace-setters where female 
autonomy was concerned.578 
 
Thus, sex work thrived in colonial Gold Coast, a major reason being the money that these 
sex workers were making from the trade. Even though it was not a given that one could 
acquire wealth by engaging in sex work, it is believed that the average amount that was 
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made on a monthly basis by sex workers ranged between ten and thirty pounds.579 It has 
also been noted that the average charge for sexual intercourse was two shillings.580 This 
is what earned sex workers in Ghana the infamous tag of “two-two women”.581 
 
In contemporary Ghana, sex work still thrives in the major urban centers. The 
lack of economic opportunities, and even the meager income generated from the little 
opportunities that are available to women generally, seems to be an important factor in 
the proliferation of sex workers and sex work in Ghana. Rural-urban migration has 
further exacerbated the problem, as many young girls move to urban areas in search of 
opportunities, and sometimes end up in the sex trade. It has been suggested for instance 
that ‘increased urbanization, increased mobility and high cost of living have brought 
significant changes in sexual ethos in the urban centres. It also exposes young women to 
new socio-sexual lifestyles such as attending night clubs and bars, parties etc.’582 The 
law prohibiting sex work seems to have done little in curbing the practice, as it remains 
practically and purposefully unenforceable – due, in part, to the high demand for sex, and 
the posture of law enforcement generally. 
 
2. The Law of ‘Prostitution’ in Ghana and the ‘Living Law’ 
																																																								
579 Id. 
580 Ione Acquah, Accra Survey (London, 1958) at p. 73. 
581 David Brokensha, Social Change at Larteh, Ghana (Oxford, 1966) at p. 140. In fact, it is believed that 
in colonial times, the general fee for a sexual encounter with sex workers was two shillings two pence, 
hence the tag “two-two” or “tuutuu” women. 
582 A. Ankomah & N. Ford, Pre-Marital Sexual Behaviour and its Implications for HIV Prevention in 
Ghana, Institute of Population Studies, University of Exeter (1993). 
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As already noted, Act 29 is the major piece of legislation that deals with criminal 
offences in Ghana.583 In Ghana, sex work is essentially criminalized, in the form of the 
proscription of “prostitution”.584 Although Act 29 does not mention the phrase “sex 
work”, its emphasis on the prohibition of “prostitution” leads to the reasonable 
conclusion that sex work is prohibited in Ghana. Thus, section 279 of Act 29 as amended 
by Act 554 defines prostitution to ‘include the offering by a person of his body commonly 
for acts of lewdness for payment although there is no act or offer of an act of ordinary 
sexual connexion.’585 As such, “sex work”, which involves the exchange of sex for 
monetary compensation, and “prostitution” can be used interchangeably, and in Ghana it 
includes performing, offering, or agreeing to perform a sexual act for money, property, 
token, favour, article, or anything of value by a person through bargaining. Sex work has 
also been referred to as paid sexual relations between a woman and her client; the 
remuneration providing part of the woman’s entire livelihood.586 However, the definition 
of prostitution in Act 29 does not focus on a particular gender. Nevertheless, in Africa 
generally and Ghana in particular, female sex workers seems to be predominant as 
compared to male sex workers. 
 
Chapter 7 of Act 29 is captioned “Offences against Public Morals” and deals inter 
alia with Brothels and Sex work. This heading suggests that Ghanaian society abhors 
such conducts, hence their criminalization. According to Section 277 therefore, the 
keeping of a brothel is illegal and amounts to a misdemeanor. Furthermore, managing or 
																																																								
583 Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) 
584 Section 274 of Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) 
585 Section 279 of Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) 
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assisting in the management of a brothel, and also being a tenant, lessee, lessor or a 
landlord and allowing use of premise for a brothel are criminal offences.587 A brothel is 
however defined to mean “any premise or room or set of rooms in any premises kept for 
purposes of prostitution”. 588  It seems therefore that regular hotels given certain 
circumstances can be characterized as brothels within the meaning of the law. 
 
Section 274 on the other hand specifically prohibits persons from trading in 
prostitution. Thus, trading in prostitution amounts to a misdemeanor.589 A person who 
knowingly lives wholly or in part on earnings of sex work, or exercises control or 
influence over movements of a sex worker in a manner to aid or compel the sex work 
being engaged in with any other person, is trading in prostitution.590 Section 274 aims at 
punishing all persons who benefit from earnings of a sex worker knowingly. However, 
implementation of this provision becomes complicated in situations where minors or 
elderly persons who are usually dependent on the earnings of sex workers are concerned. 
Can they be considered as trading in prostitution, and thus be potentially liable for the 
commission of a criminal offence? Pimps on the other hand, clearly fall within this 
provision. 
 
The law on prostitution as such actually widens those considered to trade in 
prostitution to include all persons who benefit directly and indirectly by an act of 
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prostitution.591 Persons also commit a misdemeanor if in a public place or in sight of a 
public place they persistently solicit to obtain clients for a sex worker or for any other 
immoral purpose. 592  The above notwithstanding, sex work, considered the oldest 
profession in the world, has evolved over time; as such persons can still operate brothels 
and trade in prostitution without being noticed in public. This is the main challenge in 
enforcing the law against sex work, especially as a result of the increase in technology 
particularly the proliferation of social media platforms where solicitation and 
importuning is easily done.  
 
Despite the criminal prohibition, sex work is prevalent in Ghana and occurs in all 
major towns and cities, for example Accra, Takoradi, Tamale, Kumasi etc. – just like it 
did in pre-colonial and colonial Gold Coast. In Ghana, like some other countries, sex 
work is not necessarily illegal but rather the soliciting for sex in public places, brothel 
keeping, and living on the earnings of sex work are what are deemed illegal. The law 
however heavily restricts the life of the sex worker and the only sex work that cannot 
conceivably attract prosecution is that which is carried out by a person working alone in a 
house or flat that he or she owns.593 It is important therefore to consider the categories of 
sex workers that exist in Ghana in contemporary times. Generally, classification of sex 
workers is based on four important factors: (1) their appearance (dressing and grooming); 
(2) their means of soliciting clients; (3) the type of clients who patronize their services; 
and (4) their range of prices for sexual acts. However in 1980, a report submitted to the 																																																								
591 Id. 
592 Section 275 of Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). 
593 Seaters or Home-based sex workers can therefore technically engage in sex work without infringing the 
law it seems. However increasingly, this type of sex work is dying out or is being engaged in very 
discretely. 
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National Council on Women and Development, identified five main categories of sex 
workers in Ghana: (1) Mame-I-Come/”Tuutuu” women; (2) Bobby-Stand girls; (3) the 
Monkey Don; (4) the Diga; and (5) the Krobo group.594 
 
That notwithstanding, one Ghanaian researcher has classified sex workers into 
two main categories: (1) Seaters or Home-based sex workers; and (2) Roamers or Bar, 
Hotel and Street-based sex workers.595 According to her, Seaters or Home-based sex 
workers ‘operate from their living quarters, usually in densely populated areas of cities 
and towns, e.g. the Zongos or immigrant areas’.596 On the other hand, the Roamers or 
Bar, Hotel and Street-based sex workers ‘usually operate at night and can be found in 
drinking bars, hotel waiting areas, popular eating and drinking spots, and on some 
streets well known as pick-up spots’.597 In recent times, it seems as though the Seaters are 
becoming extinct or are increasingly being more discreet. On the other hand, there is a 
proliferation of the Roamers. Another group that can be added to the category of sex 
workers in Ghana today are what I call the “Freelance/High Class” sex workers. This 
group, originally a subset of the Roamers, can be classified separately due to their modus 
operandi.  
 
																																																								
594	See,	Matilda Pappoe, The Status of Female Prostitution in Ghana (1996) at p. 22. The Mame-I-Come or 
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The hunting grounds for the Freelance/High Class sex workers are usually the 
most prestigious hotels, due to the fact that Ghanaian men of substantial means and 
foreigners often patronize these places. It has been observed for example that ‘Every 
hotel or night club has at least one worker who is designated to deal with prostitutes and 
pimps who operate on the premises’.598 However, their activities are more discreet in 
recent times, where it is believed that all the prestigious hotels maintain a list of these 
Freelance/High Class sex workers (some of whom are believed to be local celebrities), 
and often engage their services on behalf of their guests. This assertion, although 
obviously difficult to prove, must not be discounted, as it is more likely than not to be in 
existence. In recent times, it seems as though a further sub-group within the 
Freelance/High Class sex workers, mainly made up of local celebrities (especially 
actresses), are engaged in trans-national sex work, with Dubai as the prime destination.599 
 
It is believed, for example that some of these so-called celebrities earn around five 
thousand dollars ($5,000) for a weekend when engaged mainly as escorts. 600 The 
accusations and counter-accusations of prostitution between some celebrities that have 
characterized the entertainment industry in recent times must not therefore be entirely 
discounted.601 What is interesting is that in the midst of all this, we have laws that are 
supposed to essentially prohibit sex work. Is it that the law is just not realistic in light of 
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societal changes? Also, regardless of the above categories of sex workers, does it amount 
to sex work where a woman engages in sexual intercourse with a man (be it casual sex or 
within the context of a non-marital relationship), ostensibly in exchange for some 
pecuniary reward? This trend seems to be popular in Ghana as captured by Ankomah and 
Ford: 
 
While not every sexual contact of single women in the urban centre of Ghana is 
commercial, sexual services tend to be regarded as something which is obtained 
by favour or bargaining, a practice quite different from prostitution in the classic 
Western sense. Pecuniary interest may, in expediency, take precedence over the 
relationship itself. Economic pressures provide the background for most sexual 
relationships from which material gain is expected.602 
 
It is however inconceivable to categorize such sexual encounters as amounting to sex 
work. However, the socio-cultural shift from traditional conceptions of moral conduct to 
a more modern and generally fluent amoral outlook may be the reason why the law 
prohibiting sex work, as well as those prohibiting other intimate sexual conduct, like 
same-sex relations remain practically unenforceable. 
 
For example, despite the prohibition of unnatural carnal knowledge, the 
prevalence of male same-sex desire as well as lesbianism has become a permanent fixture 
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of contemporary “Ghanaian culture” as has been recently pointed out by empirical 
research.603 The research findings showed that: 
 
Looking at religious orientation and sexuality, it was revealed that 184/442 (42%) 
of Christians and 45/108 (42%) of Moslems reported being bi-sexual. Among 
those aged between 16 and 20, 53% of them had had bi-sexual encounter before, 
while only 39% of those aged 21 and 25, and 48% of those aged between 26 and 
30 reported being bi-sexual. Despite their small number, 7/38 (18%) of those aged 
46 and above said that they were homosexuals, with another 13/38 (34%) 
reporting bi-sexuality among both sexes. A separate look at gender revealed that, 
134/344 (39%) of the females were bi-sexual, while the males were even greater, 
recording 149/357 (42%) as bi-sexual. Marital status was not a bar to bi-sexuality. 
Among the married, 68/205 (33%) reported being bi-sexual with another 6/205 
(3%) being homosexual. This could simply mean that even though the individual 
is married, he or she considers himself or herself as a homosexual. Homosexuality 
amongst the divorced was 10/63 (16%) and bi-sexuality in their group was 29/63 
(46%).604 
 
It is fair to admit that there are Ghanaians who are homosexuals. However, it is irrational 
to erroneously suggest that it is culturally an abomination to be lesbian or gay. Even if 
that was the case, the dynamic nature of culture and the influence of external forces and 
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factors means that homosexuality has come to stay, and no amount of criminalization can 
automatically or magically convert self-proclaimed homosexuals into heterosexuals. 
 
The socio-cultural shift regarding perspectives of morality and moral behavior, 
essentially invalidate the criminal prohibitions that seek to root out moral decay. In fact, 
the decadence is already in motion and entrenched as a result of the over-sexualization of 
Ghanaian society, which has been appropriately described as a paradox.605 On this point, 
it has been further argued that, ‘though many cultural artefacts such as Ghanaian 
traditional fables, tales and ‘high life’ music, dances, jokes, and gibes were frequently 
woven around sex, the topic hardly came into the forefront for any formal discussion. 
Music, dance, jokes and gibes are not contradictory, neurotic or evanescent expressions. 
They are alternative media through which communication is established as a means of 
aggregation and abstraction of current socio-economic developments and its influences 
on the body politic.’606 As a matter of fact, sexual promiscuity and the exchange of sexual 
favours for pecuniary rewards are as present today as they were at the time Ankomah and 
Ford made their observation in 1993, that increased urbanization, mobility and the high 
cost of living had brought a significant change in sexual ethos in the urban centres in 
Ghana.607 A recent list of the top twenty songs that received the most airplay on radio in 
Ghana in 2017 revealed that the most played song was one entitled “Sponsor” – (a song 
that glorifies sexual relationships with older men for pecuniary rewards) by the now 
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deceased female dancehall artiste named Ebony.608 Interestingly, not even one gospel 
song made it on this list; which seems strange for a country where we pride ourselves 
with our religious faith. This however goes to buttress my earlier point of the over-
sexualization of Ghanaian society, epitomized by indigenous music, which Norman tells 
us are a means of determining socio-economic developments and its influence on society 
as a whole.609 
 
In light of the obvious socio-cultural changes occurring rapidly in Ghana, intimate 
human conducts that are criminalized have been given renewed attention. For example, a 
lot of discussions have focused on whether sex work should be legalized as exists in 
some countries.610 It has been recommended, for example, that all national legislation, 
which in intent or in practice, results in the placing of sex workers outside the scope of 
the rule of law, should be repealed. The sex industry continues to be heavily stigmatised 
and most sex workers take care to keep their occupation secret from their families. 
Projects established to provide sexual health services to sex workers report that health 
service personnel generally treat sex workers with disrespect.611 Recently, the Ghana 
Tourism Authority in collaboration with the National Security and the Ghana Police 
Service closed down a hotel in Gbawe, a suburb of Accra where sex parties were being 
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arranged and advertised.612 The Ghana Tourism Authority condemned the increasing 
spate of advertising of sex parties and other related sex activities in hotels, nightclubs, 
movie houses, pubs and other tourism establishments in the country.613 It cautioned 
stakeholders and the public that it was established and tasked among other things to 
investigate and take measures to eliminate illegal, dishonorable, unsound and improper 
activities in relation to any activity regulated under the Act.614  
 
The fact remains that, commercial sex is extremely difficult to regulate or curtail 
in contemporary times as a result of technological advancement, and the general 
difficulty in regulating such human conduct. The moral reprehensibility that is usually 
attached to sex work as the basis for its criminalization is irrational in the face of the 
rational economic decisions that participants in the trade make. How is society affected if 
some people decide to make ends meet by trading their bodies for sex i.e. through the 
legitimate and voluntary commercialization of sex? Is it that morally reprehensible to 
make ends meet through such means? As a result of the fact that criminalization has not 
really addressed these questions, sex work is on the increase generally in Ghana, and 
newer forms of solicitation for sex have been devised along the way, fueled by the 
proliferation of social media – and the countless opportunities for online interactions that 
it presents. To make matters worse, there seems to be no reported case of actual 
prosecution of sex workers for engaging in the trade.615 The trend of abuse of sex workers 																																																								
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by law enforcement authorities is however not uncommon throughout Africa.616 As a 
result, it is imperative that we turn to human rights to ascertain whether we can 
reasonably deduce a right to sex work, thereby ensuring the protection of the rights of 
legitimate sex workers. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GHANA 
 
From time immemorial sex has been a currency of commerce. The relationship between 
sex work and the law has often revolved around the debate regarding its morality; 
whether it should be criminalized or not. In today’s liberal world the discussion on the 
relationship between law and sex work is shifting to a rights based discussion. Can there 
exist a right to sex work? Is sex work supposed to be considered as a human rights issue? 
These are however questions that can only be answered based on a finite understanding 
of the idea of human rights. Interestingly, the idea of human rights only became 
entrenched as part of International Law discourse not too long ago. The devastating 
consequence of the Second World War was what led to a renewed wave of human rights 
protection globally as well as movements towards decolonization.617  
 
In this Chapter, I continue the discussion pertaining to the criminalization of sex 
work by focusing on human rights in Ghana; and whether the legal and institutional 
framework that exists today is receptive to the idea of sex workers’ rights and the right to 
sex work. In order to do this, I examine the historical evolution of human rights in post-
independence Ghana, to ascertain the attitude and posture of the country, and the courts 
in particular, with regard to the promotion and protection of general fundamental human 
rights and freedoms. By tracing the various phases of human rights development in the 
country through some of the most seminal cases adjudicated, we may be able to ascertain 																																																								
617 Many African colonies attained independence after 1945; specifically from the late 1950’s through the 
early parts of the 1960’s. 
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the posture of the courts in human rights matters, and whether there is room for the 
acceptance of sex work and the rights of sex workers as deserving of protection in 
contemporary Ghana. 
 
A) HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
There is a general belief in contemporary times that by virtue of our humanity, all 
human beings are entitled to certain fundamental rights and freedoms. However, it has 
been long suggested that the idea of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
persons has its roots and origins in antiquity. The belief that there existed certain norms 
and principles inherent by virtue of humanity alone can be traced as far back as the 
writings of the Greek philosophers Aristotle and Plato, and is firmly rooted in traditions 
and cultures of past. Throughout human history, politically organized societies have 
invariably developed various systems of justice, with the welfare of the society being of 
paramount interest. Even all the major religions of the world have one unifying factor – 
the idea that justice must be done to all. 
 
 Although the modern idea and conception of human rights is usually attributed to 
the writings of philosophers such as John Locke, we cannot dismiss the monumental role 
that certain foundational documents in the history of man have played in asserting 
fundamental human rights and freedoms. Some of the precursors to our modern 
understanding and appreciation of human rights include: the Magna Carta of 1215; the 
English Bill of Rights of 1689; the French Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen 
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of 1789; and the United States Constitution & Bill of Rights of 1791. The historical irony 
manifest in these so-called precursors to fundamental human rights is the fact that, most 
of them excluded rights and freedoms for women and many other minority groups. This 
inherent discrimination transcended social, religious and political barriers. For instance, 
the effect of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade meant that African Americans were not fully 
recognized under the Bill of Rights in the United States.  
 
It was only during the latter parts of the 19th Century and the early 20th Century 
that there begun a wave and movement towards ‘internationalizing’ human rights. This 
movement gathered steam probably as a result of the abolishing of the slave trade, and 
also as a response to the scourge of war. Thus, the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) was established in 1919 to protect the rights of workers everywhere; and most 
importantly, the League of Nations was formed in the aftermath of the First World War. 
Unfortunately, the League of Nations failed in its mission of ensuring a peaceful world, 
free from abuse of human rights and fundamental freedoms – due to the outbreak of the 
Second World War in 1939. 
 
The extermination of over six million Jewish people, Sinti, Roma as well as many 
other civilians during the course of this war shocked the collective conscience of the 
world like never before.618 The world had to act in the wake of the monstrous atrocities 
committed by the Nazi Regime and its allies. Thus, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
of the United States famously captured the emerging concept of human rights at the time 
																																																								
618 It is estimated that a total of over 40 million people lost their lives as a result of the violence of this war.	
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in his “four essential freedoms” speech to Congress.619 Hence, the United Nations 
Organization was formed in 1945 in San Francisco, with the principal aim of maintaining 
international peace and security.620 
 
The establishment of the United Nations signified the global resolve that had been 
harnessed to ensure that the atrocities that had occurred during the war were never again 
repeated.621 The colonies of the Allied powers, including the Gold Coast, contributed 
immensely towards the war efforts as “native” soldiers fought side by side with soldiers 
from the colonial powers. This, it has been argued, was one of the reasons that led to the 
demand for self-governance in many of the colonies, including the Gold Coast. The right 
to self-determination in the United Nations Charter was therefore one of the founding 
principles that fueled the independence movement across Africa. As a result, many 
former African colonies attained independence within twenty years after the 
establishment of the United Nations.  
 
One of the first things that the UN did that gave further impetus to the demand for 
self governance across the world, was the establishment of a Human Rights Commission 
under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt, with the task of drafting a document spelling 
out the meaning, scope and content of the fundamental rights and freedoms that the UN 
Charter had made mention of but failed to define. This show of renewed commitment to 
the human rights agenda during this post-war period led to the adoption of the Universal 
																																																								
619 See the 1941 State of the Union Address delivered by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the US 
Congress on 6th January 1941. 
620 See, the United Nations Charter, 1945. 
621 See U.N. Charter pmbl. 
	 207	
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 in Paris, France as already noted in 
Chapter Three.622 In Africa, this new wave of international human rights that had 
coincided with the struggle for self-government and fight for independence from the 
colonial powers, mainly Britain and France, led to self-government soon thereafter. The 
main focus of most of the African colonies at the time, and subsequently the newly 
independent African States was economic development. Respect for, and promotion and 
protection of human rights were therefore not on the political agenda of the independence 
leaders of Africa, and were thus relegated to the backburner. The consequential effect 
would be the absence of human rights provisions in Constitutions and abuse of rights by 
these same leaders, who had been hailed as liberating their countries from colonialism 
and its attendant injustices.623 
 
That notwithstanding, the UDHR continued to be standard bearer in terms of the 
acknowledgment of fundamental human rights for all. For example, article 1 of the 
UDHR provides that:624 
 
All human beings are born equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.  
 
																																																								
622 See Chapter Three of the Dissertation, in particular Section B. 
623 Ghana is a typical example of such a country, where the nationalist and pan-Africanist agenda of 
Kwame Nkrumah (the first President of Ghana) was hailed the world over; but in actual fact he presided 
over gross abuse of human rights and freedoms during his reign, as will be discussed subsequently.	
624 See G.A. Res. 217(III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) art 1.  
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In a similar vain, the UDHR provides for the principle of non-discrimination in terms of 
the enjoyment of the fundamental human rights and freedoms available to all. 625 
Unfortunately, the UDHR being a declaration did not have binding legal effect.626 
Therefore, it was not until 1966, that there would be the adoption of legally binding 
global treaties on fundamental human rights and freedoms.627 The International Covenant 
on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR) in particular provides for equality and non-
discrimination.628 
 
Several provisions of the ICCPR thus prohibit discrimination on stated grounds, 
and guarantees equal protection of the law. For example, Article 2(1) states: “Each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within 
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Article 17(1) 
provides that: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and 
reputation.” Article 17(2) then states: “Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.” Finally, article 26 provides as follows:  
 
																																																								
625 Id. art. 2. 
626 Since it was not a treaty, it only served as ‘Soft Law’ and thus the States Parties were not legally bound 
by its provisions. 
627 The International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (ICESCR), were both adopted in 1966, but came into effect in 1976. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 
628 See ICCPR art. 2. 
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All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
 
Article 28 of the ICCPR establishes the Human Rights Committee, which is mandated to 
deal with issues involving alleged violations of the rights contained in the ICCPR by 
States Parties to the Covenant, and by so doing, interpret the provisions of the Covenant 
Human rights are therefore fundamental, inherent and inalienable rights that people are 
entitled to due to the mere fact that they are human beings. In Ghana, the rights and 
freedoms that people are guaranteed, which can be traced largely to the UDHR, ICCPR 
and the ICESCR, can be found primarily in the 1992 Constitution, in chapters 5 and 6 to 
be specific. But this was not always the case, as Ghana had to endure some bitter periods 
of suppression and wanton disregard of human rights by successive regimes. 
 
B) HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN GHANA 
 
The posture of Ghanaian courts in the aftermath of independence up until recent 
times has been topsy-turvy to say the least. The shocking dereliction of duty by the courts 
is explored through the seminal cases that laid the groundwork for systemic and 
constitutionally sanctioned abuse of human rights in Ghana. I will first discuss the 
immediate post-independence period between 1957 and 1966, and then deal with the 
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post-first Republican and 1969 Constitutional era, between 1966 and 1972. Here, we 
realize the courts becoming emboldened in holding the government to account for 
infringements of human rights unlike what pertained in the immediate post-independence 
period. I then examine the post 1969 period as well as the 1979 Constitutional period 
between 1972 and 1981 to gain further insights into the attitude of the courts towards 
human rights. I also examine the post-1979 Constitutional period, between 1982 and 
1992 where Ghana experienced the longest period of military rule, ironically under the 
Provisional National Defence Council.  
 
1. The Immediate Post-Independence Period (1957 – 1966) 
From the onset, it must be noted that independence was largely at the behest of 
the British Parliament, by virtue of its enactment of the Ghana Independence Act. The 
Ghana (Constitution) Order-in-Council of 1957629 however had its main provisions 
coming into force on 6th March 1957.630 Section 54 of this Order-in-Council made 
provision for the existence of the Supreme Court and contemplated the existence of a 
Court of Appeal as well. This was created by an Ordinance dividing the Supreme Court 
into the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal with effect from 6th March 1957. 
By another Ordinance, which came into force at the same time, detailed provisions were 
made for the jurisdiction of the new Court of Appeal, and the right of recourse to the 
West African Court of Appeal (which was regarded as inconsistent with independence 
and existed hitherto) was abolished.631 The Constitution did not however contain a Bill of 
																																																								
629 (S.I. 1957 No. 277; L.N. 47) 
630 This is the official date of independence of the Gold Coast, which then became Ghana. 
631 F. Bennion, Constitutional Law of Ghana (1962). 
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Rights hence it can be argued that, persons resident in Ghana were not legally entitled to 
human rights.  
 
The first case that the courts had to deal with during this era concerning human 
rights was the case of Lardan v. Attorney-General.632 This case had to do with a 
deportation order that had been made pursuant to the Deportation Act of 1957. The order 
purported to deport the plaintiff from Ghana because it was the position of the 
government that his presence in Ghana threatened the public good. The plaintiff therefore 
brought an action in the High Court, seeking a declaration to the effect that the order was 
null and void as a result of the fact that the Deportation Act itself could not be applied to 
him because he was a Ghanaian citizen by birth. During the pendency of the matter 
before the High Court, the National Assembly (Parliament) enacted the Deportation 
(Othman Larden and Amadu Baba) Act, 1957. This law specifically authorized the 
Minister of Interior to deport the two named individuals from Ghana. Furthermore, the 
law purported to terminate proceedings in any court, which had been instituted for the 
purpose of challenging the validity of the deportation order made against the persons 
affected by the new law.  
 
Section 4(2) of this new law stated as follows: ‘On any order of deportation being 
made hereunder, any deportation order made under the Deportation Act, 1957, in respect 
of the same deportee shall be automatically revoked and if the deportee is in custody 
under the provisions of the Deportation Act, 1957, he may, notwithstanding any 
proceedings in any court, whether pending or determined, be retained in custody for the 																																																								
632 (No. 2) [957] 3 WALR 114. 
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purposes of this Act without being released and such custody shall be deemed to be legal 
custody; and any proceedings in any court instituted for the purpose of impugning the 
validity of the Alhaji Alufa Othman Larden Lalemie Deportation Order, 1957, or the 
Alhaji Amadu Baba Deportation Order, 1957, shall be automatically determined.’633 
 
The High Court therefore had to determine whether the new law was contrary to 
the dictates of the Constitution of Ghana, and whether a citizen by birth could be 
deprived of his right to citizenship. Smith J. (a British judge) however held as follows:  
 
I have considered all the other authorities cited to me and they illustrate the same 
point that 'the words "peace, order and good government" with no reservation 
attached, no restriction as to specific subjects and without qualification, give to 
any country the same plenary powers as are possessed by the Imperial Parliament 
in England. It was conceded that this Act of Deportation, and that was a 
momentary indulgence in fantasy, if passed by the Imperial Government would be 
a matter for Parliament only and the English courts would be powerless to 
interfere. If, as I hold, the words "peace, order and good government," unqualified 
in any way, are plenary powers possessed by Parliament and no less than the 
powers possessed by the Imperial Parliament, then it follows just as it would in 
England that the court here has no power to inquire into such an Act. I consider, 
'therefore, that any law which comes within the ambit of the Ghana (Constitution) 
Order in Council, s. 31, and which does not contravene any other provision in the 
constitution can only be challenged in a court of 1aw if it violates or purports to 																																																								
633 Deportation (Othman Larden and Amadu Baba) Act, 1957. 
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violate sub-section (2) or (3) of the section. On that view, the Act deporting these 
two persons, not being in contravention of any expressed limitation in the Ghana 
(Constitution) Order in Council, 1957, is a matter for Parliament … In England it 
is not open to the court to invalidate a law on the ground that it seeks to deprive a 
person of his life or liberty contrary to the court's notions of justice and, so far as 
the Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council, s. 31 (1), is concerned, that is the 
position in which I find myself. For these reasons I hold that it is not for the court 
to inquire into this particular Act and the pending actions before the Kumasi 
Divisional Court are determined under the provisions of section 4 (2) of the 
Act.634 
 
This decision by Smith J, to essentially prioritize the speedy actions of 
government over the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals laid the groundwork 
for the Executive impunity that subsequently ensued. Ghana will not be the same again, 
for essentially the court was announcing that the Government could basically do 
whatever it deemed fit and necessary for the governance of the State, and as a result had 
the Judiciary’s blessings to disregard one of the most fundamental human rights that 
exists – the right to citizenship. It must however be reiterated that, the independence 
constitution of Ghana did not necessarily have a Bill of Rights, and may have been the 
reason why the court chose to turn a blind eye on obvious abuse of human right; 
justifying it on the basis of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
The second case that we must consider in this era is the case of Balogun v 																																																								
634 Lardan v. Attorney General, supra. 
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Edusei,635 which also involved the implementation of the Deportation Act of 1957. The 
facts of this case were that, four individuals, including Wahabi Balogun, had been 
arrested pursuant to a deportation order that had been made under the Deportation Act. 
An ex parte motion for the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum was filed on their 
behalf on the ground that all the applicants were Ghanaian citizens and as such they could 
not be the subject matter of the deportation order. The court directed that notice of this 
motion be served on the Minister of Interior, the Acting Commissioner of Police as well 
as the Director of Prisons. However, on the day the notice was served, the applicants had 
already been deported to Nigeria. The court therefore held the Respondents to be in 
contempt of court, but stayed execution of their committal to prison, ostensibly in the 
hope that they would be advised to apologize and be remorseful for their actions. 
 
However, on the morning of the day that the respondents were to appear before 
the court, the Parliament of Ghana purported to hold an emergency session where it 
enacted the Deportation (Indemnity) Act (No. 47 of 1958). Section 2 of this Act provided 
as follows: ‘The Honourable Krobo Edusei, formerly Minister of the Interior, and 
Erasmus Ransford Tawiah Madjitey, Commissioner of Police, shall be indemnified from 
all penalties for contempt of court and exonerated from all other liabilities in respect of 
any action taken by them in carrying out the deportation order in the Schedule of this Act 
after the institution by the persons named in those orders of proceedings by way of 
habeas corpus.’ Smith J. (the same British judge from the Lardan case) now found 
himself in a quagmire created by his reluctance to hold the government to account in the 
Lardan case. 																																																								
635 [1957] 3 WALR 547. 
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Obviously annoyed by the blatant interference in the administration of justice by 
the Executive and the Legislature, he delivered a judgment that was poignant but totally 
irrelevant in the grand scheme of things. Clearly, he had regretted his actions in the 
earlier case but could do little to rectify the irreparable harm that he had willingly and 
knowingly caused. This is what he had to say: 
 
By the passing of this Act I take it that the court's finding that the respondents are 
in contempt is not challenged by Parliament, but that the intention is to neutralise 
any consequential order that I might make. It is plain that Parliament prefers that 
the respondents should not apologise, and it has passed this Act in order to nullify 
any order which I might make in the absence of the apology. The Courts of 
Justice exist to fulfill, not to destroy, the law, and it would not make sense for me 
to record an order which is incapable of being carried out. As to the deportations 
while the applications for habeas corpus were still sub judicae, I cannot over-
emphasize the undesirability of interference by the Executive with the functions 
of the court. Persistent indulgence in such a practice could not have any other 
than the most serious ill-effect on the well-being of the country. Decisions of a 
court are as binding upon the Executive as the laws which Parliament passes are 
binding upon the ordinary citizen, and it is the court that enforces upon the people 
obedience to these laws, thereby aiding Parliament in the ordering of the country. 
In the result, the finding of contempt stands, but I make no further order.636  
 
It is not in doubt that the court’s decisions in both the Lardan and Balogun cases 																																																								
636 Id. 
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provided a great platform for Executive and Legislative impunity in Ghana, in respect of 
the wanton abuse of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In fact, it emboldened the 
Executive to act recklessly with the tacit approval and blessings of the Judiciary; and this 
enabled it to enact the Preventive Detention Act in 1958, which sought to indefinitely 
detain persons whose actions or suspected actions were deemed to be prejudicial to the 
security of the State. 
 
The case of In Re Akoto and Seven Others,637 is probably the most important case 
in the post-independence era that captures the extent of the judiciary’s endorsement of 
impunity. The case had to do with some individuals who had been arrested and detained 
pursuant to the Preventive Detention Act of 1958. The writ of habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum was applied for on their behalf, but was denied by the High Court. The 
applicants therefore filed an appeal with the Supreme Court on the grounds, inter alia, 
that the Preventive Detention Act was enacted in excess of the powers conferred on 
Parliament by the Constitution, and that it contravened the provisions of article 13 of the 
1960 Constitution of Ghana.638 In characteristic fashion, the Supreme Court held that the 
declaration that was to be made by the President upon his assumption of office was akin 
to the Coronation Oath subscribed to by the British Monarch upon his or her ascension to 
the throne. The Court therefore held that the declaration was of no constitutional import, 
unlike a proper Bill of Rights, and as a result no legally enforceable obligation was 
created and imposed on the President. 																																																								
637 [1961] GLR 523. 
638 It must be noted that on 1st July 1960, Ghana adopted a new Constitution. Article 13 of this new 
Constitution ostensibly provided for a solemn declaration to be made by the President on assumption of 
office – these included his adherence to the principles of non-discrimination, freedom of speech and 
expression, assembly and the right of access to courts of law etc. 
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It is clear that the Supreme Court wholly adopted the position that had earlier 
been advanced by Smith J., that Parliament was a power unto itself, and that no courts 
was competent to challenge the legality of an Act of Parliament, or actions of the 
Executive for that matter. On the idea that article 13(1) provided a Bill of Rights 
guaranteed for the protection of the people from governmental abuse, the Supreme Court 
went stated as follows: 
 
This contention, however, is based on a misconception of the intent, purpose and 
effect of Article 13(1) the provisions of which are, in our view, similar to the 
Coronation Oath taken by the Queen of England during the Coronation 
Service.  In the one case the President is required to make a solemn declaration, 
in the other the Queen is required to take a solemn oath.  Neither the oath nor the 
declaration can be said to have a statutory effect of an enactment of 
Parliament.  The suggestion that the declarations made by the President on 
assumption of office constitute a "Bill of Rights" in the sense in which the 
expression is understood under the Constitution of the United States of America 
is therefore untenable … In our view the declaration merely represents the goal 
which every President must pledge himself to attempt to achieve …. The 
declarations however impose on every President a moral obligation, and provide 
a political yardstick by which the conduct of the Head of State can be measured 
by the electorate. The people’s remedy from any departure from the principles of 
the declaration, is through the use of the ballot box, and not through the courts.639 
																																																								
639 [1961] GLR 523. 
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This decision marked the final nail in the coffin of human rights in the immediate post-
independence era. Impunity became the order of the day, as with the Judiciary’s 
blessings, the government could essentially do any and everything they wanted without 
any recourse to conceptions of what was just and right. 
 
The case of In Re Dumoga and 12 Others640 also had to do with the application of 
the Preventive Detention Act of 1958. The facts were that, on or about the 14th March, 
1960, Kofi Dumoga and twelve others were arrested and detained by virtue of two 
preventive detention orders, Executive Instruments 69 and 70 of 1960, made under 
powers conferred by section 2 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1958.  On the 18th March 
1960, the applicants were duly served with the grounds of detention in compliance with 
the said Act of 1958. The applicants therefore applied to the High Court for orders of 
habeas corpus directed to the Minister of the Interior and the Director of Prisons to show 
cause why the applicants should not be released from detention. The court however held 
that, where a person was in lawful custody an application for habeas corpus does not lie, 
and that, ‘where a statute confers a discretion upon an executive officer to arrest and 
detain persons, the court cannot enquire into the exercise of that discretion, provided the 
officer acts in good faith.’641  
 
The court in this case further entrenched the ability of the Executive to abuse the 
rights of individuals without having to provide reasons for the curtailment of these rights. 
In understanding the extent to which these cases were damaging for human rights in 																																																								
640 [1961] GLR 44. 
641 Id. 
	 219	
Ghana at the time, it is important to understand the fact that human rights are inherent 
rights and all persons are entitled to them based solely and primarily on the fact that they 
are human beings. In essence, what the Preventive Detention Act did was to deprive 
individuals of their freedom of movement, and also deny them of their right to be heard 
or afforded a fair trial. The courts failure to uphold these rights and even recognize the 
fact that these people were entitled to them in the first place shows the nonchalant 
attitude of the courts towards human rights at the time. 
 
2. The Post-First Republican and 1969 Constitutional Period (1966 – 1972) 
On February 24th 1966, the Military with the collaboration of the Police and other 
security agencies ceased political power in Ghana through a coup d’état. The military 
regime of the National Liberation Council (NLC) thus ruled Ghana between February 
1966 and August 1969. The 1960 Constitution was suspended during this period, but the 
NLC Establishment Proclamation ensured that the courts remained functional and 
continued to adjudicate disputes. The case of the Republic v. Director of Prisons; Ex 
Parte Salifa642 is an early example of the newfound boldness of the courts during this era. 
In this case, a fifteen-year-old boy was sent to Guinea by his father in 1965 to continue 
his education. In 1967 he ran away from his guardian who was allegedly maltreating him. 
He went to Sierra Leone where he asked the Ghana High Commissioner to help him to 
return to his parents in Ghana. On his arrival in Accra, in June 1967, he was immediately 
arrested by the police and detained at the Ussher Fort Prison. On 25th June 1968, Salifa’s 
father filed an ex parte application for an order of habeas corpus on the ground that his 
son’s detention was unlawful.  																																																								
642 [1968] GLR 630. 
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Upon a notice of motion filed on 29 June 1968, for hearing on 2 July 1968, the 
Director of Prisons made a return thereto by an affidavit annexing thereto a photostat 
copy of a document, purporting to be a Decree signed by the Chairman of the National 
Liberation Council, which authorized the arrest and detention of Salifa. The document 
was not numbered, and neither was it published in the Gazette as required by the 
Proclamation establishing the National Liberation Council. Counsel for the Director of 
Prisons then referred the court to the Proclamation, particularly paragraph 3 (5) thereof 
and contended that by virtue of that paragraph the National Liberation Council had an 
unlimited power. The court however held that, the formal requirements of enacting a 
decree involving gazetting and numbering etc. could not be legally dispensed with in the 
making and issuing of a Decree that is to have the force of law. Consequently, since what 
was presented was neither numbered nor published in the Gazette, it could not be 
classified as a Decree.  
 
In ordering the immediate and unconditional release of Salifa, the court further 
held that: ‘The contention that the National Liberation Council had an unlimited power 
was pitched too high – it undermined or undefined the purposes for which by the 
Proclamation the National Liberation Council was established. According to the 
preamble to the Proclamation, it was established in the interest of the people of Ghana, 
and for the provision for the proper administration of the country and for the 
maintenance of law and order. In effect the Proclamation provided for the eradication by 
the National Liberation Council of illimitability of power in Ghana; for, autocracy in 
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Ghana was given a decent burial on 24 February 1966.’643 It is clear here that even 
during the military regime, the courts were ready to hold the government to account and 
protect the rights of the people, contrary to what ensued under the ‘democratic’ and 
‘constitutional’ regime between 1957 and 1966. 
 
That notwithstanding, the government immediately re-arrested Salifa and brought 
him before another High Court on the same facts. The case of Republic v. Director of 
Special Branch; Ex Parte Salifa,644 had to do with Salifa, who had been detained under a 
National Liberation Council Decree and had appeared in habeas corpus proceedings 
before Anterkyi J. who had ordered his release on the grounds, that the Decree, being 
unnumbered and unpublished, was invalid. Immediately after his release, Salifa was 
however re-arrested without warrant and detained for suspected subversion under another 
unnumbered and unpublished National Liberation Council Decree. Salifa's father filed 
another application for a writ of habeas corpus for the immediate release of his son on 
the grounds, inter alia, that the re-arrest without warrant was unlawful and further that the 
subsequent unnumbered and unpublished Decree was also invalid. The court however 
held that, the police had the right to arrest a person without a warrant who had been 
suspected of having committed or about to commit an offence.  The court thus failed to 
invalidate a warrant that deprives people their right to freedom of movement even though 
the warrant was not numbered and published and clearly invalid. The action of the court 
in this instances represents a conflict of the courts at the time whether to enforce human 
rights or not in a military regime where there was a high prevalence of abuse of rights.  																																																								
643 Id. 
644 [1968] GLR 646-666. 
	 222	
Fortunately, the military regime handed over power to a constitutionally elected 
government in August 1969. The 1969 Constitution of Ghana also contained explicit 
human rights guarantees and provisions that were entrenched in the Constitution and 
could not be repealed except through a national referendum. This was in reaction to what 
occurred during the previous era. However, the new government soon faced a challenge 
in court regarding some action that it had taken upon its assumption of office, which 
affected the rights of some citizens. 
 
In the case of Sallah v Attorney General,645 the plaintiff was, on 16 October 1967, 
appointed a manager of the Ghana National Trading Corporation (G.N.T.C.), a public 
corporation that had been established in 1961. The plaintiff held that appointment until it 
was terminated on 21 February 1970 by the Presidential Commission acting in pursuance 
of section 9(1) of transitional provisions of the 1969 Constitution. He therefore sought a 
declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of the said section 9(1) the 
Government was not entitled to terminate his appointment because his office fell outside 
the category of public offices to which section 9(1) was applicable. Neither party 
disputed the fact that the G.N.T.C. was originally established in 1961.  However, Counsel 
for the government argued that to determine the offices contemplated by section 9(1) it 
was necessary to analyze the legal consequences flowing from the 1966 revolution that 
overthrew the Government of the First Republic and the Proclamation of the National 
Liberation Council (N.L.C.).  
 
																																																								
645 2 G & G 739 (2d) 1319, [1970] GLR 55.	
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After referring to Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and State, it was argued on 
behalf of the government that the 1966 revolution repudiated the 1960 Constitution and 
the laws thereunder and that the N.L.C. did not derive its authority from the 1960 
Constitution but rather established a new legal order. Thus, all offices deriving their 
sources from laws that historically existed before the N.L.C. were juristically established 
by the N.L.C. by virtue of the proclamation. He submitted that “established” should be 
given a technical meaning and ‘any offices established’ in section 9(1) should be 
interpreted to mean ‘any office which derives its legal validity from the N.L.C’.  Counsel 
for the plaintiff however referred to the use of “establish” in local statutes, and contended 
that the word should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning as defined in the Oxford 
Dictionary. He submitted that establishing a new legal order was not the same as 
establishing new offices and further that there was a distinction between “establish” and 
to “continue in force”. The court however agreed with the plaintiff’s submissions, and 
vindicated his rights i.e. that the government had overstepped in purporting to terminate 
him from office. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld human rights and this signaled the birth 
of a new dawn where the courts were willing to assert its authority in terms of the 
enforcement of constitutional rights. 
 
3. The Post-Second Republican and 1979 Constitutional Period (1972 – 1981) 
The constitutional government elected under the 1969 Constitution was 
overthrown in a military coup d’état in 1972. The new entity that took over was known as 
the National Redemption Council (NRC). One of the important cases of this era was the 
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case of Shalabi v. The Attorney General.646 The plaintiffs, formerly of British nationality, 
took out a writ for a declaration that they were Ghanaian citizens and therefore entitled to 
operate a transport business notwithstanding the provisions of the Ghanaian Business 
(Promotion) Act, 1970 (Act 334). They had obtained Ghanaian passports in 1968 by 
virtue of the Ghana Nationality Decree, 1967 (N.L.C.D. 191), para. 1. For the Attorney-
General it was submitted inter alia that the National Liberation Council, being the 
sovereign body of the land at the time, could do whatever it liked, including depriving 
persons of their citizenship; and that by the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 
1968 (N.L.C.D. 333), paragraph 1 of N.L.C.D. 191 had been obliterated by retrospective 
substitution and consequently every person who acquired citizenship thereunder ought to 
be deemed never to have acquired such citizenship.  
 
It was held that, the National Liberation Council through the Proclamation, 1966, 
established itself as an interim government recognizing the people of Ghana as the 
repository of sovereignty. The court further held that: ‘As a constitutional interim 
government its object was to uphold the suspended Constitution, excepting so far as it 
had to derogate from it under the doctrine of necessity, thus re-establishing the rule of 
law and other principles necessary for the proper functioning of democracy. By the 
Proclamation, 1966, the National Liberation Council was established to provide “for the 
proper administration of the country” and this did not include depriving Ghanaians of 
their basic right, citizenship. Citizenship once conferred can only be lost by processes 
specifically stated in the instrument conferring that citizenship and not by an ambiguity.’  
 																																																								
646 [1972] 1 GLR 259. 
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The NRC was subsequently overthrown on June 4th 1979 by the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which comprised of junior officers of the Ghana Armed 
Forces. On 24th September 1979, the AFRC handed over power to a civilian 
administration under the leadership of President Hilla Limann, who had been elected 
under the 1979 Constitution. Limann’s administration did not last long as it was itself 
overthrown on 31st December, 1981, however a few human rights related cases were 
decided by the courts during this period. For instance, in the Republic v. Director of 
Prisons; Ex Parte Oduro,647 the plaintiff Emmanuel Oduro brought an application for 
habeas corpus in the interest of General I. K. Acheampong (leader of the NRC) who was 
arrested and detained in the interest of national security after he had been overthrown as 
Head of State. In his application, Oduro claimed to be a friend of Acheampong. However, 
it was alleged that he did not have the authority of Acheampong to bring the application 
and neither did he state in his affidavit that access to Acheampong in prison had been 
denied.  
 
In dismissing the application, the court held that the applicant was not included in 
the categories of persons who could apply for habeas corpus. According to Act 244,648 
Section 1(2), the categories of persons who could apply for habeas corpus were                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
persons alleging that they had been unlawfully detained; persons entitled to the custody 
of a person alleged to be unlawfully detained; and persons acting on behalf of the person 
alleged to have been detained.  It further provided that, in the third category, the authority 
of the person detained must be shown, unless it could be implied (as on the part of a 																																																								
647 [1979] GLR 354-359. 
648 Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244). 
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husband applying for the release of his wife). Where authority could not be implied and 
express authority was lacking, a relation or friend might still apply provided he could 
show that access to the person alleged to be illegally detained had been denied so that it 
was impossible to obtain instructions from him. The court thus concluded that the 
applicant had not shown that he had the authority of Acheampong and his application 
therefore was dismissed. This decision is interesting in the sense that, subsequent cases 
uphold the rights of individuals to act as interested persons in such cases even where they 
are not directly affected.   
 
4. The Post-1979 Constitutional Period (1982 – 1992)  
This era witnessed arguably the gravest abuse of human rights in the history of 
Ghana. This is because, the PNDC arrogated all powers of government to themselves, 
including judicial power – as they established public tribunals, that run parallel to the 
regular courts. The power of the ordinary courts, although not abolished, was highly 
diminished as evident in the famous case of Kwakye v Attorney General.649 The plaintiff, 
a former Inspector General of Police, was purported to have been tried in absentia in 
pursuance of a military decree and was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. The plaintiff 
who was outside the country filed for a declaration that he was never tried, convicted or 
sentenced by any court and that the purported sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment 
imposed on him was void and of no effect whatsoever. The regime however sought to 
have the suit dismissed on the basis of section 15(2) of the transitional provisions of the 
1979 Constitution, which forbade courts to deal with or adjudicate on matters, including 
executive, legislative and judicial actions that had been taken or were purported to have 																																																								
649 [1981] GLR 944-1071. 
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been taken by the AFRC regime. The court thus unanimously dismissed the plaintiff’s 
application and held that the trial was lawful, and thus upheld Kwakye’s conviction and 
sentence.  
 
C) HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE 1992 CONSTITUTION 
 
The 1992 Constitution was approved on 28 April 1992 through a national 
referendum, and entered into force on 7th January 1993. The Constitution defines the 
fundamental political principles establishing the structure, procedures, powers and duties 
of the government, that of the judiciary and legislature, and spells out the fundamental 
rights and duties of citizen. 650  The Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of 
Ghanaians are provided for in Chapter 5 of the Constitution.651 These rights and freedoms 
are to be respected and upheld by the all persons, including the government and other 
organs and agencies, and are enforceable by the Courts.652 All persons in Ghana are 
entitled to these fundamental human rights and freedoms irrespective of one’s race, place 
of origin, colour, religion, creed or gender.653 Some of the these rights include the right to 
life, personal liberty, respect for human dignity, protection from slavery and forced 
labour, equality and freedom from discrimination, economic rights, educational rights 
amongst others.654 
 
																																																								
650 See the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. 
651 Id. Articles 12 to 33. 
652 Id. Article 12. 
653 Article 12(2) of the 1992 Constitution. 
654 Chapter 5 of the 1992 Constitution. 
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Article 140 of the Constitution however provides that ‘the High Court shall have 
jurisdiction to enforce the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms guaranteed by this 
Constitution.’ Thus, the High Court is the court of first instance when one alleges that 
human rights have been violated. Thus, article 33(1) provides that: 
 
Where a person who alleges that a provision of this Constitution on the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being or is likely to be 
contravened in relation to him, then without prejudice to any other action that is 
lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress. 
 
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s power and jurisdiction in terms of the interpretation and 
enforcement of the Constitution generally, and the enforcement of the Fundamental 
Human Rights and Freedoms in particular is however subject to the jurisdiction of the 
High Court first. Nevertheless, where one is dissatisfied with the decision of the High 
Court, an appeal can be made to the Court of Appeal and ultimately to the Supreme 
Court. 
 
This Article provides the admissibility criteria by which the High Court will have 
jurisdiction over the case. Firstly, the right should be part of Chapter 5 of the 
Constitution. Secondly, either the violation has occurred, is occurring or likely to occur; 
and finally the violation should be in relation to the person in question. The protection of 
these rights by the courts are only in respect of the person who claims his or her rights are 
being infringed upon or is likely to be contravened in relation to him. However, in Adjei-
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Ampofo v. Accra Metropolitan Assembly and the Attorney-General,655 (on the right to 
dignity, discussed below) this legal requirement was modified. This case was decided in 
the Supreme Court although it concerned enforcement of human rights, which as already 
noted the High Court has original jurisdiction over.  
 
The Supreme Court however, declared the case as admissible and held that it was 
in the public interest of the country to do so. On the issue of the plaintiff not being 
affected by the violation personally, the court held that the affected persons as well as 
those likely to suffer did not know their rights and also did not have the monetary means 
to initiate a case in court. Therefore, even though the High Court has original jurisdiction 
over human rights matters, the Supreme Court in enforcing the Constitution as a whole 
could adjudicate at first instance on human rights matters under certain circumstances. 
This decision of the Supreme Court was likely borne out of the public interest nature of 
the case, showing how our courts have gradually appreciated the importance of 
fundamental human rights from the post-colonial era till date. 
 
Also, in the case of Awuni & Others v. West African Examination Council,656 the 
Supreme Court made provision for “monetary compensation”, a new remedy that is not 
expressly provided for in the constitution. This case unlike the Adjei-Ampofo case was 
instituted at the High Court, through the Court of Appeal and finally the Supreme Court 
where the judgment was delivered. The provision of compensation in monetary value is a 
new development as the court realized that the extent to which the fundamental human 																																																								
655 [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 411. 
656 [2004] 1 SCGLR 471. 
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rights had been violated required further efforts by the courts to bring the affected 
persons to their status quo. Finally, in the consolidated cases of Ahumah-Ocansey v. E.C; 
Centre for Human Rights and Civil liberties (CHURCIL) v. A.G and E.C, the Supreme 
Court held that prisoners had the right to vote, despite their incarceration.  
 
 In terms of sex work, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana does not even expressly 
state the right to work generally as a fundamental human right. However article 33(5) 
provides that the rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in the chapter does not 
exclude other rights and freedoms which are to be considered to be inherent in a 
democracy and intended to secure the freedom and dignity of man. The Supreme Court in 
The Ghana Lotto Operators Association v. National Lottery Authority 657  had an 
opportunity therefore to clarify whether or not the right to work could be imported into 
Ghanaian law under article 33(5) but failed to do so. 
  
 Article 14 of the constitution also speaks to the right to personal liberty and gives 
the cases under which the right to personal liberty of a person can otherwise be deprived 
from them. Clause 1(d) of this article is of importance in particular in relation to sex work 
because it personal liberty may be deprived ‘in the case of a person suffering from an 
infectious or contagious disease, a person of unsound mind, a person addicted to drugs 
or alcohol or vagrant, for the purpose of his care or treatment or the protection of the 
community’.  A study conducted by the Ghana Aids Commission in 2014 disclosed that 
5,720 representing 11% out of 52,000 female sex workers in Ghana were living with 
																																																								
657 [2007-2008] SCGLR 1088. 
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HIV.658 Deducing from this statistics, it can be said that, sex workers with sexually 
transmitted infections and diseases cannot be entitled to the right of personal liberty for 
the protection of the community. On one hand, it can be argued that, sex workers have 
the right to personal liberty and can do what they see fit unless that liberty is curtailed 
under the exceptions provided in the article 14(1)(d). 
 
The constitution in article 15(1) similarly provides that ‘The dignity of all persons 
shall be inviolable’. The Supreme Court in the Adjei-Ampofo case659 was confronted with 
an interpretation of this article of the Constitution, as to whether or not the practice of 
people carrying pan latrines on their heads as an employment given to them by the Accra 
Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) amounted to a violation of the dignity of the employees. 
Although the case was settled, it could be inferred from the consequential orders given by 
the court and the agreement reached by the parties to the action that, the practice was 
deemed to be undignifying. The question here is whether sex work and carrying a pan 
latrine on the head can be put in the same category of jobs that are undignifying. The 
inability of the court to make a pronouncement on the ambits or the metric of what makes 
a thing lack dignity makes it open for all to decide.  
 
The Constitution also talks about equality before the law and non-discrimination 
in article 17. Clause (3) thus states: ‘For the purposes of this article, "discriminate" 
means to give different treatment to different persons attributable only or mainly to their 
																																																								
658 The General Telegraph, Statistics: 5,720 female sex workers in Ghana living with HIV, 
http://www.quest.com.gh/statistics-5720-female-sex-workers-in-ghana-living-with-hiv/ - accessed on 4th 
November, 2017. 
659 Adjei-Ampofo, supra. 	
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respective descriptions by race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, gender, 
occupation, religion or creed, whereby persons of one description are subjected to 
disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another description are not made subject 
or are granted privileges or advantages which are not granted to persons of another 
description.’ In Nartey v. Gati660, Dotse JSC, in his reasoned judgment stated that, article 
17 should be read alongside article 12(2) which will give a clear indication that, all the 
rights and freedoms contained in chapter 5 are to be enjoyed subject to the rights of 
others and the public interest. In relation to sex work, the Constitution states that a person 
should not be discriminated upon based on their occupation. An occupation can be said to 
be job a person undertakes to earn a living. Sex work can be said to be an occupation 
hence; it can be inferred from this that sex workers are not to be discriminated against 
based mainly on the fact that they are sex workers. This notwithstanding, they can be 
discriminated upon only when it is in pursuance of a public interest, and the fact that sex 
work is generally prohibited makes this more likely.  
 
Another right guaranteed under the Constitution, which is of importance to the 
rights of sex workers in Ghana, is the right to freedom of thought, conscience and belief. 
The right to freedom of thought, allows an individual to hold any view they deem fit and 
worthy, independent of those of others. The framing of these set of rights makes it such 
that, people are allowed to have their own belief systems that they identify with and 
ascribe to without having to justify these to anyone. The right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and belief can be interpreted to accommodate a person’s right of choice. This 
is due to the fact that an individual’s thought, conscience and belief system informs the 																																																								
660 [2010] SCGLR 745. 
	 233	
choices they make. Sex workers, by engaging in the acts they engage in, are exercising 
their right of choice and rightfully so. This provision of the Constitution gives sex 
workers like all other persons, the freedom of thought, conscience and belief so however 
this right manifests in their life is clearly a matter of choice that is constitutionally 
guaranteed. 
 
The last set of rights which are relevant for the purposes of our discussion are: 
economic rights; 661  educational rights; 662  cultural rights and practices; 663  women’s 
rights;664 and children’s rights.665 Hence, article 24 of the Constitution is in relation to the 
right of workers to work under satisfactory, safe and healthy conditions as well as 
receiving equal pay for equal work without discrimination. This provision of the 
Constitution makes provision for people who are employed. The article seeks to protect 
workers from exploitation by their employers, hence demands that workers work under 
satisfactory conditions, and are paid properly for the jobs they do. This provision of the 
Constitution is reiterated in the Labour Act, in section 10. Article 24 of the Constitution 
does not however in any way suggest that all persons are entitled to the right to work, 
hence by extension, it does not necessarily guarantee the right to sex work. However, 
what is abundantly clear is that all persons in Ghana are entitled to economic rights like 
the right to work and to receive equal pay for equal work.  
 
																																																								
661 See CONSTITUTION Art. 24 (1992) (Ghana). 
662 See id. art. 25. 
663 See id. art. 26. 
664 See id. art. 27. 
665 See id. art. 28. 
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Similarly, Ghanaians have a right to all the various forms of education without 
any distinction whatsoever. Article 26(1) then provides that: ‘Every person is entitled to 
enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and promote any culture, language, tradition or 
religion subject to the provisions of this Constitution.’ However, article 26(2) adds that: 
‘All customary practices which dehumanize or are injurious to the physical and mental 
well-being of a person are prohibited.’ The importance of these provisions is of particular 
relevance to any discussion of sex work in Ghana. This is because, culture has always 
been one of the factors that have been often cited and relied upon in opposing the 
recognition of the rights of sex workers by some. It is thus argued that Ghanaian culture 
abhors such practices, which are expressed to be foreign to the traditional and cultural 
identity of Ghana. This argument is however counter-intuitive if you consider the 
numerous documented instances of traditional sex work that existed in the pre-colonial 
times, which has already been examined in this dissertation.  
 
Furthermore, such arguments are deficient in the sense that culture, which has 
been universally described as the way of life of a people, is not static, but rather changes 
over a period of time. Article 26(2) further buttresses this point because the drafters of the 
Constitution realize that cultural practices, albeit long standing and potentially 
unchangeable, may be injurious to the physical as well as mental well-being of humans, 
and may even dehumanize them. Thus, many hitherto unquestionable cultural practices 
like female genital mutilation666 and trokosi667 have been outlawed by virtue of this 
																																																								
666 Sometimes referred to more succinctly as ‘female genital cutting’, it involves the cutting or other 
obliteration of the female clitoris to stifle sexual pleasure. The justification for this is to prevent women 
from being promiscuous.  
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provision. It is also a notorious fact that even same-sex female relations, popularly 
referred to as “supi” has been in existence in Ghana from time immemorial.668 
 
Finally, there is the need for a brief examination of the residual human rights 
clause of the Ghanaian Constitution i.e. Article 33(5). This article provides as follows:  
 
The rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the fundamental human 
rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter shall not be regarded 
as excluding others not specifically mentioned which are considered to be 
inherent in a democracy and intended to secure the freedom and dignity of man.669 
 
This means that, despite the fact that some specific human rights have been set out in 
Chapter 5 of the Constitution, other rights which are not specifically or expressly stated, 
but which are recognized as rights in other democratic states, especially where they are 
intended to secure human dignity and freedom, shall be considered as rights in Ghana as 
well. The question that then arises is whether or not the rights of sex workers can be 
considered as one of such residual rights? The matter has not been adjudicated upon 
																																																																																																																																																																					
667 This is still practiced in some parts of Ghana, and involves the sending of young girls by their families 
to serve at the pleasure of a traditional fetish priest, ostensibly to atone for some sins that may have been 
committed by the girl’s family or forebears. These girls usually end up as sex slaves at the behest of these 
unscrupulous ‘priests’. 
668 See Serena Owusua Dankwa, “It's a Silent Trade”: Female Same-Sex Intimacies in Post-Colonial 
Ghana, 17 NORDIC J. FEMINIST AND GENDER RES. 192 (2009). 
669 Article 33(5) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. 
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directly by the Supreme Court, but recent decisions by the court seem to point towards a 
liberalization of the scope of the residual rights envisioned by article 33(5).670 
 
For example in the case of Adjei-Ampofo v. Attorney-General,671 the Supreme 
Court of Ghana held as follows: 
 
This article clearly speaks of ‘rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating 
to fundamental human rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter 
shall not be regarded as excluding other not specifically mentioned.’ The 
reference to ‘others’ referred to in article 33(5) can only be those rights and 
freedoms that have crystallized into widely or greatly accepted rights, duties, 
declarations and guarantees through treaties, conventions, international or 
regional accords, norms and usages.672 
 
Similarly, in the case of Ghana Lotto Operators Association & Others v. National Lottery 
Authority,673 the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Date-Bah in evaluating the 
scope of article 33(5) held that “evidence of such rights can be obtained either from 
provisions of international human rights instruments (and practice under them) or from 
the national human rights legislation and practice of other states.”674 
 																																																								
670 The Supreme Court of Ghana has pronounced on Article 33(5) in two notable cases. See Adjei-Ampofo v 
Attorney-General [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 411; Ghana Lotto Operators Association & Others v National 
Lottery Authority [2007-2008] SCGLR 1088. 
671 See Adjei-Ampofo, supra. 
672 Id. 
673 See Ghana Lotto Operators Association, supra. 
674 Id. 
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In Ghana therefore, although the rights of sex workers are not expressly provided 
for and protected under the Constitution and other laws, article 33(5) of the Constitution 
presents the best hope for future recognition. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned 
cases has also left room for recognition of the rights of sex workers and other vulnerable 
groups if the opportunity was to arise. It is not surprising therefore that the Constitution 
Review Commission in its recommendations to the Government regarding the issue of 
gay rights, stated that: ‘The Commission finally finds that …. there does not appear to be 
any compelling reason for the Commission to address, let alone attempt to deal with, this 
issue in the present context. The more advisable approach would seem to be to leave the 
matter for settlement by the Supreme Court in due course. If and when there is enough 
interest in the matter (and there is a sufficiently strong feeling about the issue), those who 
wish to promote the idea will be able to seek an opinion from the Supreme Court, and the 
Court will be able, soberly and in its own time, to consider the submissions put before it 
and issue the interpretation of the Constitution in the light of the strength of the 
arguments advanced. In doing so, the Court may also seek to take account of the 
prevailing conditions and views in the country at the time.’675 
 
Even though the Commission avoided taking a position one way or the other on 
the rights of sexual minorities, but rather deferred to the Supreme Court if there was 
“enough interest in the matter” (a position that was accepted by the Government of 
																																																								
675 See CONSTITUTION REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION REVIEW COMMISSION: FROM A 
POLITICAL TO A DEVELOPMENTAL CONSTITUTION ¶ 18 (2011) (hereinafter CONSTITUTION REVIEW 
REPORT). 
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Ghana without any further comment),676 it seems as if the Commission offered some 
general hope to sexual minorities in Ghana. Thus, in relation to the issue of 
discrimination generally, under the subtheme of “Equality and Freedom from 
Discrimination,”677 the main dimension of the issue was captured as: ‘whether to include 
the grounds of discrimination in the Constitution to include sex, sexual orientation, 
North-South discrimination, Natural resource discrimination, age and disability.’ The 
Commission extensively reviewed the scope of Article 17 of the Ghanaian Constitution 
and made the following findings:678 
 
The Commission finds that the framers of the 1992 Constitution substituted “sex” 
(which was in the 1979 Constitution) with “gender” for the following purpose: to 
ensure the recognition of the natural/biological state of a woman and a man. The 
Commission observes that including “sex” in the anti-discrimination clause of the 
Constitution, in addition to “gender” would add to the legal arsenal of those who 
argue that the Constitution abhors discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation …. The Commission observed that at the National Constitution 
Review Conference, it was proposed that Article 17(2) should be amended to read 
thus: A person shall not be discriminated against directly or indirectly on grounds 
of sex, gender, race, color, ethnic origin, religion, creed, civil, political, social, 
cultural, or economic status, disability or age or any other ground.679 																																																								
676 GOVERNMENT OF GHANA WHITE PAPER ON CONSTITUTION REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT. On the issue 
of Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Rights it was stated that: “Government has taken note of the 
recommendation of the Constitution Review Commission that the legality or otherwise of homosexuality be 
decided by the Supreme Court if the matter comes before the Court.” Id. 
677 See id., ch. 13.  
678 Id. at 653-654. 
679 Id. 
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On this basis, the Commission therefore recommended to the Government of 
Ghana that an Affirmative Action Act be enacted, which ‘should deal with all types of 
discrimination against vulnerable groups and minorities.’ 680  It can be reasonably 
deduced from the foregoing that the Commission intended to have the proposed 
Affirmative Action Act protect the rights of sexual minorities as well as other vulnerable 
groups like sex workers, in an equal manner. Interestingly, the Government of Ghana also 
accepted this recommendation of the Commission in its White Paper in the following 
terms: ‘The Government accepts that the recommended Affirmative Action Act should 
deal with all types of discrimination against vulnerable groups and minorities.’681 Thus, 
it appears that the country is slowly but steadily moving towards formal recognition of 
the rights of sexual minorities, sex workers and other vulnerable groups; or at least the 
opportunity to present arguments in favor of formal recognition and protection through a 
public interest case that may be brought before the Supreme Court and/or the possible 
enactment of the Affirmative Action Act in the near future. 
 
However, a very important fact to be considered in the ascertainment of the rights 
of sex workers is the essential criminalization of the work they engage in. As previously 
noted, the Criminal Offences Act, Act 29, in chapter seven gives elaborate provisions on 
offences against public morals. In section 274 (1) it is stated that ‘Any person 
who knowingly lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution; or is proved to 
have, for the purposes of gain, exercised control, direction or influence over the 
movements of a prostitute in such manner as to aid, abet or compel the prostitution with 																																																								
680 Id. at 654. 
681 See id. at 44. 
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any person or generally, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour’. The title of this section of 
the Act, is ‘Persons trading in prostitution’. From the wording of the section, nowhere 
does it expressly ban sex work, what the section rather does, is to make it an offense for a 
person to aid a sex worker. The persons who exercise any form of control or influence 
over sex workers are pimps. So in effect, what the section does is to impute criminal 
liability on pimps. 
 
 The first part of the section also says a person who lives wholly or in part on the 
earnings of prostitution commits a misdemeanour. Once again, the Act does not expressly 
ban the act of sex work per se. What the Act does is to make a person who lives on the 
earnings on sex work, criminally liable. Invariably, a sex worker will have to live on their 
earnings. Sex workers partake in this line of work because they need a means to earn a 
living, hence they will definitely live on the money they make from the work they do. 
This section is very wide in its scope. Also, we must consider the fact that sex workers 
are not the only ones who live on their earnings. Most sex workers have relatives and in 
some cases children who they take care of; so to the extent that all these people 
knowingly live on the earnings of a family member who is a sex worker, they commit a 
criminal offence – as untenable and unenforceable as that is.   
 
The 1992 Constitution affords all persons human rights, which are subject to other 
provisions of the Constitution and to the public interest. Of all the rights enumerated in 
the Constitution, some of them seem to accommodate the rights of sex workers; for 
example – the right to freedom of thought, conscience and belief. This right gives 
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justification to sex workers for partaking in their chosen occupation. Similarly, the rights 
to dignity and equality & non-discrimination seem applicable to all persons without 
distinction, sex workers inclusive, deducing from the recommendations of the 
Constitutional Review Commission. The rest of the rights discussed above may 
accommodate the rights of sex workers but not without a lot of complications. An 
important detail that need not be glossed over in the determination of whether or not sex 
workers in Ghana have a right to engage in sex work is the fact that their activities are 
indirectly barred by statute, which makes it difficult advocating for their rights in the first 
place. This is a theme that is further explored in Chapter Six. 
 
D) REGIONAL & INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
 
1. The Banjul Charter 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Right, otherwise known as the Banjul 
Charter was adopted in Nairobi in June 1981. Ghana has signed and ratified this Charter. 
The Banjul Charter, which is a treaty that is unique in the sense that it does not only deal 
exclusively with rights per se, but it also emphasizes responsibilities. It is also the only 
regional human rights instrument that places a premium on communal rights or ‘peoples’ 
rights. Article 2 states:  
 
Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind 
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such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other 
opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.  
 
Article 3 deals with equality before the law, and equal protection of the law. Specifically, 
article 3(2) states that, ‘Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law.’ 
This provision of the Charter was clarified in the case of Modise v. Botswana,682 where 
the court held that, the protection of the law here should not be limited to citizens only, 
regardless of the content of their respective Constitutions.  
 
Article 4 provides that: ‘Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall 
be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily 
deprived of this right.’683 In relation to the rights of sex workers, the Charter permits sex 
workers like all other persons to be protected by the law. Article 5 also prohibits 
exploitation and degradation of man ‘particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. This provision of the Banjul Charter 
speaks to the right to dignity of all persons in the following terms: ‘Every individual shall 
have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the 
recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man 
particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and 
treatment shall be prohibited.’684 
 
																																																								
682 (2000) AHRLR 30.	
683 Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981. 
684 Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981.	
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The jurisprudence of the court in respect of this article, points to the fact that, the 
court primarily looks at dignity from the standpoint of slavery, torture and other acts that 
people do not consent to. This notwithstanding, the court had to determine in the case of 
Thebus and Another v. The State,685 whether the conviction of a person amounted to an 
abuse of their right to dignity. The court held in the negative that, the conviction and 
subsequent incarceration of a person did not amount to the abuse of their right to dignity. 
Under this provision, one cannot rightfully infer the rights of sex workers under the 
Charter. The intention of the framers of the Charter and the jurisprudence of the court and 
African Commission on Human Rights point to the fact that, the article was intended to 
protect people from exploitation and abuse. Sex work, where the parties consent to, 
which is the case in most situations does not involve the exploitation and or abuse of the 
parties. Judging from this, it may be difficult to infer the right to sex work from this 
article of the Charter. 
 
Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights states that, ‘Every 
individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be 
deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. 
In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.’ The wording of this article 
points to the fact that, the Charter wants to protect individuals from being unduly arrested 
and detained by the State. It will not be unreasonable to deduce a right to sex work from 
this provision of the charter. Article 8 also provides that freedom of conscience, 
profession and the free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. It states that no one may, 
subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these 																																																								
685 (2003) AHRLR 230. 
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freedoms. The African court in Prince v South Africa,686 noted that, the right to religion 
like all other rights, are limited to the laws of the State under the doctrine of margins of 
appreciation. Also, the right to a profession has been stated in the Charter, but is yet to be 
interpreted by the court. Although sex work can be argued to be a profession, it is 
doubtful whether the court will accept such a postulation. 
 
Article 15 of the African Charter is in relation to the right to work under equitable 
and satisfactory conditions. The African Court of Human Rights has held in the case of 
Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, 687  that, the applicants were 
entitled to be paid for the work they did as well as the work they did under favorable 
conditions. The failure of the State to provide this was tantamount to slavery in the 
opinion of the court. Also, in Prince v. South Africa,688 the court in arriving at the 
decision that South Africa was not in breach of the provision of the Charter, indicated 
that, ‘One purpose of this Charter provision is to ensure that States respect and protect 
the right of everyone to have access to the labour market without discrimination. The 
protection should be construed to allow certain restrictions depending on the type of 
employment and the requirements thereof. Given the legitimate interest the state has in 
restricting the use and possession of cannabis as shown above, it is held that the 
complainant's occupational challenge can be done away with should he chose to 
accommodate these restrictions. Although he has the right to choose his occupational 
call, the Commission should not give him or any one a leeway to bypass restrictions 
legitimately laid down for the interest of the whole society. There is no violation, thus, of 																																																								
686 (2004) AHRLR 105.                         
687 (2000) AHRLR 149. 
688 (2004) AHRLR 105.                         
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his right to choose his occupation as he himself chose instead to disqualify himself from 
inclusion by choosing to confront the legitimate restrictions.’689   
 
In relation to the right of sex workers in Ghana, it can be inferred from the 
decisions of the court that, no such right to work as a sex worker will be acknowledged. 
Act 29, prohibits sex work and to the extent that it has been barred under Ghanaian law, 
for the purposes of protecting public morality, the court will not guarantee such a right. 
To sum it up, the provisions of the African Charter coupled with the jurisprudence of the 
African Court on Human Rights, seems to suggest that the right to sex work or 
prostitution may not necessarily be generally guaranteed or accommodated just yet. 
 
2. Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa 
The Women’s Protocol in article 3 states, ‘Every woman shall have the right to 
dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition and protection of her human 
and legal rights. Every woman shall have the right to respect as a person and to the free 
development of her personality’. The effect of this article reinforces the right to dignity 
already provided for under the African Charter but adds an additional leg to this right i.e. 
the free development of her personality. This additional provision to the right to dignity 
can be construed to accommodate the rights of sex workers. This is due to the fact that, in 
allowing a person to develop a personality of their own, their choices are very essential. 
The decision to be a sex worker will invariably impact a person’s personality. The 
protocol demands that, every woman’s personality development be respected and 
protected.  																																																								
689 Id. 
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Article 4(2)(a) of the protocol states that, ‘States Parties shall take appropriate 
and effective measures to enact and enforce laws to prohibit all forms of violence against 
women including unwanted or forced sex whether the violence takes place in private or 
public’. This article of the protocol relates to violence, including sexual violence. The 
violence here however, could be extended to the sex workers who are abused. The ambits 
of this article cannot be interpreted to mean or guarantee a right to sex work nonetheless.  
The Protocol in article 13 is however dedicated to the protection of the economic and 
social welfare of women. For the purposes of the right to sex work in Ghana, the relevant 
clauses are, clause (d), which states, ‘State parties shall adopt and enforce legislative and 
other measures to guarantee women the freedom to choose their occupation, and protect 
them from exploitation by their employers violating and exploiting their fundamental 
rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws and regulations in force.’ 
Clause (e) also provides that, ‘States Parties shall adopt and enforce legislative and other 
measures to guarantee and create conditions to promote and support the occupations and 
economic activities of women, in particular, within the informal sector.’  
 
These two provisions seek to address the issue of exploitation of female workers 
and the promotion of women in the informal sector. Generally, women in the informal 
sector are women who are into agriculture, trading and other vocational jobs. Sex work, 
cannot form part of the informal sector within the meaning of this provision of the 
protocol because, from the wording of the article, the drafters envisaged women who 
undertake generally accepted businesses of which sex work is not part. Also, it can be 
argued that categorizing sex work as a type of work in the informal sector will more or 
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less open the floodgates for the inclusion of other generally unacceptable “trades” as part 
of the informal sector – for example armed robbery, fraud and other vices. The protocol 
therefore demands of State parties to make sure women who already have jobs are not 
discriminated against, and also to protect them from exploitation. 
 
3. International Human Rights Obligations: CEDAW, ICCPR & ICESCR 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the United Nations in 1979 in resolution 340/180 and 
entered into force in September 1981 as one of the UN international human right treaties. 
In 1980, Ghana acceded to the CEDAW and subsequently in 1986, ratified this accession 
without reservation. Article 1 of the Convention defines discrimination against women as 
‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or 
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field.’ This definition of discrimination is very wide in its application and scope. It 
covers specifically, discrimination targeted at women in the favour of men. Sex work is 
an occupation that is primarily undertaken by women and there is virtually no 
discrimination in terms of sex work against men in any form. The type of discrimination 
that can be argued that may exist is in terms of society’s perception of sex workers. It 
cannot however be reasonably deduced from this provision that, a right to sex work exists 
for women and should be protected from discrimination. 
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Similarly, Article 11 of CEDAW states that, ‘States Parties shall take all 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of 
employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, 
in particular: (a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings; (b) The 
right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same 
criteria for selection in matters of employment; (c) The right to free choice of profession 
and employment, the right to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of 
service and the right to receive vocational training and retraining, including 
apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and recurrent training.’ This provision 
expressly guarantees women the right to work and enjoins State parties to the convention 
to ensure that women are not discriminated against when it comes to issues of 
employment, be it in the formal or informal sector.  
 
Ghana signed and ratified both the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) on 7th September 2000.690 The ICCPR691 contains several provisions that 
prohibit discrimination on stated grounds, and also guarantee equal protection of the law. 
However, in terms of the protection and recognition of the rights of sex workers, the most 
salient provisions of this treaty are Articles 2(1); 17; and 26. Article 2(1) states:  
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized 																																																								
690 See http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx 
691 This treaty was adopted in 1966, and entered into force in 1976.  
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in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.692 
 
Also, article 17(1) provides that: ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on 
his honor and reputation.’ Article 17(2) then states: ‘Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.’ 
 
Finally, article 26 provides that: ‘All persons are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the 
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.’ The ICCPR therefore provides for the right to inherent dignity of all persons, the 
right to liberty and autonomy and the right to equality, equal protection of the law and 
non-discrimination. On the other hand, Article 6 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) states that ‘States Parties to the present 
Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the 
opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take 
appropriate steps to safeguard this right.’ This provision of the treaty is clear and 
unambiguous. It gives all persons the right to work and goes ahead to provide that people 
are entitled to choose any work they want to do, and the State must take steps to 																																																								
692 Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. 
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safeguard this right. This article of the treaty can be said to give all sex workers a right to 
work and goes the extra mile to require of States to protect and safeguard the rights of sex 
workers.  
 
Thus, under article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, sex workers have a right to engage in sex work and also demand their 
States to safeguard this right. The only problem is that sex work is generally criminalized, 
and as a result, such an interpretation may be difficult to advance, especially in Africa. 
On the other hand, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women does not necessarily guarantee the right to engage in sex work. What the 
convention does however is to require State parties to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against women. 
 
E) CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
All in all, the major lesson to be learned from the brief exposition of Ghana’s 
human rights history and track record is that, the courts have gradually come to accept 
human rights as part and parcel of the national identity. However, when it comes to 
sexuality and sexual offences with a human rights nexus, the courts are yet to make a 
definitive pronouncement. The conservative attitude of Ghanaians in general regarding 
sexuality will probably be a determining factor in whether or not the rights of sex 
workers and the right to sex work will be vindicated if such a matter were to present itself 
for adjudication.  
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What is important however is that, Ghana’s constitutional prescription of 
fundamental human rights leaves room for the future incorporation of rights that have not 
been expressly provided for in the Constitution, or those yet to be developed. Ghana’s 
regional and international human rights obligations may also play a critical role if sex 
worker rights are to be recognized, and the right to sex work guaranteed. However, it is 
my considered opinion that for this to be achieved, we will have to critically examine the 
law prohibiting sex work from a constitutional standpoint so as to provide legal 
justification for the right to sex work, and the rights of sex workers. This is what Chapter 
Six of this dissertation seeks to do. 														
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATING INTIMACY AND SEXUAL MORALITY: APPLYING THE 
D.I.E. FRAMEWORK 
 
The question whether law should concern itself with the regulation of private morality in 
general, and intimate human conduct and sexual morality in particular is not easy to 
answer. Throughout the dissertation, I have however tried to establish that the public 
policy underpinnings of laws that seek to regulate and/or curtail the individual’s “moral” 
choices must remain neutral; hence, my proposal for the adoption of the D.I.E. 
framework of public policy making, where the criminal law is concerned, especially in 
relation to intimate human conduct and sexuality. It must be noted at this point that 
contemporary debates regarding sex work and its propriety or otherwise in the modern 
nation State have revolved around four key strategies for tackling the phenomenon.  
 
These are: prohibition (criminalizing the buying and selling of sex); abolition 
(providing penal sanctions for the buying of sex – for if there is no demand, supply will 
necessarily be affected); regulation (sanitizing the trade by situating sex work within the 
context of labour, healthcare and safety, urban planning etc.); and full legalization. This 
part of the dissertation therefore examines the nexus between private and public morality 
with particular emphasis on sex work, and whether or not we can deduce a constitutional 
guarantee, prohibition, abolition or regulation of sex work under the 1992 Constitution of 
Ghana, using the D.I.E. framework; and which of these four strategies for tackling the 
phenomenon will be the most appropriate within the context of Ghana. 
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Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Ghana has over the years laid down some 
general guiding principles of constitutional interpretation. The constitutionality of the 
criminalization of sex work generally under Act 29 is therefore examined in light of the 
possible interpretations that may be ascribed to specific human rights provisions of the 
Constitution (i.e. the right to dignity, individual autonomy and equality), based on the 
principles of constitutional interpretation generally accepted in Ghana. These guiding 
principles, which will be subsequently explored in some detail, are as follows:693 
 
1) A national Constitution must be given a benevolent, broad, liberal and purposive 
construction so as to promote the apparent policy of its framers i.e. the court must 
avoid a strict, narrow, technical and legalistic approach; 
2) A Constitution must be construed as a political document capable of growth; 
3) A national Constitution is a document sui generis and must therefore be 
interpreted according to the principles suitable to its character and necessarily 
according to the ordinary rules and presumptions of statutory interpretation; 
4) The Court must avoid importing into the Constitution what does not appear 
therein; 
5) The Court may have to take into account the spirit of the Constitution as a tool for 
constitutional interpretation; 
6) The provisions of the Interpretation Act may be relevant in construing provisions 
of Ghana’s Constitution; 
																																																								
693 S.Y. BIMPONG-BUTA, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW IN GHANA (2010). 
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7) The Court may resort to the Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter 6 of 
the Constitution as a tool of constitutional interpretation; 
8) The Court must ascertain the intention of the framers of the Constitution as 
collected or gleaned from the provisions of the Constitution, and once ascertained, 
it is the duty of the Court to give effect to that intention; 
9) In construing a Constitution, the court must look at all the provisions thereof as a 
whole; 
10) In testing any law for unconstitutionality, the Court should not concern itself with 
the propriety or expediency of that impugned law, but what the law itself provides 
i.e. that the highest motives and best intentions are not enough to displace 
constitutional obstacles; and 
11)  Public policy considerations should not be used as a tool for constitutional 
interpretation just as public policy cannot be relied upon in statutory 
interpretation. This is because public policy is usually vague and unsatisfactory, 
and may lead to uncertainty and error i.e. public policy ‘is a very unruly horse’. 
        
A) CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATING PRIVATE AND SEXUAL MORALITY 
 
1. The Right to Human Dignity 
As already noted in Chapter Three of the dissertation, respect for human dignity is 
the fundamental basis of a rights-based regime. Human dignity is at the core of human 
rights, and is to a large extent the catalyst for the respect, promotion and protection of all 
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other rights in a democratic society.694 In Ghana, article 15 of the 1992 Constitution 
provides for the respect of human dignity in the following terms: 
 
(1) The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable. 
(2) No person shall, whether or not he is arrested, restricted or detained, be 
subject to– 
  (a) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
(b) any other condition that detracts or is likely to detract from his dignity 
and worth as a human being. 
(3) A person who has not been convicted of a criminal offence shall not be treated 
as a convicted person and shall be kept separately from convicted persons. 
(4) A juvenile offender who is kept in lawful custody or detention shall be kept 
separately from an adult offender. 
 
The concept of human dignity from a constitutional perspective is therefore linked one 
way or the other to the criminal justice system, as can be ascertained from article 15. 
How then do we measure the inviolability of the dignity of individuals within that 
context? 
 
I have already proposed that for the sake of sound public policy, all laws that seek 
to regulate intimate human conduct must have at its core the preservation and promotion 
of the inherent dignity of the individual.695 Hence, criminal offences that hinge on some 																																																								
694 See J. Tasioulas, Human Dignity and the Foundations of Human Rights (2013). 
695 See Chapter 3 of the dissertation. 
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conception of societal moral precepts must fundamentally seek to safeguard the 
inviolability of human dignity. The questions that remain to be resolved are as follows: 
does the law prohibiting sex work respect, promote or safeguard the dignity of sex 
workers? Better still, is there anything undignified about offering sex for money? What is 
inherently offensive to society about such transactions? Finally, are the laws prohibiting 
sex work constitutional? To answer these questions, it must be reiterated that Ghanaian 
law prohibits the solicitation of sex in public places, procuration for sex, the exchange of 
sex for money in brothels, the keeping of brothels, or living off the earnings of sex 
workers.696 
 
Sex work in its classical forms and manifestations cannot therefore be legally 
engaged in save for limited circumstances.697 The law in Ghana all but classifies sex 
workers as criminals as a result of their line of work. They are humiliated, looked down 
upon and publicly shamed when their identities are exposed. But beyond the ‘false 
consciousness’ ideology that the Catherine MacKinnon wing of feminism will have us 
believe, is it not possible that people engaged in sex work are making rational economic 
choices and decisions? Basic economic principles reveal that whenever there is a demand 
for a commodity or service, a supply chain is created that increases sometimes 
exponentially i.e. demand fuels supply. Is it therefore fair to degrade people and 
essentially violate their ‘inviolable’ human dignity by criminalizing them, and their 
rational economic choices simply because society is not comfortable?  
 																																																								
696 See sections 273 to 277 of Act 29. 
697 As already noted earlier, the only conceivable exception is situations where a sex worker receives clients 
at his or her personal residence, since soliciting and importuning in public places are prohibited. 
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Some may however suggest that the same argument can be marshaled in defense 
of armed robbers, whose activities are criminalized because it offends the public good. 
The difference however between armed robbery and sex work is that, exchanging sex for 
money is prima facie purely a consensual, often private and voluntary affair, whilst the 
same cannot be said for the former. Armed robbers deprive people of their property, 
usually in a violent manner that goes beyond the specific victim(s) in question. Sex work 
however is purely transactional, and except for situations where it involves a minor (who 
is not capable of consenting to sex anyway), or is linked with the forced trafficking of 
persons and forced prostitution, genuine sex work should not offend the sensibilities of 
society. 
 
Then again, critics will postulate that engaging in sex work or soliciting for sex in 
public places like street corners or brothels etc. offends the moral fiber of the society. 
That it sends the wrong message to the youth about the society’s acceptance of an 
inherently immoral act. But, what led society to come to this conclusion in the first place? 
Is it the case that sex is generally bad and as such should not be openly alluded to in the 
form of street or public solicitation? Surely that is not the case, for sex cannot be deemed 
bad by any human society. If so, then it is because some other factors must have led to 
this conclusion that in turn influenced the public policy direction that the law prohibiting 
sex work epitomizes. These factors are conceptions of morality, mostly from religious 
and cultural perspectives, as already noted in the previous chapters. 
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The law does mirror the religious and cultural conception of moral uprightness 
that sex work clearly runs counter to. It prioritizes the collective sense of morality 
deduced from religion and notions of cultural heritage, over the individual’s private sense 
of what is moral – a general acceptance of which has entrenched the belief in the ideals of 
such laws. That notwithstanding, persons who freely choose to engage in activities like 
sex work for a living are violated in the sense that no dignity is attached to this line of 
work in Ghana. The law has made sure of this. In fact, degrading and insulting terms like 
“ashawo” which translates to mean “prostitute” are reserved for sex workers, and indeed 
any female who is deemed promiscuous – whereas no such equivalent terms exists for 
their male counterparts. As a matter of fact, promiscuity in males in Ghana is celebrated, 
encouraged and accepted as a socio-cultural norm. 
 
It seems the law does not seek to promote the dignity of the sex worker because it 
considers her/him prima facie as a criminal. What is however interesting is that the law 
only focuses on the supply side of the equilibrium, to the total neglect of the demand side. 
Presently, the law in Ghana does not sanction or concern itself with persons who pay for 
sex. Is it the case that we consider it bad and immoral to sell one’s body for monetary 
compensation, but we cannot really be bothered if you decide to pay money in exchange 
for sex? Or is it that the policy of the law has been to degrade sex workers, mainly 
female, from time immemorial, since such conduct is considered immoral? Such mixed 
and contradictory signals that the law seemingly sends out is problematic because it 
provides no focused and rational public policy basis for the law in the first place.  
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Does the law therefore pass the constitutional test of upholding the inviolability of 
human dignity? It is my considered view that for so long as there are laws that prohibit 
sex work in Ghana, these laws will continue to inherently infringe on the inviolability of 
the dignity of sex workers because it considers them criminals. Article 15(1) of the 
Constitution makes no distinction as to the persons entitled to enjoy this basic human 
right to dignity. Thus, unless some compelling reason(s) exists for prohibiting voluntary 
and consensual sexual transactions between adults, the criminalization of such 
transactions will not be rational and necessary in our contemporary world.  
 
The religious and cultural arguments of maintaining the moral fiber of society can 
no longer be justification for such repressive laws due to the fact that we live in a secular 
State, where religion and the State are separate and must remain so, and the multi-cultural 
world we live in has also become very dynamic. Religious and/or cultural conceptions of 
morality can therefore no longer be the underpinnings of public policy where intimate 
human conduct/behavior is concerned. The law prohibiting sex work in Ghana, in my 
view, does not pass the constitutional test of inviolability of human dignity. 
 
This is because, the main provision of the Criminal Offences Act that seek to 
prohibit sex work, only does so in terms of street solicitation or importuning. Section 
276(1) of Act 29 for example, provides that ‘A person who persistently solicits or 
importunes in a public place or in sight of a public place for the purposes of prostitution 
commits a criminal offence ..’ Thus, merely standing on the street corner in the middle of 
the night in a manner that suggests that one is a sex worker can be deemed as solicitation; 
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whilst approaching passers-by in vehicles for example would amount to importuning. 
These acts are deemed criminal according to section 276(1) of Act 29. The issue 
therefore is whether this provision is consistent with the admonishing for the respect of 
human dignity under article 15 of the Constitution of Ghana, in particular, article 15(1) 
and 15(2)(b).  
 
The test of constitutionality and principles of constitutional interpretation as 
outlined above involves eleven (11) important considerations. The first of these has to do 
with the fact that constitutional provisions must be given a benevolent, broad, liberal and 
purposive construction so as to promote the apparent policy of its framers i.e. the court 
must avoid a strict, narrow, technical and legalistic approach. Thus, article 15(1) which 
suggests that the dignity of all persons in Ghana are inviolable can clearly be given ‘a 
benevolent, broad, liberal and purposive construction’ to apply without distinction to all 
persons including sex workers. Thus, sex workers are also entitled to respect of their 
inherent dignity.  
 
Similarly, article 15(2)(b) which provides that no person regardless of 
circumstances should be subjected to conditions that detract or is likely to detract from 
their dignity and worth as human beings is also applicable to sex workers. Giving this 
provision a liberal, benevolent, broad and purposive construction will probably negate 
laws that criminalize the free and rational economic choice that sex workers make to 
engage in that trade. The fact that the conduct of sex workers are criminalized by the law 
clearly detracts from their dignity and worth, because as earlier suggested, absent 
	 261	
religious and cultural conceptions of acceptable moral conduct, there is nothing 
undignifying about offering sex for monetary reward. In fact as already noted, many of 
the sexual relationships in Ghana are sometimes premised on pecuniary rewards. If no 
dignity is involved in sex in exchange for reward (monetary or otherwise) and it is 
inherently immoral, we might as well criminalize the conduct of persons who enter into 
marriages with the sole purpose of achieving financial stability or benefiting from the 
finances of the other spouse! Similarly, we should criminalize persons who maintain 
multiple sexual partners simply because they are addicted to sex! 
 
Also, if sex workers (roamers) cause such a nuisance in public places to the 
extent that their activities ought to be criminalized, what about street hawkers and 
beggars who are a constant nuisance in all the major cities of the country, but yet are 
allowed to operate largely unhindered.698 At least, the most popular form of sex work in 
Ghana only involves solicitation or importuning late at night when the general public and 
majority of the people are asleep and not in public anyway. Thus, is it the case of 
selective public policy making? Or is it that society does not consider begging and street 
hawking as moral issues, grave enough as that of sex work? The bottom line is, by 
criminalizing sex work in general, the dignity of the sex worker is violated as he or she is 
deemed a criminal for rational and legitimate economic choices they have made.  
 
We must also note that the Constitution is a political document capable of growth 
and must be interpreted according to its own principles. Article 15 is clear and admits of 																																																								
698 It must be noted that there are laws that prohibit street hawking and general public nuisance in Ghana; 
yet a distinctive feature of the urban areas in Ghana is the excessive street hawking menace. 
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no ambiguity as it applies to all persons in Ghana regardless of their status. There is thus 
no need to import words into article 15 to make it clearer, as the spirit of the constitution 
itself will abhor violations of the dignity of the sex worker, because at the end of the day, 
we are all human beings, deserving of respect of our dignity, regardless of our life 
circumstances. In a similar manner, the directive principles of state policy contained in 
Chapter 6 of the Constitution provides in part that ‘The State shall endeavor to secure 
and protect a social order founded on the ideals and principles of freedom, equality, 
justice, probity and accountability as enshrined in Chapter 5 of this Constitution; and in 
particular, the State shall direct its policy towards ensuring that every citizen has 
equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law’.699 
 
Also, article 37(2)(b) provides that ‘The State shall enact appropriate laws to 
assure– the protection and promotion of all basic human rights and freedoms, including 
the rights of the disabled, the aged, children and other vulnerable groups in development 
processes’. Sex workers are clearly a vulnerable group within the meaning of article 
37(2)(b), due to the marginalization and social stigma they face; and as a result, the law 
must protect them and promote their rights, including respect for the inviolability of their 
dignity. The intention of the framers of the Constitution as can be gleaned from a reading 
of the entire Constitution cannot therefore be compatible with disregard for the dignity of 
sex workers. Indeed, the fact that a whole Chapter of the Constitution is devoted to the 
promotion and protection of the rights of all persons in Ghana must be construed as a 
direct intent on the part of the framers to protect all persons in Ghana from unjust laws 
that criminalize conduct solely on the basis of religion or culture. 																																																								
699 See article 37 of the 1992 Constitution. 
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In this regard, it is my considered view that the propriety and expediency of the 
law prohibiting sex work on the basis of religious and cultural conceptions of morality 
cannot outweigh the constitutional precept of the inviolability of the human being. The 
public policy dimension (safeguarding public morals) of criminalization of sex work is 
also not a suitable justification for the state of the law because public policy has been said 
to be an “unruly horse”. It can run in directions that may misrepresent the true state of 
affairs regarding societal conceptions of morality or right and wrong. Thus, both these 
two tests of constitutionality of the law prohibiting sex work, seem to reinforce the fact 
that the inviolability of the dignity of all persons including sex workers cannot be 
overridden by propriety and expediency of the law, or its public policy underpinnings of 
maintaining the moral fiber of the Ghanaian society. 
 
2. The Right to Individual Autonomy/Liberty 
Individual autonomy or liberty is another important variable or principle, which 
all laws seeking to regulate intimate human conduct must measure up to. Thus, I have 
suggested that the individual’s ability to act in an autonomous manner free from social 
coercion must be reflected in laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct. The 
1992 Constitution of Ghana provides in Article 14(1) that ‘Every person shall be entitled 
to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty …’ There 
are however seven (7) exceptions to this general guarantee of individual autonomy and 
liberty. These are: restrictions of liberty for the purposes of carrying out the sentence of a 
court; in execution of an order of a court; for the purpose of bringing a person before a 
court in execution of an order of the court; for the purpose of treatment or care of persons 
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of unsound mind etc.; for the purposes of educating or providing the welfare of children 
below 18 years; for preventing unlawful entry into Ghana or for expelling and extraditing 
or removing persons from Ghana; and upon reasonable suspicion of the commission of a 
criminal offence.700 
 
Section 276(1) which criminalizes sex work clearly falls within the context of the 
exceptions to the non-restriction of autonomy and liberty of the individual provision of 
the Constitution. This is because, the law clearly makes it possible for a person’s liberty 
to be restricted upon suspicion of the commission of an offence or upon suspicion that a 
person is about to commit a criminal offence. However, the law prohibiting sex work in 
itself is an affront to individual liberty and autonomy because it seeks to restrict such 
autonomy on the basis that society finds it morally unacceptable. By categorizing all sex 
workers as criminals, the law mandates and constitutionally sanctions the curtailment of 
the liberty and autonomy of sex workers. However, this should not be the case as the 
individual in a modern democratic society must be free to make rational economic 
decisions and engage in occupations that are legitimate, and should not offend the law 
simply because a section of society find it morally unacceptable on religious and cultural 
grounds.701 
 
3. The Right to Equality, Equal Protection of the Law and Non-
discrimination 
																																																								
700 See Article 14(1) of the 1992 Constitution. 
701 The individual’s right to occupation is further explored from the perspective of sex work and non-
discrimination principles in the next section. 
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The Constitution of Ghana abhors discrimination. Article 17(1) of the 
Constitution, which provides that ‘All persons shall be equal before the law’, is the 
clearest indication of the constitutional guarantee of equality for all Ghanaians. Article 
17(2) goes on further to prohibit discrimination on stated grounds.702 Article 17(3) 
explains what “discrimination” means for the purposes of the Constitution: ‘For the 
purposes of this article, “discriminate” means to give different treatment to different 
persons attributable only or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, place of 
origin, political opinions, colour, gender, occupation, religion or creed, whereby persons 
of one description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another 
description are not made subject or are granted privileges or advantages which are not 
granted to persons of another description.’ 
 
Even though discrimination on the basis of sex work is not explicitly stated in 
article 17 or any other provision of the Constitution for that matter, the fact that article 17 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of occupation, can encompass sex work. The goal 
here is to examine the rights to equality, equal protection of the law and non-
discrimination having regard to the aforementioned guiding principles of constitutional 
interpretation. This will enable us to determine whether or not article 17 protects sex 
workers from discrimination on the basis of their occupation.  
 
																																																								
702 The grounds for non-discrimination under Ghana’s Constitution are: gender, race, color, ethnic origin, 
religion, creed or social or economic status. 
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 The first question we need to resolve is what will be a ‘benevolent, broad, liberal 
and purposive construction’ of article 17? In the case of Tuffuor v. Attorney-General,703 
the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court of Ghana when called upon to construe 
certain provisions of the 1979 Third Republican Constitution of Ghana held as follows:704 
 
A written Constitution such as ours … embodies the will of a people. It also 
mirrors their history. Account, therefore, needs to be taken of it as a landmark in a 
people’s search for progress. It contains within it their aspirations and their hopes 
for a better and fuller life … A broad and liberal spirit is required for its 
interpretation. It does not admit of a narrow interpretation. A doctrinaire approach 
to interpretation would not do. We must take account of its principles and bring 
that consideration to bear, in bringing it into conformity with the needs of the 
time. 
 
Similarly, in New Patriotic Party v. Attorney-General (31st December Case),705 Hayfron-
Benjamin JSC writing for the majority, held as follows: ‘My duty was to discover the 
‘intent and meaning’ of … our Constitution and apply ‘a broad and liberal spirit’ in its 
interpretation. There is no benefit in these modern times in applying a strict 
interpretation to modern democratic Constitutions. So to do would mean that we forget 
that Constitutions are made by men for the governance of men.’706 
 
																																																								
703  [1980] GLR 637. 
704 Id. at 647-648. 
705 [1993-94] 2 GLR 35.	
706 Id. 
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Beginning with the premise that article 17(1) of the Constitution is intended to 
apply to all persons in Ghana, and that articles 17(2) and (3) set out the grounds for non-
discrimination, a ‘benevolent, broad, liberal and purposive’ construction of the latter two 
provisions will not admit of a conclusive and exhaustive non-discrimination criteria. To 
argue that the omission of sexual orientation and sex work in these provisions and/or that 
sex work cannot legitimately be an occupation within the meaning of these provisions is 
conclusive of the intent of the framers not to protect that class of citizens, will be too 
narrow a construction. This construction fails to bring the Constitution into conformity 
with the needs of contemporary times – where admittedly sex workers do exist in Ghana, 
and are in need of the protection of the laws of the country, just like every one else. 
 
Similarly, since ‘a Constitution must be considered as a political document 
capable of growth’, any construction of article 17 must be reflective of this principle. In 
the Tuffuor case, it was held as follows:707  
 
The Constitution has its letter of the law. Equally, the Constitution has its spirit. It 
is the fountain-head for the authority which each of the three arms of government 
possesses and exercises. It is a source of strength. It is a source of power … Its 
language, therefore, must be considered as if it were a living organism capable of 
growth and development. Indeed, it is a living organism capable of growth and 
development, as the body politic of Ghana itself is capable of growth and 
development.708  																																																								
707 Tuffuor supra. 
708 Id. 
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If the provisions of the Constitution are akin to living organisms capable of growth and 
development, article 17 must have room to grow and develop since it is now over twenty-
five (25) years old. Assuming that it was not the intent of the framers to protect or 
legislate against discrimination on the basis of sex work as an occupation initially, article 
17 is old enough now to recognize that, in a diverse society, equality before the law and 
non-discrimination requires the protection of vulnerable groups, regardless of whether or 
not a majority of the people agree. 
 
The right to equality and non-discrimination as constitutional guarantees must 
also be construed according to its peculiar character, since the Constitution itself is sui 
generis and must be examined as a whole. So in Kuenyehia v. Archer,709 the Supreme 
Court held that: ‘Any attempt to construe the various provisions of the Constitution 1992, 
… must perforce start with an awareness that a constitutional instrument is a document 
sui generis to be interpreted according to principles suitable to its peculiar character and 
not necessarily according to the ordinary rules and presumptions of statutory 
interpretation.’ 710  The right to equality and non-discrimination therefore must be 
jealously guarded in light of this, and as a result sex workers should not be easily 
discounted as falling outside the purview of persons entitled to this constitutional 
protections. 
 
The next principle of constitutional interpretation against which we must examine 
article 17 is that ‘Courts must avoid importing into the Constitution what does not appear 																																																								
709	[1993-94] 2 GLR 525.	
710 Id. 
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therein.’ This has been explained by Bimpong-Buta in the following words: ‘In other 
words, the constitution must be interpreted in the light of its own wording and not on the 
basis of words found in other constitutions. The court must therefore generally recognize 
that judicial pronouncements in other common law jurisdictions founded on the wording 
of their constitutions are not likely to be of assistance.’711 It may therefore be argued that 
sex work may not necessarily be considered an occupation within the meaning of article 
17(2) & (3), and that sex work as an occupation was not intended to be protected by the 
Constitution, since we are admonished not to read into the Constitution words that are not 
originally in there.  
 
However, as has been shown, such a construction is not only archaic, but is also 
inimical to the principle of the Constitution being a living organism capable of growth. 
Thus, the fact that words must not necessarily be imported into the Constitution does not 
however mean that, the guiding principles of constitutional interpretation are mutually 
exclusive and cannot therefore co-exist. It is therefore my considered opinion that, as and 
when the Supreme Court of Ghana is called upon to interpret the ambit of article 17 and 
whether or not discrimination on the basis of sex work as an occupation is covered by 
that provision, the Court will consider all the principles of constitutional interpretation it 
has itself laid out, as a whole, and be guided by the need to construe the provision in a 
manner that accords with common sense as well. 
 
In this regard, the spirit of the Constitution as well as the intention of the framers 
must be considered in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. So in the case of 																																																								
711 THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN GHANA, supra. 
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Sallah v. Attorney-General,712 the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court of Ghana 
held, per Justice Sowah as follows:713 
 
I consider that the best guide to interpretation is the letter and spirit of the 
intention of the Constitution; if the intention of the Assembly … can be collected 
from the words used and if that intention, when so collected, is in consonance 
with the spirit of the Constitution, then there is no need for further aids.714 
 
Sowah JSC once again in the celebrated case of Tuffour case,715 noted that ‘The 
Constitution has its letter of the law. Equally, the Constitution has its spirit. It is the 
fountain-head for the authority which each of the three arms of government possesses 
and exercises. It is a source of strength. It is a source of power … A broad and liberal 
spirit is required for its interpretation.’716 
 
Also, in the case of New Patriotic Party v. Attorney-General (31st December 
Case),717 the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether or not it was 
unconstitutional for the government to proclaim and celebrate 31st December each year as 
a national holiday, with State resources. 718  In declaring the celebrations as 
																																																								
712 (1970) CC 5; (1970) 2 G & G 493. 
713 Id. at 506.	
714 Id. 
715 Tuffuor supra.	
716 Id. 
717 [1993-94] 2 GLR 35.	
718 31st December was celebrated a national and public holiday in Ghana during the 1980’s and early 
1990’s. The significance of the date was that it was the day (31st December 1980) that the Provisional 
National Defence Council (P.N.D.C.) led by Jerry John Rawlings, overthrew (through a coup d’état) the 
constitutionally elected government of President Hilla Limann and abrogated the 1979 Constitution. Other 
infamous days that were celebrated as national holidays included June 4th – which marked the overthrow of 
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unconstitutional by a 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that, even if 
there was no contradiction with the letter of the Constitution, the celebrations infringed 
upon the spirit of the Constitution, since the Constitution made it clear that it abhorred 
coup d’états. Thus, the State should not engage in celebrations that essentially glorified 
the overthrow of a past Constitution, an occurrence that the present Constitution kicks 
against and admonishes all citizens to prevent its overthrow.719  
 
Francois JSC commenting on the essence and importance of the spirit of the 
constitution as a guide to constitutional interpretation stated: ‘My own contribution to the 
evaluation of a Constitution is that, a Constitution is the out-pouring of the soul of the 
nation and its precious life-blood is its spirit. Accordingly, in interpreting the 
Constitution, we fail in our duty if we ignore its spirit. Both the letter and the spirit of the 
Constitution are essential fulcra which provide the leverage in the task of interpretation 
… In every case, a true cognition of the Constitution can only proceed from the breadth 
of understanding of its spirit … The necessary conclusion is that the written word and its 
underlying spirit are inseparable bedfellows in the true interpretation of the Constitution 
… For if the Constitution, 1992 frowns on violent overthrows of duly constituted 
governments, and rejects acts that put a premium on unconstitutionalism to the extent of 
even proscribing the promotion of one party state, it is naivety of the highest order, to 
expect the Constitution, and in the same breadth, to sing Hallelujah’s in a paean of 
praise to unconstitutional deviations, past or present. If the past is being buried, the spirit 
of the Constitution, 1992 would frown on the resurrection of any of its limbs. That is the 																																																																																																																																																																					
the Supreme Military Council in 1979, and brought into power Jerry John Rawlings as Head of State for the 
first time, until he handed over power to the democratically elected Hilla Limann in 1979. 
719 See CONSTITUTION Art. 3 (1992) (Ghana). 
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whole point of the cloak of indemnity conferred in section 34 of the transitional 
provisions of the Constitution, 1992 … The admission that a violent overthrow of 
government occurred on 31 December, forecloses any sanctioning of public celebration 
in a constitutional era.’720  
 
How then does the spirit of the Constitution apply towards the interpretation of 
article 17 of the 1992 Constitution? It is submitted that the spirit underpinning article 17 
is the fundamental principle that discrimination on the basis of differential characteristics 
is not to be countenanced in Ghana. While there is no express mention of sex work as a 
form of occupation as a ground for non-discrimination, the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution are inseparable bedfellows, and the overarching purpose of the spirit of the 
constitution is to reveal the true essence of a constitutional dictate or provision. Article 17 
must therefore be interpreted to cover discrimination on the basis of occupation, 
including sex work. I do not believe that it was the intention of the framers of the 
Constitution to positively endorse discriminatory practices against sex workers with their 
omission. 
 
Furthermore, despite the generality of the word ‘occupation’ as used in article 17, 
is it not discrimination where ordinary workers in other occupations are given different 
treatment as opposed to sex workers, attributable only to their chosen occupation? If the 
framers of the Constitution intended to exclude sex workers from the class of persons 
who are to be equal before the law, they could have done so. To suggest therefore that 
occupation as a ground for non-discrimination excludes sex work and that indicates the 																																																								
720 NPP v. Attorney-General, supra at pp. 79-80, 81 and 83-84. 
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framers’ intent is too simplistic an argument, because it fails to consider the underlying 
theme of the provision in question i.e. its spirit. 
 
It has also been suggested that the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792) may be 
relevant in construing the provisions of Ghana’s Constitution. Section 10 of this Act, 
which is captioned ‘Aids to Interpretation or Construction’ provides in Section 10(4) that: 
‘Without prejudice to any other provision of this section, a Court shall construe or 
interpret a provision of the Constitution or any other law in a manner (a) that promotes 
the rule of law and the values of good governance, (b) that advances human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, (c) that permits the creative development of the provisions of the 
Constitution and the laws of Ghana, and (d) that avoids technicalities and recourse to 
niceties of form and language which defeat the purpose and spirit of the Constitution and 
of the laws of Ghana.’ Emphasis added. 
 
Clearly therefore, the Supreme Court is under a legal obligation to advance 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. They are also to creatively develop the 
provisions of the Constitution. In respect of article 17, the only way of advancing the 
frontiers of human rights is to creatively construe the provision as protecting all persons 
including sex workers from discrimination on the basis of their occupation. Such a 
construction accords with common sense, and is essential in a democratic society such as 
Ghana if we are to give true meaning to the principle of equality before the law. As 
already indicated, the spirit of the law and the fact that the Constitution itself is to be 
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treated like a living organism capable of growth, is justification enough for protecting sex 
workers from discrimination. 
 
Also, the Directive Principles of State Policy721 further reinforce the need to 
protect sex workers from discrimination in accordance with article 17. This is because 
article 34(1) of the Constitution provides that: ‘The Directive Principles of State Policy 
contained in this Chapter shall guide all citizens, parliament, the President, the 
Judiciary, the Council of State, the Cabinet, political parties and other bodies and 
persons in applying or interpreting this Constitution or any other law and in taking and 
implementing any policy decisions, for the establishment of a just and free society.’ 
Emphasis added. Therefore, the Supreme Court can resort to Chapter Six of the 
Constitution as a guide when called upon to interpret provisions of the Constitution. 
 
One of such important provision that is worth reproducing here is article 37, 
which is captioned ‘Social Objectives’. It provides as follows: 
 
(1) The State shall endeavor to secure and protect a social order founded on the 
ideals and principles of freedom, equality, justice, probity and accountability as 
enshrined in Chapter 5 of this Constitution; and in particular, the State shall direct 
its policy towards ensuring that every citizen has equality of rights, obligations 
and opportunities before the law. 
(2) The State shall enact appropriate laws to assure– 
																																																								
721 See CONSTITUTION Ch. 6 (1992) (Ghana).	
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(a) the enjoyment of rights of effective participation in development 
processes including rights to form their own associations free from state 
interference …. 
(b) the protection and promotion of all other basic human rights and 
freedoms, including rights of the disabled, the aged, children and other 
vulnerable groups in development processes. 
(3) In the discharge of the obligations stated in clause (2) of this article, the State 
shall be guided by international human rights instruments which recognize and 
apply particular categories of basic human rights to development processes. 
 
What this means therefore is that every citizen of Ghana is entitled to equality of rights 
which is to be guaranteed by the State. Furthermore, the State is obligated to pass laws 
that ensure the enjoyment of basic fundamental rights by all persons, including 
vulnerable groups – a phrase that is not defined in the Constitution, but must definitely 
include groups such as sex workers due to the marginalization and stigma they face. 
Finally, the State is to be guided by international human rights norms and standards. 
 
The conclusion that can be drawn here is that, using the Directive Principles of 
State Policy as a guide, the Supreme Court can reasonably interpret article 17 of the 
Constitution in a manner that will ensure greater equality for all vulnerable groups. In 
terms of vulnerability, the socio-cultural context of Ghana means that sex workers are 
one of the most vulnerable groups that exist. The marginalization and social stigma they 
face reinforces this. Therefore, the State (including the Court) has a duty to ensure that 
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the rights of such vulnerable groups are protected, and that they are not discriminated 
against simply because of their chosen occupation/profession. Since public policy has 
also been described as a “very unruly horse” it cannot aid in construing article 17. In any 
case, any public policy concerns (protection of public morals, for example) regarding the 
protection of sex workers from discrimination on the basis of their occupation, is 
outweighed by the overarching need to protect such vulnerable groups, which the spirit of 
article 17 demands. 
 
As has been painstakingly demonstrated, article 17 of the Constitution which 
provides for non-discrimination on the basis of occupation, must be interpreted to include 
sex work as an occupation protected by the law. The question that remains is whether or 
not in light of this, section 276(1) of Act 29 is constitutional. The Supreme Court in the 
case of New Patriotic Party v. Attorney-General (Ciba Case),722 held that in testing the 
constitutionality of any law, the Court must not concern itself with the appropriateness or 
convenience of the impugned law, but rather the contents of the law. Bamford-Addo JSC 
citing with approval, the dictum of Lord Diplock in the case of Hinds v. R,723 therefore 
held that ‘the highest motives and the best intentions are not enough to displace 
constitutional obstacles.’724 
 
Section 276(1) of Act 29 however criminalizes private consensual adult sexual 
intercourse involving the exchange of money. Since the court must not concern itself with 
the propriety or convenience of the law, (standards that the entrenched Ghanaian socio-																																																								
722 [1996-97] SCGLR 729. 
723 [1976] 1 All ER 353 at 356. 
724 NPP v. Attorney-General (Ciba Case), supra. 
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cultural context obviously endorses), the actual essence of the law must nonetheless be 
examined, devoid of any biases and gender stereotypes. Such an examination only leads 
to the conclusion that the law regulates sexual intercourse, plain and simple. It seeks to 
categorize sex workers prima facie as criminals, and imposes a total ban or restriction on 
their sexual life, the expression of their sexuality and the exercise of their occupation. As 
we have concluded that article 17 protects sex workers from discrimination on the basis 
of occupation, it follows that section 276(1) which seeks to curtail aspects of the 
expression of the sexuality and free exercise of occupation of sex workers, cannot be 
constitutional. 
 
B) THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SEX WORK: APPLYING THE D.I.E. FRAMEWORK 
 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that the legal regime in Ghana 
regarding sex work is one of partial prohibition, as it only criminalizes the supply side of 
the trade. Following from this discovery, it can also be further concluded that the 
provisions of Act 29 that partially prohibits sex work are at variance with certain 
fundamental constitutional dictates i.e. the right to dignity, individual autonomy and 
equality and non-discrimination. Thus, it is my position that the Constitution guarantees 
the rights of sex workers in Ghana; and consequently there is a right to sex work in 
contemporary Ghana. The strategy that must be adopted to make this right meaningful 
and officially acknowledged, in my opinion, is structured regulation as opposed to full 
legalization; and this will be discussed in the concluding chapter of the dissertation. 
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1. Guiding Principles on the Right to Sex Work 
The legal and regulatory framework that exists in Ghana today for the protection 
of sex workers is more receptive than it seems at first sight. Thus, the guiding principles 
in any formulation of the rights of sex workers generally, and the right to sex work in 
Ghana in particular, must be premised on the constitutional guarantees of human dignity, 
individual autonomy, liberty and freedom, and the equality, equal protection and non-
discrimination clauses of the 1992 Constitution. Collectively, they point to an inherent 
recognition and protection of the rights of all Ghanaians, regardless of their status or 
occupation. 
 
Hence, all laws that seek to control intimate human conduct and sexual morality 
for that matter must ensure human dignity, preserve the individual’s autonomy and 
liberty, and must not be discriminatory. Public policy demands of a multi-cultural and 
religious society like Ghana must not outweigh these three fundamental principles of 
human rights enshrined in the Ghanaian Constitution. In terms of construing the 
phenomenon of sex work, the D.I.E. framework can therefore be looked to as a rational 
means of making public policy, rather than the sole reliance on the religious and cultural 
conceptions of morality of the majority of the society, as has been the case since 
independence in Ghana. 
 
 To reiterate, the Dignity, Individual Autonomy and Equality (D.I.E.) framework 
for public policy making, which I have proposed in this dissertation are as follows: 
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1) All laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct must have at its core the 
objective of preserving and promoting the inherent dignity of the individual; 
 
2) The individual’s ability to act in an autonomous manner free from social coercion 
must be reflected in laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct; and 
 
3) All laws that seek to regulate intimate human conduct must have the quality of 
equality about it i.e. it should not criminalize particular groups of people because 
of personal choices that do not conform with societal standards. 
It is within the context of this framework that I believe the right of sex workers and the 
right to sex work can be guaranteed.  
 
2. Legal Formulation and Justification 
The inescapable conclusion that can be drawn from all the analysis of the law thus 
far is that, the continuous criminalization of consensual sex work under the Criminal 
Offences Act of Ghana, is an affront to the freedoms and liberties inherent in Ghana’s 
Constitution. Therefore, to the extent that section 276(1) of the Criminal Offences Act of 
Ghana prohibits sex work involving consenting adults, it is unconstitutional as it offends 
basic freedoms under Ghana’s Constitution. In particular, the provisions of Act 29 
regarding sex work does not preserve or promote the inherent dignity of sex workers; 
neither does it guarantee sex workers their autonomy and liberty; and finally, it does not 
ensure equality between all persons, as sex workers are treated in an unequal manner and 
discriminated against, as though they were a lower class of human beings. Enforced sex 
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work however, including control of sex workers by pimps, sex trafficking etc. fall outside 
the scope of the constitutional protections and guarantees, and as such must remain 
illegal. 																				
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout this dissertation I have tried to advance the position that laws that criminalize 
or seek to regulate intimate human conduct must have at its core certain fundamental 
values. These values, I argue, must be considered along side the usual public policy 
determinants of religion and culture in making laws that seek to restrict or prohibit 
specific human conduct usually through the prescription of penal consequences. The 
major recommendation that I propose as a result is not total decriminalization or full 
legalization of sex work, as this may not be achievable in the foreseeable future; but 
rather I propose the eventual regulation of sex work and the sex trade holistically through 
multi-faceted means. The reason for regulation is simple. I have already intimated that 
section 276(1) of Act 29 partially prohibits sex work and thus infringes on specific 
freedoms and liberties contained under Ghana’s Constitution. Thus, there must be a way 
of remedying this blatant unconstitutionality in a manner that does not necessarily offend 
the sensibilities of a majority of the Ghanaian population, since cultural and religious 
conceptions of morality will continue to dictate public policy. The only way to do this is 
by developing a regulatory regime or framework that takes into consideration the mood 
of the country, the rights of sex workers as well as public health, zoning demands, and 
other concerns. 
 
My proposal for the eventual regulation of sex work in Ghana, which is discussed 
in detail in this chapter, is what I term the gradual systematic approach to influencing 
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public policy. This approach is three-fold. Step One is the preparatory stage, which 
essentially provides the foundation for regulation by setting the agenda and creating 
public awareness. More specifically, it includes (1) the organization of stakeholders’ 
forums on law and morality; (2) the organization of nationwide/public forum(s) on 
morality, its various manifestations and its proper role in maintaining law and order; and 
(3) the provision of a platform for sex worker activism. Step Two is the formal proposals 
stage. This stage is a follow up to the preparatory stage, and as such will include the 
doing of one or all of the following: (1) drafting and presenting a formal proposal on the 
need for a Sexual Offences Act to the Law Reform Commission; (2) petitioning 
Parliament to amend specific provisions of the Criminal Offences Act; (3) advocating for 
the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into sexuality and sexual offences in 
Ghana; and (4) advocating for a sex workers’ regulatory body and regime. Finally, Step 
Three involves litigation as a last resort. 
 
I conclude the dissertation by discussing where and how theory can meet practice, 
in particular whether my D.I.E. framework for public policy making and the gradual 
systematic approach to influencing public policy I propose in this chapter can actually 
work. It is my belief however that, although my recommendations and approach may 
seem overly ambitious given the conservative nature of Ghana, if implemented in the 
right way and in the gradual and systematic manner I propose, it will help move public 
policy away from the era of sole reliance on religious and cultural conceptions of 
morality to a new phase of human rights appreciation and enforcement. Indeed, the aim 
of these recommendations is to lay the groundwork for dignity, autonomy and equality to 
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be at the heart of public policy and reflect in laws that seek to curtail intimate human 
conduct and behavior.  
        
A) RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Before I begin to elaborate on my proposals, it is instructive that I make reference 
to and briefly summarize some activities that have been undertaken in the past, which led 
to several recommendations in relation to sex work in Ghana. It has been documented, for 
instance, that since the 1970s, several attempts have been made towards addressing the 
issue of sex work in Ghana.725 As a matter of fact, it is on record that the Department of 
Social Welfare in Ghana undertook a series of studies regarding sex work in Ghana in the 
1970s, which led to the establishment of Women’s Vocational Centres in all the ten 
administrative regions of Ghana.726 As Pappoe puts it, ‘prostitutes were rounded up and 
sent to the Centres for training, but the programme was soon abandoned.’727 This was 
likely as a result of the fact that the allure of sex work, in particular the monetary reward 
therein far outweighed any money that such “rehabilitated” sex workers would make after 
learning a trade in these vocational centres. 
 
Another attempt at tackling sex work in the 1970’s was when religious 
organizations decided to take a stance. Thus, the Christian Council of Ghana’s women’s 
committee sent a resolution to the government of Ghana that demanded that firm and 
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concrete action be taken in relation to sex work in the country.728 Similarly, in the 1980s, 
the National Council on Women and Development (NCWD), an entity whose sole 
purpose was the elimination of sex work, which it identified as an affront to the 
integration of women in the developmental process, organized a three-day consultative 
meeting that led to various recommendations and proposals sent to the government.729 In 
all, eighteen proposals were recommended to the government of Ghana, for it to consider 
in curbing sex work in Ghana. 
 
Prominent among these recommendations were as follows: (1) that job 
opportunities should be made available to girls and women in general; (2) that women 
who engage in prostitution on any level should be penalized; (3) that the government 
should implement proposals of the Law Reform Commission on the law of intestate 
succession to alleviate the plight of widows and children; (4) that as a matter of urgency, 
the attention of churches and traditional institutions should be drawn to the high cost of 
marriage with a view to reducing such cost; (5) that the Ministry of Education should 
ensure that hobbies like basket weaving, smithing, backyard gardening and fish farming 
are introduced into school syllabuses so that young people can learn to spend their leisure 
time usefully in the future; and  (6) that since social evils emanate from poor economic 
situations, it was necessary that the economy be strengthened and job opportunities 
created for young people especially.730 
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It is doubtful that many of these recommendations saw the light of day, although 
the Intestate Succession Law was passed in 1985.731 The fact however remains that, many 
of the socio-economic conditions that were identified as factors that lead to young 
women engaging in sex work still exist today. Women still remain marginalized in terms 
of job opportunities, the economy has not improved dramatically, and vocational training 
and other alternative livelihood and rehabilitation programs have not achieved any 
meaningful results. Thus, the status quo of harsh economic realities remain, and as such 
sex work is a potent area of opportunity that many young girls and women consider so as 
to make ends meet to take care of themselves and sometimes their families as well. As a 
result, any discussion of sex work in Ghana must take into consideration the socio-
economic situation as well as the cultural context of the country. It is for these reasons 
that my recommendations for the eventual recognition of the rights of sex workers and 
the regulation of the industry as a whole, albeit ambitious and radical, are structured in 
various phases, with a view to gradually and systematically achieving progress. Below, I 
discuss the three stages in a chronological order. 
 
1. The Preparatory Stage 
As already noted, this first step/stage towards the eventual regulation of sex work 
in Ghana involves three separate but interrelated activities i.e. (1) the organization of 
stakeholders’ forums on law and morality; (2) the organization of nationwide/public 
forum(s) on morality, its various manifestations and its proper role in maintaining law 
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and order; and (3) the provision of a platform for sex worker activism. I will briefly 
provide an overview of all three activities, and their confluence points. 
 
i. Stakeholders Forum on law and morality 
The preparatory stage begins with a proposal for the organization of stakeholders’ 
forums. The idea behind this proposal is to bring to the policy/decision-making table a 
wide range of stakeholders within the criminal justice system like policy makers, law 
enforcement agents and legislators as well as from academia, civil society, traditional 
rulers, the clergy and religious organizations. The aim of this stakeholders’ forum is to 
discuss ways in which the State can effectively regulate intimate human conduct or 
behavior through the criminal law. Through these forums, dialogue on international best 
practices and the ways of dealing with issues like sex work can be discussed and 
deliberated upon in a congenial and a mutually respectful manner.  
  
Aside the regular stakeholders’ consultative sessions that will be core to this 
proposal, I also propose the organization of academic conferences on the theme of 
sexuality, morality and the law generally. This is one way of getting leading academics 
and advocates operating within the field of criminal law and justice to engage in rigorous 
academic discourse on the subject matter. As a matter of fact, my home institution, the 
School of Law at the Ghana Institute of Management & Public Administration (GIMPA) 
is a recognized leader in pushing the frontiers of the law with annual conferences, as well 
as monthly symposia on the law in Ghana generally. As such, I will propose and 
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spearhead the organization of a conference on law, morality and sexuality in Ghana to be 
held in the 2018/2019 academic year. 
 
The major aim of these forums will be to provide a platform for recommending 
public policy reforms to the appropriate authorities, in particular the Law Reform 
Commission of Ghana. Such a move is important and will be beneficial in the long term 
for the country as a whole. Having different stakeholder groups put forward their views 
and consolidating these will definitely influence the ultimate decisions that are taken by 
the decision makers, be it the Legislature and/or the Executive, in enacting legislation or 
taking decisions that are rational and reflect contemporary legal thought, philosophy and 
international best practice.  
 
It is envisaged that the conferences/seminars and stakeholders’ consultative 
sessions will therefore thoroughly discuss the role of religion and culture in public policy 
making. With specific reference to sex work, the economic situation of the country will 
be a key theme for discussion, as socio-economic factors are arguably the most important 
consideration for those who enter into the sex trade. Also, it is important that the 
discussions within these fora, tackle the issue of human trafficking, in particular sex 
trafficking and child trafficking. This will ensure that all the various facets of sex work in 
our contemporary world are considered, and distinguished for the purposes of effective 
regulation eventually. 	
ii. Consultative public assembly’s on law and morality 
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Following on the heels of the stakeholders’ forums, it will be important and 
prudent to organize a nationwide public forum(s) on the role of morality in the law 
making process. I therefore propose that these forums be held throughout the country, in 
the form of town hall meetings, for example, where ordinary people will have a platform 
for voicing out their opinions. The importance of these forums will be to thoroughly 
discuss the nature, scope and application of various conceptions of morality, and its 
influence on the laws we have, in particular the criminal law.  
 
More specifically, offences like engaging in sex work can de de-stigmatized 
through such forums where the core issues pushing some people into sex work can be 
dispassionately discussed on a wider scale. The fact that some people are making rational 
economic choices to engage in sex work and out of their own free will should not 
necessarily attract penal consequences. Rather, we as a society must find a way of 
addressing the core issues that leads to such decisions (like poverty), and also critically 
assess the role of religion and culture, especially their prescriptions of moral conduct and 
their effect on our criminal laws.  
 
If such public forums are held throughout the country, it is my belief that people 
will start appreciating the proper role of the State in terms of regulating ‘moral’ conduct. 
Human rights freedoms and guarantees can be discussed from many different 
perspectives, and be balanced against the legitimate interest of the State in regulating 
some aspects of intimate human conduct. Once there is this appreciation, public policy 
can be made not solely based on cultural and religious conceptions of morality, but also 
on rational principles, which all persons can relate to regardless of their opposition. I 
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believe that a nationwide forum(s) on law and morality is long overdue, and can be done 
if the right stakeholders are involved. Town hall style meetings can be organized in the 
various universities as well as on a nationwide basis in the regional capitals, for example. 
 
In addition, social media can be effectively used as a means of supplementing the 
nationwide forums. In contemporary times, a lot more people receive their news and 
other information through the various social media outlets like Facebook, twitter, 
instagram etc. Thus, it is imperative that we use social media platforms to sensitize 
Ghanaians about sexuality and the law generally, and the underlying factors that lead to 
engagement in sex work. Regular media engagements, through the use of the traditional 
media outlets, can also be an avenue of stimulating and generating public debate and 
discourse as well. 
 
iii. Creating a platform for sex worker activism  
Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) as well as other Civil 
Society Organizations (CSO’s) and other groups must also be encouraged to provide a 
platform for sex worker activism in Ghana. Given the conservative nature of Ghanaian 
society, and our proclivity to ‘judging’ people who come out as being engaged in what 
the broader society considers as morally questionable conduct, it is difficult to see a 
situation where sex workers themselves can actively organize to push for and fight for 
their rights. In actual fact, any attempt to register a non-profit entity for the sole purpose 
of advocating for sex worker rights may prove futile. However, already existing CSO’s 
	 290	
and NGO’s within the field of human rights and social protection can easily provide this 
platform, which can be done in so many ways.  
 
For example, activism in the form of sex workers’ health can ensure that the 
authorities take issues of that nature much more seriously. Education for sex workers in 
the form of outreach programs, can provide a safe space for some of these sex workers 
who can then be provided with the necessary knowledge regarding issues of healthcare 
like HIV Aids, as that is critical for their continued engagement in the trade. Sex workers 
can then be empowered to organize themselves so as to gradually make demands on the 
government, in terms of the recognition of their rights. Such grassroots organizing 
together with the stakeholders’ and nationwide public forums will put the plight of sex 
workers on the national agenda, and the government will be forced into action one way or 
the other.  
 
Such a platform, I believe is necessary in Ghana because the sex workers’ 
movement is taking seed in most parts of the continent, where active organizing is 
reaping dividends for the movement.732 Even though issues pertaining to sex are usually 
not publicly discussed in Ghana because of the discomfort it brings, the time is ripe for 
there to be an honest and open discussion about the plight and future of sex workers. The 
truth is that, regardless of the laws that exist, and even if the government decides to 
tighten these laws, sex workers will continue to exist as long as demand for their services 
exist. Since there is no way of cutting the demand chain of the equilibrium, concrete steps 
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need to be taken to ensure that the industry is not driven further underground, as that will 
have various consequences not just for the sex workers, but for the State as well. 
 
As a result, I propose the production of a television documentary on the plight of 
sex workers; similar to how documentaries have been produced in recent times that have 
highlighted the plight of remand prisoners in Ghanaian prisons, and pregnant women in 
the hospitals of Ghana. This is one of the surest ways of grabbing national attention, as 
such documentaries tend to shock society into action. Thus, sex workers can be 
interviewed to tell their story, in particular the underlying factors that got them into the 
sex trade. Experts, including academics and practitioners’ within the fields of criminal 
law and justice, as well as social scientists can also be interviewed to gain their 
perspectives on the issue. At the end of the day, the general viewing public will be left to 
decide on the way forward once such a documentary is produced and aired; as public 
interest in the matter will be generated. 
 
Ghanaian feminists should also be encouraged to take a stance in relation to sex 
workers and sex work as a whole. For example, the nexus between legitimate sex work 
(where women make rational economic choices) and domestic human/sex trafficking and 
child trafficking for the purposes of sex work must be debated and resolved. It is also 
proposed that empirical research be undertaken to appreciate the extent and proliferation 
of sex work and sex workers in Ghana. All of the aforementioned strategies 
(stakeholders’ forums & conferences, nationwide public forums and sex worker activism) 
if executed well, I believe, can lead to the creation of a social movement, that will be 
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armed with the arsenal needed to mount an assault on the status quo regarding sex work 
in Ghana and the rights of sex workers.        
             
2. The Formal Proposals Stage 
The second step/stage towards the eventual regulation of sex work in Ghana 
involves four separate, mutually exclusive or interconnected activities i.e. (1) the 
proposal for a Sexual Offences Act to be submitted to the Law Reform Commission of 
Ghana; (2) petition to Parliament to consider amending portions of Act 29; (3) petition to 
Parliament, the President and the Council of State to consider establishing a Commission 
of Inquiry into Sexuality and Sexual offences in Ghana; and (4) proposal for a sex 
workers’ regulatory body. I will also briefly provide an overview of all four activities, 
and their confluence points. 
 
i. Proposal for a Sexual Offences Act 
Here, the recommendations, outcomes and reports produced in the preparatory 
stage will now be formally organized into a concrete proposal to be submitted to the Law 
Reform Commission of Ghana. The Law Reform Commission is established by virtue of 
the Law Reform Commission Act, 2011 (Act 822). The main object of this Commission 
is to promote law reform in Ghana.733 For the purposes of this proposal, it is imperative 
that I set out the functions of this Commission in detail, to provide guidance on how my 
proposal falls within the mandate of the commission. Section 3 of Act 822, captioned 
‘Functions of the Commission’, provides as follows: 																																																								
733 Section 2 of Act 822. 
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To achieve the object, the Commission shall 
(a) receive, consider and make proposals for the initiation and reform of any law 
in the country; 
(b) prepare and submit through the Minister proposals for the examination of 
different aspects of the law including recommendations for the codification of 
legislation; 
(c) make practical proposals for the development, simplification and 
modernization of the law; 
(d) advise the Minister on policies for law reform; 
(e) undertake the examination of particular areas of the law and formulate 
proposals for reform after appropriate research; 
(f) provide advice and information to Ministries, Departments, Agencies and the 
private sector for the reform or amendment of a law; 
(g) obtain information on the legal systems of other countries that may facilitate 
the performance of its functions; and 
(h) perform any other functions that are ancillary to the object of the 
Commission.734 
 
It is evident from its functions that the Commission is mandated to receive proposals for 
reform on any aspect of the law in Ghana. Thus, a report containing proposals for reform 
of sexual offences should be produced taking into consideration the outcomes of the 
stakeholders’ consultative sessions, nationwide forums and the sex workers’ activism 
strategy. 																																																								
734 Section 3 of Act 822. 
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In this regard, I propose in addition to the report a draft Sexual Offences Act, 
which will consolidate the existing sexual offences in Act 29 into one separate Act. Thus, 
a thorough review of all the sexual offences must be undertaken to ensure that the 
proposal is sound, is backed by research and empirical data, and incorporates 
contemporary human rights norms into the conceptualization of sexual offences to 
guarantee its conformity with the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The lessons from the 
UDHR drafting process must guide this phase, simply because the UDHR and its 
subsequent popularity and general acceptance as customarily international law shows that 
it is possible to enact legislation that takes into account different conceptions of rights, 
regardless of conflict of moral values. At the worse, the Law Reform Commission will be 
forced to examine this proposal and make its recommendations to the Attorney General 
on whether or not to proceed with such reforms. 
 
ii. Proposal for the amendment of Act 29 
The Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) has undergone some changes since its 
enactment when Ghana attained Republican status in 1960. However, to ensure that the 
provisions regarding public morality, in particular that which has to do with sex work 
accords with contemporary human rights norms, it is imperative for a review of those 
infringing provisions. To this effect, I propose maintaining the prohibition of enforced 
sex work controlled by pimps and sex trafficking generally; however, the main provision 
of Act 29 that I believe must be amended or repealed is section 276(1). This provision 
makes it an offence to persistently solicit or importune in a public place or in sight of a 
public place for the purposes of sex work. 
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The difficulties associated with any rational implementation of section 276(1), 
including but not limited to the constant reports of police abuse of sex workers, makes it 
imperative for amendment. A weak law enforcement culture, and the lack of interest in 
enforcing such laws, coupled with the resources needed for implementation means that an 
amendment will be in order. For example, the law can be amended by the removal of its 
classification as a misdemeanour, which carries jail time. Such a move will accord with 
contemporary criminal justice thinking, where increasingly petty offences are not 
punished with incarceration – and sex work shouldn't even be an offence in the first 
place.  
 
In addition to the de-classification of sex work as a misdemeanour, the law can 
also be amended to specify the exact types of public places or spaces and times where 
persistent solicitation or importuning may be regarded as a public nuisance. It has already 
been pointed out that the night sex trade mainly takes place very late at night, outside the 
normal scope of public awareness, although the areas of operation remain public places. 
Thus, with the exception of law enforcement officials like the police that may be on 
patrol late at night, and those persons enjoying nightlife or engaged in other legitimate 
activities, as well as those making up the demand side of the sex trade equation, an 
overwhelming majority of the public is technically oblivious to the solicitations and 
importuning that occurs on specific streets (public places) at night.  
 
Hence, even though areas like Cantonments and some parts of East Legon (Lagos 
Avenue) for example, which are notorious for the sex trade at night, are all public places, 
the law can be amended to reflect the reality and fact that these prima facie public places 
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change character at night. Thus, sex workers may be prohibited from these same spaces 
during daytime (which is the de facto case anyway), but it makes no sense to restrict them 
from plying their trade there at night. The flip side to this argument is the idea that all 
forms of solicitation in public places regardless of the time of day should be prohibited 
i.e. the status quo must be maintained. I believe however that section 276(1) ought to be 
amended to reflect present day realities; and at the least, the misdemeanour tag should be 
removed as it serves no useful purpose to subject sex workers to incarceration as a 
punishment. Public zoning laws must however be considered in any case, as the local 
authorities in certain prime areas may want to avoid the tag of their areas being sex hubs. 
 
The proposal for amendment of Act 29 to be sent to Parliament and the individual 
Parliamentarians must therefore stress on the constitutional infringement on the rights to 
dignity, autonomy/liberty and equality, that continuous criminalization of sex work and 
other sexual offences portend. To ensure that our criminal laws do not advocate a 
particular religious or cultural dictate or prescription, the sexual offences in Act 29 must 
be thoroughly reviewed, and amended so as to bring our law in line with international 
best practice. 
 
iii. Proposal for the establishment of a Commission of Enquiry  
Under Ghana’s Constitution, specifically Article 278(1), the President can appoint 
a Commission of Enquiry into any matter of public interest if he is so satisfied, or if the 
Council of State advises him that it is in the public interest so to do, or if Parliament by a 
resolution requests that he appoints such a Commission into a matter of public 
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importance.735 In recent times, Commissions of Inquiries have been appointed into all 
kinds of public interest matters in Ghana including: allegations of corruption regarding 
the planning and execution of Ghana’s fiftieth independence celebrations; 736  a 
commission to inquire into the state of judgment debts granted by the courts;737 a 
commission on allegations of corruption surrounding Ghana’s participation in the 2014 
FIFA World Cup tournament in Brazil;738 a commission to inquire into the causes of a 
stadium stampede; 739  a Reconciliation Commission mandated to inquire into past 
atrocities committed by successive regimes in Ghana with a view to ensuring 
reconciliation;740 and a Commission of Inquiry into the Creation of New Regions.741 
 
It is therefore clear that once a matter garners enough attention to be deemed one 
of public interest, there is the likelihood that a Commission of Inquiry may be appointed 
to look into the issues at stake and make appropriate recommendations. It is for this 
reason that this particular proposal must be advocated for in the second stage of reform 
efforts, after the preparatory stage has been completed. Thus, by the time of submitting 
this petition, a social movement will have been formed in respect of the reformation of 
sexual offences generally, through the various social media campaigns as well as 
nationwide forums and stakeholders’ meetings. There will therefore be sufficient public 
interest in the matter to put pressure on the government to act. To ensure this, a petition 
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can be sent to the President, the Council of State and Parliament in accordance with 
article 278(1) of Ghana’s Constitution.  
 
iv. Proposal for a Sex Workers’ regulatory body 
The final recommendation in this stage, which is in line with my position of 
regulating the sex trade, is a proposal for the establishment of a sex workers’ regulatory 
body and regime to be submitted to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Gender & Social 
Protection. This is because, most sex workers in Ghana are female, and their plight in 
terms of the continuous criminalization of their trade and abuse of their rights is an 
indictment on the country’s human rights credentials. The proposed regulatory body, can 
therefore be established, either through an Act of Parliament, or through some other 
means to essentially attempt to control sex work in Ghana. As difficult and far-fetched as 
this may sound to many, that may be the best way of checking and bringing the sex trade 
into the realms of the law. 
 
As it stands now, despite the essential (partial) prohibition of sex work, it is a 
notorious fact that the trade is well and alive with little to no regulation whatsoever, and 
as such, pimps and other sex traffickers continue their nefarious activities. Hardly has any 
sex worker been fined or prosecuted for engaging in the trade; except the regular police 
extortion schemes already noted. Yet, a drive through some of the major areas of urban 
Accra after 10pm will reveal to the curious mind, a somewhat well organized, and active 
sex market. The only law that applies is that which is dispensed by police officers on 
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patrol, who are famously known for extracting sexual favours from sex workers to leave 
them alone, and/or extorting and sometimes abusing them. 
 
Thus, a proper legal and regulatory regime is needed to sanitize the sex trade one 
way or the other. Although many countries in the world continue to prohibit and/or 
restrict sex work by adopting various means, the sex trade hasn't been curbed in any part 
of the world. If anything, it has been driven further underground. Yet, examples exists in 
parts of the world where effective regulation has ensured a fairly sanitized trade – 
Amsterdam’s famous Red Light District being a prime example. As morally opprobrious 
as it may sound to many Ghanaian readers, regulating the sex trade in a manner like it 
pertains in the Netherlands, will lead to huge benefits for the country. 
 
First, there will be protection for the sex workers, as their trade will no longer be 
necessarily considered as illegal. Thus, access to healthcare and health facilities may be 
easier. The spread of veneral diseases like HIV Aids may be checked through intense safe 
sex education and easy access to healthcare. Similarly, sex workers who want to exit the 
trade can be guided to do so by the introduction of alternative livelihood programs, which 
admittedly have failed in the past. That notwithstanding, where there are formal 
structures in place with clear economic opportunities, it is possible that those desirous of 
leaving the sex trade for lack of any employable skills may finally be able to do so in 
their own time and at their own pace. 
 
Also, transforming this informal trade to a semi-formal one may reap some 
pecuniary benefits for the State, through licensing, fees and taxes. This will however be a 
	 300	
difficult task because of the largely informal structure of the Ghanaian economy 
generally, where even most small business owners pay no taxes whatsoever. Thus, it will 
be difficult for the central government to spread its tentacles to cover individuals who 
engage in the sex trade, no matter how organized it is. There will be a need to streamline 
the industry as far as it is possible, for this proposal to have a chance of working. 
 
Tourism may even be boosted as a result of regulation; but once again, this 
proposal will definitely be condemned as preposterous and highly immoral due to 
Ghana’s reputation as being a religious country. Thus, official sanction of what some 
view as an inherently immoral profession or trade, may face severe backlash. However, 
as I have advocated throughout this dissertation, I believe that it is about time that we 
take the religious dimension of morality out of the equation when deciding or making 
public policy. This will however be hard to do for obvious reasons; but at least it is a 
conversation that must be had, and will be had at some point in time now or in the near 
future.  
 
The regulatory regime that can be established for the purposes of regulating the 
sex trade can play a pivotal role in the overall development of the country. But this may 
be impossible to achieve in the short term. However, beginning the conversation through 
the stakeholders’ and nationwide public forums can be a start in this process. The 
important factor of which sight must not be lost is the interest and well being of sex 
workers. At the end of the day they are human beings, most of whom have made rational 
economic choices, and must be protected just like all other people, instead of 
criminalizing their conduct and line of work.  
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All the aforementioned proposals discussed in this stage can either be pursued 
separately, or alongside one another. The problem is that, it is possible that the Law 
Reform Commission will not take any proposals on the reformation of sexual offences 
serious enough to warrant a report being sent to the Attorney General for further action. 
Similarly, Parliament may not be amenable to amending the sexual offences contained in 
Act 29 since it may not be wise politically so to do for many of the Parliamentarians who 
have one eye on re-election, and whose constituents are religious persons who regard 
religious conceptions of morality as the overall determinant of public policy and law for 
that matter.  
 
Again, the petitions to the President, Parliament and the Council of State for the 
establishment of a Commission of Inquiry may also prove futile; although I believe that is 
probably the most promising of all the proposals in this stage, due to the public support 
and interest that would have been garnered at this point. However, the recommendation 
for a sex workers’ regulatory body may also not be successful. Thus, it is imperative that 
we carefully consider which of these strategies or combinations thereof have the highest 
likelihood of success and vigorously pursue it. 
 
3. Litigation as a Last Resort 
The final stage in the push for legal reform is the litigation stage. However, it is 
my proposal that litigation must only be pursued as a last resort. Thus, if the first two 
stages, as outlined above, fail to yield any positive outcomes, it may become necessary to 
bring an action in the Supreme Court. The Constitution provides that anyone can bring an 
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action in the Supreme Court if he or she is of the opinion that an enactment or anything 
contained therein is inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution.742 The only 
foreseeable problem with this strategy is navigating around the seemingly overlapping 
jurisdictional prescriptions of the Supreme Court and High Court of Ghana. This is 
because, even though the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in matters relating to 
the interpretation and enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution generally,743 the 
High Court has original jurisdiction, even to the exclusion of the Supreme Court, in 
matters relating to actual infringements or potential infringements on the fundamental 
human rights and freedoms contained in Chapter 5 of the Constitution.744 
 
It is my opinion that, if litigation becomes necessary, it may be wise to begin from 
the High Court, where it can be argued that provisions of the Criminal Offences Act 
relating to sexual offences in general, and sex work in particular, infringe on the 
fundamental human rights to dignity, autonomy/liberty and equality & non-
discrimination as enshrined in the Constitution. Thus, if the suit is unsuccessful at the 
High Court level, there will still be the possibility of appealing the decision to the Court 
of Appeal and subsequently to the Supreme Court. 
 
Litigation as a strategy of last resort has varying levels of success. Some 
advocates in equally conservative countries in Africa have been able to use this to bring 
about legal change in terms of sexuality generally. For example, recently in Botswana, 
the High Court for the first time held that by refusing to change the gender identity of a 																																																								
742 Article 2(1)(a) of the 1992 Constitution. 
743 Article 130(1)(a) of the 1992 Constitution. 
744 Article 33 of the 1992 Constitution.	
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man, who was born as a female but self identifies as a man, on his identity document, the 
National Registration Registrar of Botswana had violated several of his basic human 
rights.745 This was done even though the country is very religious, culturally conservative 
and still maintains strict laws prohibiting homosexuality. Therefore, legal change is 
possible through litigation, but probably as a last resort when public interest in such 
matters has been sufficiently garnered. 
       
B) CONCLUSION 
 
The D.I.E. framework for public policy making, which I have advocated for in 
this dissertation, is a theoretical framework that is not likely to be adopted in Ghana 
without much debate. The underlying objective of this framework is the advancement of 
the rights of vulnerable groups and persons like sex workers and sexual minorities. It 
focuses on protection and promotion of fundamental human rights in contemporary 
Africa. However, there is a new wave of human rights scholarship that suggests that too 
much focus on substantive human rights in our world today has systematically increased 
economic inequality.  
 
In his book entitled Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World,746 Samuel 
Moyn, for instance, explores why the rise and acceptance of human rights as our highest 
ideals has led to grave economic inequalities.747 He suggests that the twentieth century 
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wave of human rights that prevails today has led to an over-concentration on substantive 
human rights, especially civil and political rights, to the neglect of broader social and 
economic justice ideals.748 This criticism relates to my D.I.E. framework for public policy 
making because, focusing on ensuring the protection of the rights of sex workers per se, 
will not necessarily lead to the elimination of the major underlying factor that drives 
people into the trade in the first place i.e. economic hardship. 
 
Also, the human rights approach of my framework is likely to be criticized as 
being foreign to the cultural ideals of traditional Ghanaian society. Thus, the theory for 
reform is unlikely to receive much support on the ground initially because of the 
skepticism that human rights scholarship is greeted with in Africa generally, where 
certain sexual offences are concerned. Despite these criticisms and skepticism that is to 
be expected, we still need to find a middle ground from which to proceed in ensuring law 
reform because it is the right thing to do. How then do we achieve this?   
 
As already suggested, getting broad based support for reform through a new wave 
of social movement might be one of the surest ways of kick-starting the reform agenda. 
The reason is simple, social change and law reforms have a common denominator – the 
will of the people. So in addressing the issue of homosexuality and the rights of sexual 
minorities in Ghana, the President of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo recently stated as 
follows: 
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This is a social, cultural issue, I don’t believe that in Ghana so far, a sufficiently 
strong coalition has emerged which is having that impact on public opinion that 
will say “change it, let’s now have a new paradigm in Ghana.” At the moment, I 
don’t feel, I don’t see that in Ghana there is that strong current of opinion that is 
saying this is something we need to deal with. It is not so far a matter that is on 
the agenda … I grew up in England at the time that homosexuality was banned 
there. It was illegal and I lived in a period where British politicians thought it was 
an item not to even think about. But suddenly the activities of individuals and 
groups, a certain awareness, a certain development grew and grew stronger and it 
forced a change in law. I believe that those are the same processes that will bring 
about changes in our situation.749 
 
How then do we achieve a strong coalition that can impact public opinion and force a 
change in the law? I believe increased public awareness and sensitization regarding the 
irrationality of criminalizing sexual behaviour that does not conform to entrenched 
societal standards can be a start. 
 
It is for this reason that my proposals for change is structured in a gradual, 
systematic manner, so as not to appear overly radical from the onset. To reiterate, the first 
stage prepares the ground through public awareness drives, sensitization campaigns etc. 
Once the matter has garnered substantial public interest over a period of time, then formal 
proposals can be submitted to the authorities for law reform. If this second step is 																																																								
749  Naa Sakwaba Akwa, Legalizing homosexuality not on the agenda but…. – Akufo-Addo, 
https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2017/November-26th/legalizing-homosexuality-not-on-the-agenda-
akufo-addo.php. 
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unsuccessful, litigation can then be resorted to as a last resort. It is my considered opinion 
that such a strategy is the most appropriate in bringing about change in the law generally, 
but especially in respect of sexual offences involving the curtailment of the individual’s 
right to the legitimate expression of his or her sexuality, in particular. 
 
In conclusion, the proscription of legitimate sex work has no place in a 
contemporary democratic society where human rights and fundamental freedoms should 
underpin public policy and law. Criminalizing such intimate human conduct does not 
further any legitimate State interest, but rather perpetuates the religious and cultural 
morality prescriptions that have long dictated public policy and law. It also drives such 
activities further underground, and outside the remit and scope of any meaningful law 
enforcement measures. I strongly believe however that the time has come to hold such 
laws that seek to regulate intimate human behavior to higher standards. Thus, such laws 
must measure up to fundamental human rights including dignity, liberty & autonomy and 
equality. It is only when such a balancing act is done, that proper regulation can be 
achieved. 
 
The example of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which has 
generally achieved universal acceptance as the standard of human rights the world over 
should provide motivation for a rational public policy framework in regulating certain 
intimate human conduct. The fact that diverse groups of people were able to generally 
agree on fundamental rights and freedoms that should govern all persons the world over, 
despite their differences, proves that it is possible to achieve compromise on moral 
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standards. Thus, we must look to the example of the UDHR when coming up with public 
policy prescriptions that underpin laws, in particular the criminal law – where intimate 
human conduct involving sexuality is concerned. That is not to advocate a neglect of core 
moral principles that are sound for public policy making, but in addition we must 
emphasize on the respect for basic human rights as complementary and equally important 
principles in the decision making process. 
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